

DISSENT

VIETNAM

A symposium on policies and perspectives with Norman Thomas, Lewis Coser, Henry Pachter and David McReynolds

POVERTY

Michael Harrington (*The Other America*) in a full-scale study: "Can Poverty Be Abolished in the Welfare State?"

MAOISM

Benjamin Schwartz, leading authority on China, presents a careful profile of Maoist society

INTERVENTION

John Schrecker and Michael Walzer in a controversial study of U.S. as self-appointed policeman of the world

Plus

JOSEPH BUTTINGER on "Vietnam's Colonial Heritage"

STANLEY DIAMOND on "Black and White"

IRVING HOWE on "Stevenson: The Last, Sad Years"

DANIEL FRIEDENBERG on "Draper and Castroism"

MICHAEL RUSTIN on "Troubles of British Labor"

AUTUMN 1965

95c.

AMONG OUR CONTRIBUTORS

Henry Pachter's (Henri Rabasseire) book on the Spanish Civil War, originally published in French, has been revised for a Spanish edition, *Espana Crisol Politico*, shortly to be issued by Proyeccion Buenos Aires. . . . David McReynolds is Field Secretary of the War Resisters League and prominently associated with the Socialist party. . . . John Schrecker is instructor of Chinese history at Princeton; his special field is the modern period and he is currently working on a study of Sino-German relations in the late 19th century. . . . Benjamin Schwartz is Professor of History and Government at Harvard and the author of *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao* and *In Search of Wealth and Power: Yen Fu and the West*. . . . Michael Rustin is lecturer in sociology of West Ham College of Technology (London) and is an editor of the socialist journal *Views*. . . . Lee Kuan Yew is Prime Minister of Singapore. . . . Carl Oglesby is the newly elected president of Students for a Democratic Society. . . . Otis L. Graham teaches history at George Washington; this is his second appearance in *DISSENT*. . . . David T. Bazelon (*The Paper Economy*) is finishing a book on politics on which he has been working for several years; he will teach a seminar in corporations at Rutgers this fall. . . . Arthur I. Waskow is the author of *From Race Riot to Sit-ins, 1919 and 1960's*, to be published by Doubleday this January. . . . Murray Hausknecht teaches sociology at Hunter College. . . . Abraham Asher is Associate Professor of History at Brooklyn College; he has written for *Survey*, *Political Science Quarterly* and other journals. . . . Philip Green teaches government at Smith College; his articles have appeared in *DISSENT*, *Commentary*, *New Republic*. . . . August Meier, professor of history at Roosevelt University, is author of the coming *Negro Protest Thought in 20th Century* (Bobbs-Merrill).

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DISSENT

VOLUME XII

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A QUARTERLY OF
SOCIALIST OPINION

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AMONG OURSELVES

The manuscript for *The Radical Papers*—a collection of political and social essays by DISSENT writers and friends—was delivered to the publisher this September. Plans are for the book to appear in hard-cover in March 1966 and in paperback about a half year later. The book, which deals mostly with domestic social and economic problems, though it also has sections on socialist theory and international affairs, contains essays by Michael Harrington, George Lichtheim, Harold Rosenberg, Paul Goodman, Bayard Rustin, Tom Kahn, Irving Howe, Ben Seligman, and many others. It will come to approximately 350 pages. In our next issue we will have a full-scale announcement.

That job accomplished, we are now thinking of a companion volume concentrating mostly on foreign policy and international politics.

We are happy to announce that the last issue, containing Irving Howe's "New Styles in 'Leftism,'" has sold out virtually completely. A few copies may yet be returned from newsstands but as we go to press we are out of the issue entirely.

Books, and important ones, by DISSENT editors, continue to roll off the presses. Michael Harrington's *The Accidental Century*, an analysis of twentieth-century politics and culture, has appeared during the last few months. Due for publication in the fall is a scholarly study by Michael Walzer, *The*

Revolution of the Saints, an analysis of the English Puritan revolution. It is our policy not to review the books of editors, but we think many of our reader will want to look into these.

Among books by our contributors, Claude Brown's *Manchild in the Promised Land* has been received with extraordinary acclaim and is already beginning to climb on the best seller lists. Readers will recall his "Harlem, My Harlem," from which the book developed, in our special New York issue.

Two interesting pamphlets have come to the office. One is "To Build a New World" by Thomas R. Brooks, published by the League for Industrial Democracy, 112 East 19St., New York City (35¢). This pamphlet is a popular history, in abbreviated form, of the American labor movement, and is addressed especially to young people. It may be exactly the thing for those readers who would like their children to know something about the labor and radical past in the U.S., a past the schools largely neglect. The other pamphlet is called "Dominican Republic, a study in the new imperialism," published by the Institute for International Labor Research, 113 East 37 St., N.Y.C. 16 (25¢). This pamphlet brings together valuable material analyzing and criticizing U.S. policy in the Dominican Republic. It includes the study by Theodore Draper which was sent out to DISSENT readers a few

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COMMENTS AND OPINIONS

Vietnam and the Left: a symposium

The discussion we propose here is confined to those who are critical of current U.S. policy in Vietnam. Apart from urgent expressions of anxiety as to the dangers of an escalated war and equally urgent condemnations of terror bombings and destruction of entire villages in Vietnam—matters upon which we surely all agree—there follows the question: what course of action should the American left now advocate in regard to Vietnam? We have therefore worked up some questions, as specific as we could make them, which we hope may guide, though they should not constrict, your comments.

1) Do you favor immediate withdrawal by the U.S. of its military forces from Vietnam? Since it seems most unlikely that such a policy will in fact be adopted by the U.S. government, do you believe that this should nevertheless be the central focus of public protest? Assuming, however, that such a course were accepted by the U.S., what do you see as the likely consequence in regard to Vietnam itself, Southeast Asia and international politics?

2) If you do not favor immediate withdrawal, what proposals would you advance for a U.S. policy directed toward enabling negotiations in Vietnam? In what specific ways would your proposals be differentiated from those of the Johnson Administration, which claims also to be in favor of negotiations?

3) Let us now assume that the proposals advanced under question 2 were to be accepted and acted upon by the U.S. government. Let us further assume that Hanoi, Peking and the Vietcong, one or all, refused to negotiate with the U.S. What course of action would you then favor? Withdrawal? (If so, why not favor it now?) A holding action of some sort in Vietnam until negotiations were possible? (If so, might that not mean agreement with the current policy of military build-up as a way of making such a holding-action possible?)

4) The protest against U.S. action in Vietnam raises some complex issues concerning democratic politics which, so far as we know, not many of those actively engaged in protest have seriously considered. The majority of the people seem to favor a bad policy, and this raises a conflict between the democratic idea as the will of the majority and the democratic idea as the embodiment of certain values. Specifically: in the present circumstances do you favor civil disobedience as a means of protest? What is your view concerning efforts to persuade young people not to serve in the army? If, as seems likely, such action would alienate the Vietnam protest movement from the mass of the population, how can it be combined with an effort to convince large numbers of Americans that our Vietnam policy is wrong? Or does a resort to civil disobedience signify a tacit assumption that it is now impossible to affect large sections of the population on the subject of Vietnam?

I think all opponents of our war in Vietnam, and certainly the Left, should take what seems to me the most promising and reasonable line:

Put every conceivable and possible effective pressure on the President to get him to implement his repeated desire for unconditional negotiations by dramatically calling for a cease-fire and an end to further outside aid, supervised by neutral nations, as a prelude to immediate negotiations in which the National Liberation Front should be recognized as a principal negotiator, not a tail to North Vietnam's kite. He should make it clear that we will withdraw all our military on the completion of negotiations reasonably satisfactory to the Vietnamese people and with strong guarantees against massacres of revenge. In general there should be a return to the Geneva line of 1954 which called for neutralization, plus offers of American economic aid.

This is the best and most likely line for withdrawal. It meets as far as is right our commitments to our present Vietnamese allies. It is based on our concern for peace in itself and as a condition of growth of any sort of real freedom. It would give the U.S. a position in the eyes of world opinion and probably that of the great majority of Vietnamese, sick of war and atrocities on both sides, which the Communists could not ignore.

In the unlikely event that the Vietnamese Communists, North and South, should refuse this, I should still insist on withdrawal under some formula which I think the situation would en-

able us to find, but I shouldn't expect the President to say this now.

In our mixed-up world, I should not denounce any sincere effort for peace, but I think that at this time protests involving nonviolent, dramatic civil disobedience may do our cause more harm than good with the public as well as the President. Time, events, the clear failure of the plan I advocate might change my mind.

I myself, if I know myself, would refuse to fight in Vietnam whatever it might cost me. But conscientious objection to all war or to a particular war in our imperfect democracy is so grave and personal a matter that I have never urged it on our young men, especially since I am not myself subject to the draft.

In general, civil disobedience in a democracy, especially at a time when there is so much lawlessness, is to be justified only in situations justifying revolutionary action, in which case it may be not only ethically but practically preferable to violence. It is not a virtue *per se*. (I am referring now to clear-cut and acknowledged civil disobedience, not the breaking of some local law or police ordinance in itself believed to be unconstitutional. Very few civil rights demonstrations have involved genuine civil disobedience. The riots have been riots, not examples of civil disobedience, violent or non-violent, except as clearly provoked by the aggression of police, Klansmen and the like.)

I think each case of civil disobedience in the service of a cause must be judged on its merits: Is the end to

which it is directed so important as to warrant it? Is it likely to serve the end? There was one of the great Gandhi's hunger strikes—that over the representation of outcastes—that didn't seem to me to meet these tests even in the India of his day. To use suicide by hunger to defeat the passage of a law is a form of undemocratic coercion. I have said that I would be a conscientious objector to fighting in Vietnam but I don't think I have an equal right of control over my own property in our modern democratic state. One shouldn't pick and choose the taxes he will pay. It is an example that too many people might follow

for the wrong reasons. A wholesale strike against an identifiable and particularly iniquitous tax might be another matter. If one has any property the government can collect its tax anyway.

To get back to Vietnam, my concern is for the most likely way to stop the war. I am interested in peace, not in the victory of Vietcong, as are some of the "New Left." I know that we who have had so disastrous and stupid a Chinese policy can conquer neither China nor Communism in Southeast China by force of arms. Democracy's hope is in the realm of ideas and performance.

Henry Pachter

I assume each of the respondents will begin by rejecting your condition—to discuss the Vietnam war "apart from urgent expressions of anxiety . . . and indignation." That would be like talking about hell without fire. The conduct of this war is inseparable from its causes and consequences; it has become so cruel and now shows so many symptoms of a colonial war, that the nature of the war itself determines my conclusions as to its likely outcome and the necessary adjustments on the part of the United States. I would support a policy designed to save South Vietnam; but if that policy can be carried out only by terrorism, brutality and wanton murder of children, then it apparently defeats its purpose. We have only to think back to the Algerian war. As soon as the atrocities became known

and as soon as the military admitted they could not win without such atrocities, the colonial war turned into a civil war, and eventually even de Gaulle decided that France must withdraw.

Something very similar is happening to the United States in the Vietnam war. The question no longer is one of winning or losing, or of carrying out a policy, but of the price to be paid. It is conceivable that a government threatens escalation in order to reach its policy aim. The temptation to do so is very great if, as in the present case, the U.S. government could easily increase the pressure beyond the point where its enemies must give up. But the U.S. government failed to reckon with the kind of escalation which it cannot, but its enemies can, increase to the breaking point—

namely terrorism, torture, fanaticism, the deliberate holding of entire populations as hostages. Are we to compete with the Vietcong in this race? All reports indicate that our boys cannot take that kind of warfare.

The price is too high, not in the estimation of this or that U.S. citizen, but objectively, on the premises of this country's structure. By the criterion of success or failure, a policy leading to such a choice is erroneous, nay disastrous. Here again I must reject the question which has been put to me: we don't have the choice between an agreeable and a disagreeable policy. We just have to admit that we are beaten or are likely to be beaten, if not now then a few years from now. Such a military disaster, on top of the political disaster, would make things even worse for the U.S., and it might therefore be the part of wisdom to withdraw.

Am I advocating defeatism? I simply mean: we must admit defeat. I do not mean to say that withdrawing from Vietnam means a great victory for the U.S. or the start of a new lease on U.S. policies in South East Asia. In contrast to the breast-beating, conscience-ridden Liberals, I don't think that one gets credit for ethical behavior in foreign policy. I think that withdrawal will be an unmitigated disaster. It will make the defense of Thailand, Burma and India impossible; these countries will not even wish to be defended by a nation which has failed. Withdrawal from Vietnam will jeopardize also the U.S. position in Berlin and may in fact kill what remains of NATO. It certainly will increase neutralism in Germany, and

thus deprive the U.S. government of its only ally.

Though after the foregoing I don't have to answer your second question, I am thankful for it. It seems to me that none of the Administration's critics has advanced a program or line of procedure that offers an alternative to withdrawal or escalation. The Vietcong are winning, and as long as they feel they can win, they will not be brought to the conference table. Even supposing that they are dependent upon the Hanoi government (which is not necessarily the case)—what reason should either of them have to let the U.S. off cheaply and honorably? Their theory has been that it is necessary and possible to humiliate the U.S. and with it all colonialists. Those who have spoken of "Titoism" in Hanoi, have not offered a single proof that anyone there wishes to negotiate with the U.S. on anything but a U.S. withdrawal or wishes to be bribed by Johnson's generous offer of a Mekong Valley Plan. Their aim is political, not economic, and those who think in terms of an accommodation have forgotten the history of Soviet relations with the West. Unless one can fight the Communists to a standstill, which does not seem possible in the present case, he cannot hope to contain them with economic aid.

Question 3: I would be in favor of a saving our few friends through a holding operation and even of military build-up if there were any chance of success. Possibly the government is in possession of information which is not accessible to me, and therefore has come to a different conclusion. The question arises: how much confidence

should we have that the government knows what it is talking about and what it is leading us into? I am not sure that this question must always and automatically be answered in the negative, but neither am I sure that we can be confident. The teach-ins have not taught me anything except that the professionals who give advice to the government use the same information as those who wish to be the government's advisers. The latter, by the way, when pressed hard for an answer, have been forced to declare that they have none. Particularly Mr. Morgenthau caved in when asked: What if the Vietcong don't wish to negotiate?

Your question 4 therefore is well put: what kind of pressure shall we bring to bear upon the government to change its policy? I would not be satisfied with the argument that "the majority" apparently supports the government. The majority may change in either direction: it may ask the Administration to use all available means to "win the war," as it did in the Korean war; or it may ask the Administration to make peace. An effort to influence public opinion could not neglect the means of direct action and of civil disobedience—provided these were successful and are related to the present question. I don't think the present demonstrations are of this type; all they do is to advertise the impotence of a non-existent peace movement. The pickets achieve the masochistic aim of getting arrested but fail to become heroes of a new movement. The kind of demonstration that is merely a disturbance of traffic or of public order not only alienates the majority (which is not necessarily a wrong) but is manifestly misdirected.

One may wish to prevent the functioning of organized society when and if one is dealing with a truly revolutionary situation. But it is plain as day that the U.S. is not at the point of revolution and that U.S. citizens are not prepared to overthrow the system in order to prevent the war in Vietnam. Nor do they think this is necessary. There are a few would-be Lenins among us who would use the present conflict to change the system. They choose not to see the difference between changing a policy and changing the system. The Vietnam war is plainly not due to a crisis of the system but on the contrary, seems to have its origin in external factors which really are a disturbance of the system. We must believe that the Administration is inconvenienced by the war in Vietnam; all its plans are stalled, and it finds itself in an impasse out of which we must help it to retreat. To make the question of withdrawal a question of the American system means to defeat the purpose of peace.

It follows that you ought to have asked a fifth question: if our action is not meant to "bear witness," then what other advice can we give the Administration? Basically, it does not look like a bad idea to try to reach the Vietcong via Moscow, but Moscow's influence in that area seems to weaken. The only other way left, therefore, is Peking. Despite the rather belligerent noises which have come from Mao's lieutenants recently, these very protestations seem to indicate to me that China is waiting for an overture. The Administration seems to think it possible to "differentiate" between Peking, Hanoi, and the National Liberation

Front in South Vietnam. Much as I welcome the news that for once we do differentiate, I still feel that no question in Southeast Asia can be solved without China's consent. Though China wishes to humiliate the U.S., she also wishes to deal with us. I am convinced that the war in Vietnam

can be settled by a package deal with China and that the role of pacifists at this juncture may be to prepare the American public for the changes of attitude which are necessary lest the U.S. gets entangled in a series of jungle wars which will be increasingly difficult and increasingly unpopular.

David McReynolds

1. Yes, it is imperative that we urge immediate withdrawals of U.S. troops and military forces from South Vietnam—while keeping in mind that with so large a force “immediate withdrawal” will require weeks or months even if begun at once. Unlikely though it is that the U.S. government will follow this course, it is imperative for the independent radical to urge it, if only because it helps to pressure the government from further expanding this war. When a radical, confronted by profound political immorality, limits his appeals and suggestions to those steps the government is going to take anyway, or is likely to take, the radical movement has lost its moral basis for existence and has also lost the intellectual basis which marks it off from liberal and conservative positions. If we cannot speak with the voice of of conscience, that voice will be silenced in our society. The radical is first of all a man of conscience and only second a political animal. There was little chance Russia would heed our appeals to end its brutal action in Hungary in 1956 but that would hard-

ly have excused or justified our urging upon the Russians some more “reasonable” course than her simple withdrawal.

Obviously those who favor withdrawal, a position held by most of us in the Socialist party and in the pacifist movement, are not opposed to the U.S. government declaring a cease-fire and negotiating. We would support any steps that will lead us closer to the position we urge: withdrawal.

I have no doubt whatever that a U.S. withdrawal in Vietnam will mark the beginning of a general U.S. withdrawal from all of Asia. I think “Vietcong” type of insurrections will begin in Thailand and possibly also in Cambodia and Malaysia. I think a Peking-Jakarta axis will dominate Asia, with India and Japan seeking to contain China and Indonesia. Given the force of nationalist sentiment in Asia, they may succeed where we have failed.

I very much wish matters were otherwise. I am not happy to think of China and Indonesia setting a pattern of “Asian socialism.” I am after all a Westerner. I believe that the best of our traditions have universal mer-

it and I deeply regret that these traditions will not, for the moment, have a real impact on Asia. (I am referring to the traditions from Moses through Christ to Bernard Shaw and Gene Debs—not to the strain of fanaticism that encompasses St. Paul and Lenin, nor the mechanistic views of a Henry Ford. It is disturbing to me—and I think it would have been disturbing to Marx himself, who was rooted in the humanist traditions of the West—to realize that all that the East may take from us just now is “Marxism” and machine tools.)

But the West has had its chance. We cannot prevent “Asia from going Asian” without in the process destroying it altogether. We have already lost most of our friends in the course of defending them. Had matters taken a different turn some decades ago, there might now be viable democratic alternatives for those Asian states that move toward totalitarian solutions. Had the French and German socialists brought down their national governments in World War I, rather than being “responsible” and killing one another; had a socialist West ended colonialism a generation ago; had a revolutionized West set for Asia the example of a truly revolutionary and yet profoundly democratic socialist movement; had all those things happened, the present would offer less dreadful alternatives. But not even a President from Texas can remake the history of the past fifty years. We cannot now police Asia. We can destroy it or we can withdraw from it while there is still time.

2. Question two must be dealt with by my friends who answered “no” to the first question.

3. Question three is also not directed to those who share my position, but I would comment that if the first question posed very real problems for those of us in the Socialist party and in the pacifist movement, the third question is equally rough on those who pride themselves on being hard political realists. Peking has little to lose and much to gain from keeping the U.S. involved in South Vietnam. Peking knows that every day we remain in South Vietnam we undermine further our moral and political standing throughout Asia—and Peking has, I think, as little regard for human lives as does Robert McNamara. Both sides are willing to use Vietnamese as pawns. Thus Peking is unlikely to be reasonable. Russia dares not be too reasonable, for fear of losing ground to the Chinese in the world Communist debate. Hanoi has less control over the National Liberation Front than most of us realize, and is probably not in a position to negotiate a settlement if she wanted to. She probably does want a settlement—but the bombing of North Vietnam has placed new and serious blocks in the way of any initiative from Hanoi. It is the NLF, finally, which must negotiate. And they are unlikely to negotiate while they are winning. Thus far we have refused to negotiate with NLF anyway and if the tide of battle turns in our favor we are likely to lose interest in negotiation (if, indeed, we are really interested now, which I doubt). Nixon’s recent statements about the need for total victory gives a warning that any American victories in Vietnam will only spur on those Republicans (Nixon chief among them) who are

only too willing to trade blood for votes. Particularly if the blood they are trading is not their own.

Thus the prospect for negotiations is poor, given the unbending positions of both the Vietnamese and the Americans. There is another problem to be noted. It is now quite impossible to take anything Johnson says at face value. The Administration has lied (I use the word "lie" in its very strict and literal sense—not as an act of political rhetoric) to us so massively and so frequently that it will be terribly hard to know when the Administration really wants negotiations and when it doesn't. Readers of *DISSENT* are surely aware that in the area of foreign policy the Johnson Administration is now entirely lacking in credibility.

4. The fourth question requires more space than we have here. First, it is doubtful if the "majority of the people seem to favor a bad policy"—opinion polls differ on this, depending on how the questions are worded and what week they are asked. My guess is that most Americans will "support" whatever Johnson does abroad as long as they can get Medicare, Voting Rights, and changes in Taft-Hartley. But I also think most Americans are willing to see the U.S. get out of Vietnam and are rather prepared for that.

But there is a new problem in contemporary society where, the teach-ins aside, the mass of the public can so easily have its opinion moulded on issues that are distant from their immediate lives. Madison Avenue cannot make Harlem Negroes love Jewish slumlords, nor can Madison Avenue persuade middle-class whites that in-

tegration of slum Negro children into their schools is a good thing. In both cases there are certain concrete facts involved, facts that press against people daily, and it is the facts one must deal with in order to change minds. But when the issue is distant, when the public is not directly affected one way or another, it is astonishingly easy for the "establishment" to displace the object of hatred, and to shift that object from one nation to another. (Without an external object of hatred it is doubtful if most modern societies, either capitalist or communist, could survive their own internal tensions.) Yesterday we hated Russians. Today we hate Chinese and most Americans seem to believe we are fighting Chinese troops in Vietnam—something not even Dean Rusk has yet alleged, expert as he has proven at the manufacture of facts. I question whether in a situation like Vietnam, where the government lies so openly and where so many people are desperately eager for an "approved target of hate," one can talk about "democratic politics" with any real sense at all. This is a very serious and profound problem for those like myself who are committed to democratic values. What, for example, are we to make out of a situation like the Dominican fiasco, where between 80% and 90% of all serious Latin American experts opposed the Johnson intervention, and where reporters on the scene were sending back daily reports flatly contradicting Administration statements, and where it was still possible for Johnson to register about 90% public support in opinion polls? How is democracy to operate when the mass of people simply ignore the

printed facts, and when, through his automatic command of TV time, the President can transmit his own hysteria as if it were the truth?

On the matter of the draft, I obviously support and encourage resistance to the draft. In fact, confronted by an evil as monstrous as the American involvement in Vietnam, I support, almost literally, every form of opposition. In speaking in various parts of the country on the Vietnam issue I have invariably called on men of draft age to refuse military service, and have urged men now in the armed forces to apply for immediate discharge. I would hope that such absolute opposition to the Johnson Administration could be carried out with a spirit of decency and integrity such as would prevent our being alienated from the general public. (There has been, in some parts of the Vietnam Protest movement, a strident and shrill tone, a willingness to make the Vietcong our special heroes. Somehow it is typically American of the young "anti-Americans" of the New Left—and some of their older leaders who ought to know better—that they are simply not able to oppose the almost absolute evil of U.S. policy in Vietnam without in the bargain seeking to locate some absolute good to sup-

port. The American spirit is quite alien to the concept of existential and heroic action on the basis of ambiguity.)

But even if the public is alienated, we must speak. Even if we are jailed, we must speak. And if we must finally speak from prison—God forbid—it may be that only then will our voices have the power to be heard; only then will we be believed when we cry out as we must that those who conduct the war in Vietnam are war criminals. I may deplore the shrill anti-Americanism of some of the students, but I prefer that by far to the silence of a part of the old and democratic left. It is a silence so loud it can be heard. I do not attack the U.S. government because I am un-American but because it is the government itself that now violates every human value I was taught not only in the socialist movement, but in the public schools of this nation. We voted for Johnson. We got Goldwater. We spoke for peace. We endure war. We have been betrayed—a betrayal that compromised the whole democratic process.

Thoreau put it best when he said, regarding civil disobedience, that the good citizen is the one who upholds the moral law when the government is violating it.

Lewis Coser

Though I feel that the U.S. will have to withdraw all of its military forces from Vietnam if this disastrous chapter in our history is finally to be closed, I do not favor

"immediate withdrawal." There are no major political forces in the U.S. which would conceivably support such a proposal and hence it has no chance of being implemented. I do not think that

radicals should proffer policies which do no good to anybody and only serve to gratify their own conscience.

One of the decisive mistakes of current American policy, perhaps the decisive mistake, has been to assume that there is an identity of interests between the Vietcong, Hanoi and Peking. Realistic policy must articulate the differences among these three powers; instead we have helped to fuse them together by assuming that they respond to the same motives and interests. By neglecting to take advantage of the differences among them, we have impeded a settlement by negotiations.

Concretely, we have so far refused to negotiate directly with the Vietcong under the pretense that they are "directed" by Hanoi and hence not an independent factor. This is folly. Just as de Gaulle finally realized that only direct negotiation with the Algerians would bring results, so we must realize that only negotiations with the Vietcong can bring the war to an end. I am aware that the control of Hanoi and Peking over the Vietcong is probably stronger than any controls Nasser or anybody else exercised over the Algerians. Nevertheless, I believe that they are by no means subservient tools. There are a number of indications that there are policy differences and frictions between the Vietcong and the North. By refusing to recognize them as a valid force in negotiations, we drive the Vietcong further into the arms of Hanoi and Peking. Similarly, by refusing to see in Hanoi anything but an annex of Peking we neglect the chance to exploit long-standing antagonisms between the two. American foreign policy planners have verbally accepted that we now live in a world

of polycentric communism, but they still neglect to draw serious policy consequences from this fact.

I take it to be axiomatic that the bulk of the population of the South either supports the Vietcong or is, at least, hostile and indifferent to the Saigon "government." Hence the war cannot be won, except, as Hans Morgenthau has recently written "by the indiscriminate killing of everybody in sight, that is, by genocide." This being the case, there is no other decent way of ending the war than ultimate withdrawal.

We no longer have the option of hoping to install a regime which is "neutral" in our favor; the best we can hope for is a regime which is "neutral" though in fundamental ways nearer to Peking and/or Moscow than to the West. Our policy ought hence to be directed at assuring as far as possible that a federated and, later on, reunited Vietnam maintains a modicum of independence from Peking and Moscow—possibly by having the ability to maneuver between the two.

I cannot imagine a situation in which either the Vietcong or Hanoi would refuse in principle to negotiate—the matter is different with respect to Peking which might well be eager to let the war go on indefinitely. I think that the men leading the Vietcong and the North are basically rational, they are not interested in a Hitlerian *Goetterdämmerung*. They will negotiate when the preconditions for such negotiations seem worthwhile to them. They do not enjoy the prospect of seeing their populations and productive capacities destroyed; they do not wish to preside over a waste-

land. I therefore believe that they would be amenable to a settlement which provided for neutralization, phased American withdrawal of troops and weaponry, and major international aid, perhaps under U.N. auspices, for the rebuilding of the devastated country.

I have admiration for those who advocate a politics of conscience and favor civil disobedience, but I cannot agree with them. The absolutist ethics of these men seem to me to provide no hold when it comes to specifically political issues. In politics only a Weberian ethics of responsibility, a politics which is concerned with weighing con-

sequences and assessing concrete results, seems applicable. Total separation between the ethical and the political sphere leads to nihilistic *Realpolitik*—but to subsume the political under the ethical leads to political futility.

Current American policy in Vietnam is not only criminal, it is stupid. To get out of the seeming impasse into which Washington has maneuvered us requires disciplined intelligence as well as moral fervor. Hence the writings of Walter Lippmann and Hans Morgenthau as well as those of A. J. Muste provide required guidelines for sane conduct.

Joseph Buttinger

Notes on the Colonial Heritage in Vietnam

The following statement was submitted as background material for the informal hearings held in New York City this past August by Congressman William F. Ryan on the Vietnam crisis. The author is at present completing a history of Vietnam, of which the first volume, The Smaller Dragon, has already been published.—EDITORS.

The heritage of colonialism in Vietnam is Communism. The strength of the Communist party of Vietnam is a unique phenomenon in the developing world. Vietnam was the only country where a Communist-led government was established at the end of World War II without the kind of outside help the Red Army gave to the Communist parties of Eastern Europe.

From this follows a still unrecognized and therefore startling truth:

The loss of Vietnam to Communism occurred in 1945. All the fighting that has been going on there for the last twenty years has aimed at reversing this historical fact.

There is no evidence at all for an innate disposition of the Vietnamese people to favor Communist ideas. Communist strength is the result of historical conditions—economic, social, and political conditions peculiar to Vietnam and created by the colonial regime.

Colonial Vietnam had only a small industrial labor force. The social basis of Communist strength was the rural masses constituting 85 per cent of the population. They were not land-owning peasants interested in maintaining their status and therefore politically conservative. By creating, particularly in South Vietnam, a system of feudal landholdings, the colonial regime had gradually destroyed the traditional class of land-owning peasants. Colonialism transformed the rural masses into agricultural laborers, landless peasants working as tenants for landlords, and poor peasants without sufficient land. All were ruthlessly exploited by the landlords, the moneylenders, and the taxation policy of the colonial regime. Landrents robbed the tenant of up to fifty per cent of his crop. Of the price at which rice was sold by the Saigon exporters, the peasant's share was 12%. Any movement that promised these people an end to their inhuman conditions of existence was bound to gain their support. For reasons also peculiar to Vietnam, this was done only by the Communists.

Another cause of Communist strength was the conditions of existence which the colonial regime created for the country's educated elite. In Vietnam, education had always been not only the primary source of prestige but also a road to power. Under the colonial regime, the elite of the nation was deprived both prestige and power. Thousands of young Vietnamese, mostly sons of landlords and mandarins, received a higher education, but were not given an opportunity to apply their knowledge and skills. No opportunities existed for them in business,

commerce or industry, activities virtually closed to the Vietnamese. The modern sectors of the economy, as far as they existed, were in French and Chinese hands. A small number of intellectuals were allowed to enter the colonial administration, but under conditions materially unsatisfactory and morally degrading. Others worked as teachers, journalists, lawyers and doctors, but many remained unemployed, and all were deeply frustrated because the colonial regime deprived also them of any kind of political voice. Ninety per cent of the prominent Viet Minh leaders came from this class of people.

Colonial Vietnam never developed a middle class in the Anglo-Saxon sense, a class of property-owning natives opposed to radical social movements. This too was a result of a colonial policy which held back the development of industry and excluded the Vietnamese from participating in trade and commerce. There was virtually no Vietnamese capitalism, no Vietnamese bourgeoisie. Capitalism was foreign, an alien power engaged in exploiting the land and the people, and therefore opposed by all patriots striving to free Vietnam from foreign rule. The people who most consistently expressed this national sentiment were of course the Communists.

The absence of a solidly conservative peasantry, of a property-owning middle class, and of a socially satisfied intelligentsia meant that the country lacked the social basis for moderate democratic movements interested in maintaining or improving the *status quo*. Whoever was awakened to political consciousness sooner or later aimed at overthrowing not only the colonial

regime but also the social order it had created. A political movement based on a strong native middle class would of course also have fought for national liberation, but it would have been opposed to social revolution. Since such a class was practically non-existent, all nationalist movements tended to embrace socialistic ideas. This was true even for an authoritarian conservative like Ngo Dinh Diem.

Most effective in directly promoting Communist strength were the political conditions which French colonialism created for the existence of all nationalist movements. Only pro-colonial attitudes could be freely expressed. Movements organized by moderate middle-class nationalists were as brutally suppressed as was the Communist party. No trade unions were allowed. Nationalist movements could operate only clandestinely, in an atmosphere essentially hostile to the development of democratic ideas. The most moderate nationalists, forced underground, hunted by the police, condemned to death or to endless years of concentration camp, ended up by becoming radicals, believers in revolutionary action and in the necessity of fighting the colonial regime with force. No one expressed this necessity more consistently than the Communists, who constantly attracted the most determined elements of all the nationalist groups.

The Communists alone possessed certain advantages essential for the survival of illegal organizations. They had a wealth of experience and skills in underground work, and highly sophisticated theories about it, which had been tested in Russia and elsewhere over a long time. They had schools to train people engaged in

secret political activities. These schools were held abroad, where the Communists permanently kept a reserve of *cadres*. They also had support from the Soviet Union. No other group enjoyed any of these advantages. Who in the Western world showed an interest in the national aspirations of the Vietnamese people, let alone supported them? France, the only democratic country that knew about these potentially democratic movements, was engaged in destroying them.

Furthermore, the Communists were the only ones who knew that a successful revolution against the colonial regime required organization of the masses. Nationalist intellectuals who lacked a Communist political training clung to the century-old view of Vietnam's elite, which was that public affairs were matters reserved to the educated; the masses were not ripe for political action, and had no significant part to play in the national liberation of Vietnam. Only the Communists trained *cadres* for organizing the masses. When the revolution broke out in April 1945, only the Communist party had people who spoke in support of the Viet Minh to the rural masses in the villages all over the country. They did not speak of Communism; the aims of the revolution were declared to be national liberation and moderate social reforms. In the absence of any organized forces to oppose them, the Communist leaders gained the support of almost the entire nation before one month had elapsed. They were solidly in power when the anti-Communist leaders a few weeks later arrived from their exile in China, together with the unwelcome Chinese armies of occupation.

But the colonial regime went even further in its promotion of Communism. After having reconquered the Southern half of Vietnam, the French, in exchange for permission to station army units in the North, recognized the Ho Chi Minh government at Hanoi with an agreement in March 1946. When the anti-Communist nationalists, in an attempt to exploit popular opposition to the return of the French army, fiercely attacked this agreement, the French cooperated with the Communists in destroying all nationalist groups opposed to the Viet Minh regime. The French were of course not "pro-Communist"; they knew that their compromise with Ho Chi Minh would end in armed conflict, but they did not want the anti-Communist groups as their opponents in the government of Vietnam. They preferred to present the war against the Vietnamese national revolution as a war against Communism.

French colonial policy, by provoking the Indochina War, again contributed to the popularity of Vietnamese Communism. The Viet Minh government became the symbol of national resistance to colonialism. Most nationalists supported the armed struggle against the French led by the Viet Minh. This is when Ho Chi Minh became Vietnam's great national hero.

During the Indochina War, the French could have helped weaken the Communists' hold on the nationalist movement by granting a non-Communist regime what the Vietnamese people were fighting for, which was not Communism but national independence. Instead, the French colonialists set up a corrupt puppet regime under the former emperor Bao Dai, discredit-

ing the cause of anti-Communist nationalism, and enhancing once more the prestige of the Hanoi regime. This failure to take proper political action led, in turn, to the military defeat of the French at the hands of the Viet Minh. During the war, the French had denounced the entire resistance movement as Communist; when it triumphed, the Vietnamese naturally gave the Communists most of the credit. The prestige of the Hanoi government was immense. Its popular support and military strength were such that it could probably have thrown the French out of Indochina and extended its power over the whole of Vietnam. Communist control was limited to the North of Vietnam only by the international circumstances that induced the Western and Eastern powers to conclude, and impose upon the Viet Minh, the compromise reached at the conference of Geneva.

Why the government established in the South in 1954 failed to break the power of the Communists is another story. This is a failure not only of Vietnamese anti-Communism but also of the United States. Basically it is due to the fact that in too many social and political areas the Diem regime did not liquidate the colonial heritage. It did not create a land-owning peasantry immune to Communist propaganda; it did not oppose organized Communism by creating democratic mass movements, but decided to fight it with police and army; it treated its democratic opponents as they had been treated by the colonial regime, denouncing them as Communists and throwing them into jail. Instead of turning South Vietnam, with United States help, into a country that might

seem attractive to the people both in the South and the North, the Diem regime relied for its survival on force.

Many of these colonial conditions still persist under the tutelage of the United States. It would of course be absurd to impute colonial motives to American intervention in Vietnam. But there are still more than merely shades of the colonial heritage in the views and actions which describe United States policy in South Vietnam. If there is still, as under the colonial regime, a total neglect of social and political reform, the United States must accept part of the blame for this. The present regime of South Vietnam, which could not exist without American support, is politically just as ineffective against the Communists as was the Bao Dai regime under the French. We too, like the French, act as if military force alone could defeat Communism. We too use napalm, condone torture, kill innocent civilians by bombing and burning villages. We treat the National Front for the Liberation of the South as the French treated the Viet Minh—as a solid Com-

munist bloc, and, like the French, we refuse to negotiate with the people whom we are fighting. However, what reminds the Vietnam people more than anything else of their colonial past is that the Saigon regime, like that of Bao Dai, would collapse overnight if foreign armies were not again on Vietnamese soil.

If we rely on force, it must be because we either do not know the means required to defeat Vietnamese Communism politically, or we are afraid to apply them. Our force is probably sufficient to prevent the Communists from winning this war. At the risk of starting a larger conflict, we may even succeed in defeating the enemy, but we can defeat him only under one condition: We must summon up the inhuman determination to destroy the country, wiping out most of its unfortunate people.

As long as the colonial heritage in Vietnam is not liquidated by a socially progressive regime, the people of South Vietnam will continue to expect the Communists to perform this urgent historical task.

Irving Howe

Adlai Stevenson: The Last, Sad Years

Adlai Stevenson was surely the most attractive human being to figure prominently in American politics since the second world war. He was a cultivated man in the tradition of an older America that seems almost to have disappeared. His wit was

real, and it was his own. He was happily free of those delusional claims to omnipotence and omniscience which seem to overcome men of power, even in democratic republics. And for thoughtful people there was something intensely affecting in his readiness to

acknowledge inner doubt, as if it were not at all a cause for shame but rather a mark of humanity.

Stevenson did not try to create a legend around his person; only his admirers did. He had the courage to enter American politics without a "lovely family": he had neither an unforgettable wife like Mamie nor a beautiful one like Jackie. He came alone, without a clan.

In underlying values and personal manner, Stevenson was a liberal man. He was ready to listen to opposing views with courtesy and attention; he believed in civilized discourse; he sought to puncture his opponent's pretensions, not to destroy his existence. But as we use the word "liberal" in this country, to signify someone more-or-less militantly devoted to social and economic reform, Stevenson was certainly not a liberal. Indeed, there was something both comic and pathetic in the eagerness of his intellectual admirers to remold him in the image of their desire. It was as if, in their affection for his style, they could not bear to acknowledge his distance from their belief. In some cases, however, the intellectuals were drawn to him precisely because he lacked the militant posture of the traditional American liberal: they were drawn to him because, in the increasingly conservative 'fifties, when the myth of social peace came to be accepted with barely a qualification, Stevenson represented what they hoped to become rather than what they had once been or might still be.

A moderately conservative man, Stevenson was prepared to accept the welfare state and some humane extensions of it. But this is no longer a

matter of liberalism, only of intelligence. He had no zeal, no crusading fire, very little of the gift for reaching the ear of the masses which his far less attractive contemporary, Harry Truman, did have. And he never pretended to be anything but what he was. For the wistful delusions of his admirers he could not be held responsible.

The last years were painful, even pitiable. Stevenson at the U.N. was forced to defend precisely those aspects of American policy—the Bay of Pigs, escalation in Vietnam, invasion of the Dominican Republic—that were least defensible. He shrank in valor and manliness by choosing to repeat untruths and allowing himself to be used, quite cynically, by two presidents who needed his reputation and skill but cared little for his advice. Loyalty one can understand, even to presidents he might not have quite admired. But there comes a time when it is loyalty to one's deepest convictions which matters most—that and nothing else.

Perhaps that time had come; perhaps it is true, as some correspondents have written, that he was preparing to resign. It would have been good. It might have helped stem, or slow, the disastrous course of President Johnson's foreign policy. Yet there is no reason to suppose that Stevenson would have taken the lead as public spokesman for the opposition, stirring the country to the outrage in the Dominican Republic, the danger in Vietnam, the distortion of the Alliance for Progress. He was not that kind of man and, what is more, he did not hold the views of those of us who criticize U.S. foreign policy from a radical perspective.

Still, we who would judge Stevenson for not having resigned—and I do judge him—must also consider what his choices were. He could have led the opposition? But in practice, what did that mean? For there is no real, no significant, no major opposition to which he could have turned.

The ADA: is it anything more than an agency for passing a few resolutions? The “new left”: can you imagine Adlai Stevenson linking arms with Prof. Staughton Lynd, who has recently delivered himself in public print of a fantasy about demonstrators taking over the White House? The trade unions: can you see those intellectual eminences, George Meany and Jay Lovestone, welcoming Stevenson? The teach-ins: well perhaps, but they hardly constitute a major force within American life.

The sad part of Stevenson's last years was not merely that he lost in dignity, nor even that he allowed himself to do some very dirty work for Kennedy and Johnson. No, the sad part was that there was nowhere for him to turn, no arena of liberal criticism in which he could speak. The lack of structure, the absence of coherence, the failure in sustained controversy, which characterize our political life also limits the opportunities available to individual leaders. They cannot do by themselves, even if they should want to, what the political system does not support. Stevenson's failure was the failure of an old-fashioned style of personal politics, the cultivated conservatism of the nineteenth century trying to cope with the realities of the twentieth.

An attractive human being is gone:

we have not had very many in public life, and our present leaders do not encourage expectations of more. But let us not delude ourselves as to what Adlai Stevenson signified. He was not a man of the left, not a traditional or even new-style American liberal. He was a man who tried to act by civilized standards within the present society, and he did not succeed.

AMONG OURSELVES

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months ago; as well as articles by Jose Figueueres, former president of Costa Rica, Robert Alexander, Norman Thomas and Juan Bosch. It is a valuable and well-documented collection.

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We have had to hold a number of articles until the winter issue because of lack of space. Among these are a full-scale study of American education by Christopher Jencks; an analysis of the idea of “community” in American social thought by Dennis Wrong; articles on U.S. political perspectives (coalition or not) by Emanuel Geltman and Stanley Plastrik, and by Tom Hayden; a piece on U.S. labor by Paul Jacobs. We are also promised for the winter issue a first-hand report on eastern Europe from Norman Birnbaum. In preparation are a special section on Latin America; a group of review-studies of books on the Cold War; etc.

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Michael Harrington

THE POLITICS OF POVERTY

Can poverty in the United States be abolished within the limits of the welfare state? Or does the present commitment to end the scandal of economic misery in the richest nation history has known require measures which will go beyond the present theories and practices of American society?

The answer is, I think, clear enough. The Johnson Administration's current "War on Poverty" is basically inadequate, a fact which can be demonstrated by the Government's own figures. The liberal-labor proposals for social investments which would both generate jobs and destroy the very physical environment of poverty represent a considerable advance over the present program and deserve vigorous support. But even these measures have implications which are considerably more radical than liberal reform. Understanding that the poor need a planned allocation of resources in their favor is but a first step toward the knowledge that a revolutionary technology is subverting some of the most cherished myths and principles of the entire society and demands fundamental changes in our economic and social structure.

In short, the goal announced in the Economic Opportunity Act is much more profound than its framers suspected. "It is, therefore, the policy of the United States," that law proclaims, "to eliminate the paradox of poverty in the midst of plenty in the Nation by opening to everyone the opportunity to live in decency and dignity." This sounds reassuring. It is the American rhetoric and the wisdom of the New Deal: the state intervenes to guarantee the citizen a fair chance in the private economy.

In fact, however, living up to these familiar goals is going to take unfamiliar action. For specific and historical reasons, the accumulated American knowledge about how to abolish poverty applies less and less each day. Unless there are profound changes in the American economy and society—new ways of allocating resources and distributing wealth—the economic underworld of the poor will not only persist but probably grow.

In saying these things, I do not want to dismiss the Johnson Administration's War on Poverty (or John F. Kennedy's tremendously important first steps in this direction). If it is necessary to point out considerable, and even basic, inadequacies in the Government's current programs, the very possibility of serious discussion is a gain which one owes in part to that program. But now that a start has been made, there is no point in fostering the illusion that a sort of Federal Community Chest is going to get together the men of good will, the Henry Fords and Walter Reuthers, Russell Longs and Martin Luther Kings, and by a little more generous welfare-ism do away with a national shame. The task is much more difficult than that; the remedies are much more radical.

In developing this analysis, one need not enter into any argument over the exact, statistical nature of poverty in the United States. A small library of books written in recent years has demonstrated the brutal fact that tens of millions of Americans are poor. For convenience, the definitions and figures used here will be those published by the Government in the Economic Reports of 1964 and 1965. We discuss, then, a misery which, in a most cautious and prudent statement, embraces thirty-five million Americans and particularly afflicts the aging, the young, the non-white, and certain categories of workers and farmers. (It should be noted that a recent study of the Social Security Administration is even grimmer than the Economic Reports. It finds "about fifty million Americans, one quarter of the population" who "live within the bleak circle of poverty or at least hover around its edge.")

How can these thirty-five-million—or perhaps even fifty million—be given "the opportunity to live in decency and dignity"?

To begin with, one must understand the obsolescence of much of the traditional American wisdom about abolishing poverty. The "old," pre-World War II poor, whose experiences dominate so much of our present thinking, were different kinds of people than the poor of the 1960s and they faced different problems.

The old poor lived at a time when economic opportunity was a trend of the economy itself. They suffered terribly, to be sure, and by statistical indices of living standard and life expectancy many were worse off than the impoverished of 1965. But they also participated in that incredible growth of American capitalism, a development which, in Colin Clark's figures, saw a 4500% increase in the net income from manufacturing between 1860 and 1953. The farmers came to the city in good times to better their luck. They were not driven into the metropolis as bewildered, despairing exiles, which is so often the case today.

And the insatiable manpower needs of mass production meant that there were jobs for grade school dropouts and for Eastern European immigrants who could hardly speak English.

There was objective, realistic reason for hope—and the old poor of the cities were hopeful. The immigrants, for instance, often brought a language or a culture with them. The resultant solidarity provided the basis for self-help institutions within the culture of poverty: for political machines, churches, social clubs and the like. In a good many instances, aspiration and a hunger for learning became a way of life.*

These internal resources of the old poor were used in the creation of the big city political machines, one of the first welfare systems in the United States. But they also provided the basis for something more than “self-help” and group benevolence. In the 1930s they played a role in a climactic moment of American social history. Millions of the old poor participated in the organization of unions, particularly the CIO, and in the political struggle for the New Deal. They—and their ethnic drives, their community hopes—became an important constituent of a new political coalition which translated into law many of the reforms advocated by liberals and socialists of an earlier generation—the Wagner Act, Social Security, Minimum Wage, etc.

Naturally, the resultant welfare-ism was permeated by the experience and some of the assumptions of the old poor.

In Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.’s analysis of the Roosevelt years, there is a distinction between the “first” and “second” New Deals which is quite relevant at this point. The first New Deal was supported by very significant sectors of American business. It was dominated by the NRA, which gave legal recognition to an old corporate dream of the anti-anti-Trusters: that something like the European cartel could be given American citizenship. This was a period in which the Chamber of Commerce was talking about a planned economy—planned by business.

By the end of Roosevelt’s first term, this initial New Deal was breaking up. Parts of the labor movement were restive, millions were listening to demagogues like Huey Long, business was souring on FDR. The Supreme Court ended the NRA and Roosevelt turned, so to speak, toward his left. Paradoxically, he did so by moving away from the concept of planning and toward the “free market.” The result was the second New Deal which was *the* New Deal of the liberal nostalgia and, more importantly, the source of welfare theory and anti-poverty wisdom to this moment.

* The various national groups had different patterns of response and varying degrees of success. Some of these contrasting patterns are analyzed in *Beyond the Melting Pot* by Glazer and Moynihan and in *The Ghetto Game* by Dennis Clark.

The heart of the second New Deal was, of course, Keynesian. To be sure, some of the old pledges were redeemed: "floors" were provided for some of the aging and the workers in Social Security and minimum wage legislation; collective bargaining was recognized as a national policy (though it took several years of militant activity to make the promise real). *Still the American percentage of the Gross National Product devoted to direct social benefits has yet to achieve even half of the typical European contribution.* And the basic assumption of the second New Deal was that Government intervention should not plan, but stimulate, the economy and that the private sector and initiative would continue to be the mainspring of progress. Public works were thus a temporary expedient and, as the second New Deal went on, they shifted from planned social investments toward projects designed primarily to get money into the economy.

The second New Deal did not succeed in its avowed aim of ending the Depression. That did not happen until the massive armaments spending of the War period. Nevertheless, Roosevelt did define the fundamentals of the American welfare state: modest contributions in direct welfare spending, a legal framework for the conflict between labor and management, and a Government commitment to stimulate, or brake, the private economy in the interest of orderly growth without depression.

After World War II, there was only one amendment in principle to the wisdom of the thirties. It centered around programs for training and retraining.

In 1956, for the first time in history, there were more white collar than blue collar workers in the United States. At the same time, unemployment, while well below Depression levels, was chronic and persisted even in the good years. The diagnosis of this situation made by the Kennedy Administration, and followed by President Johnson, had two main elements. Growth rates were lagging and the Government must therefore stimulate the economy by deficits even at a time of business prosperity; and certain individuals required special help if they were to survive in the labor market.

The training-retraining component was built into a series of laws: Area Redevelopment, Manpower Development and Training, Economic Opportunity and even the Federal Aid to Education Act of 1965. Some workers, it was acknowledged, were not participating in the general economic advance or were even being expelled from it by automation. They, and a growing number of high school dropouts, were denied economic opportunity because they lacked the right skills. The Government was to give them the training, or the retraining, which would change this

situation. At the same time, neo-Keynesian tax cuts were to spur the nation and create the employments which the training-retraining graduates would fill.

This general perspective is reflected in many pieces of current legislation. It is the foundation of the war on poverty and summarizes bitter experience and arduously acquired knowledge. It will certainly help some people and probably not hurt many and is, on balance, to the good. Still, this approach misses the fundamental problem of the poor today. To understand why, it is necessary to turn to the new poor.

The basic reason why the poor of today differ from those of a generation ago and therefore require radical measures if their poverty is to be abolished, is that the economy is so different from that of a generation ago. In absolute terms and objective indices, the impoverished today are better off than their predecessors in misery; but relatively speaking, in terms of hope and economic opportunity, their plight is much worse. Moreover, this economic fact has all kinds of social and psychological consequences for the poor and it therefore cannot be described in simple, statistical terms.

For instance, because of their peculiarly underprivileged place in history and the economy, the new poor have fewer internal resources with which to combat their degradation and to seize chances when they appear.

Perhaps the most terrible example of how contemporary poverty affects group psychology is found among American Negroes. Negroes, who make up 25% of the new poor, were systematically stripped of their African heritage under slavery. Every human institution—religion, the family, the tribe, or the community—was abolished as far as that was possible. After the Civil War, this terrible crime of white America against the very spirit of the Negro continued through indirect economic pressures rather than the overt coercion of slavery. The Negro male was often emasculated socially, i.e., not given the chance to earning a living, to be the real head of a family, to function as a father. The result was a matriarchal tendency in Negro life.

Sociologists like Franklin Frazier have documented this terrible history in detail. One aspect of their analysis is particularly important here. The high percentage of broken families within Negro life, and particularly in the Northern ghettos, makes it much more difficult to organize the black masses of the 1960s than the predominantly white masses who formed the CIO. On the other hand, there is a paradoxical sense in which the very virulence of American racism has given Negroes a certain minimal solidarity, based on color, which is denied to many

of the white poor. (Several years ago, Richard Russell, dean of the Senate Dixiecrats, lamented the fact that impoverished blacks had a civil rights movement while the whites did not.)

So it is that the other principal groups of the new poor also have tremendous problems built into the very structure of their life. The farm worker who comes to the city today is not drawn there by economic opportunity but driven there by the fact that he has been made obsolete by agricultural modernization. (In 1929, 25.1% of the population was engaged in farming; in 1964, 6.7%. And the latter figure underestimates the actual trend. If one spoke of those Americans engaged in *market* farming, i.e., the well-off rural people who are subsidized by the Government, they would number well under 5% of the population.) The result is exile colonies of the rural poor in cities like Cincinnati, St. Louis, Chicago.

In the depressed areas, the typical pattern is that those with viable skills, or youth and hope, leave. Those who stay behind tend to lack militancy and aggressiveness. Where the old spirit does remain, as among the miners of Hazard, Kentucky, they face the fact that so much of Federal depressed-areas legislation—the Appalachia Act, for instance—is constructed on a trickle-down theory. The Government, in keeping with the conventional, neo-Keynesian wisdom, makes public investments in the infrastructure by building roads and dams. And the first recipients of aid are the local business people. Their prosperity is supposed to eventually provide jobs for the poor people in the area. But, of course, it is precisely against this middle class that the most proud and aggressive of the miners have fought their battle. So the law which is supposed to help them may well be used to discipline them.

And there are white, urban workers caught in this downward spiral of pessimism. About half of the families of the poor are headed by an employed worker. These people work long, hard hours in jobs which are not covered by minimum wage law (17.6 million workers in private industry are not) and in which the minimum wage set by law is lower than the accepted poverty line. They are in the kinds of occupations—laundry workers, lowly service functions in restaurants and hotels, hospital orderlies, etc.—which in general are not organized by unions.

So the new poor are in a different, and much more difficult, position than the old poor. In saying this, I do not want to romanticize the misery and exploitation of the past, or to imply that the poverty-stricken of today somehow just don't possess the spirit of their predecessors and never will. There is no point of repeating the error of the artisans of the AFL who, in the 1930s, looked down upon the industrial workers and pre-

dicted that they would never organize into an effective union. But there are two reasons why the new poor do not have a *present* potential for militant action equal to that of auto and steel workers in the thirties. For one thing, they are not assembled together daily in huge and organizable units like the mass production factory. They live in chaotic slums and work at jobs which the union has never reached. But much more important, the new poor do not even have the economic hope which existed in 1936 and 1937, when the CIO emerged. Then, with a brief recessionary interlude, the economy was reviving, and the worker could believe that his job would be there tomorrow even if he joined and fought for the union. *But the new poor are the automation poor.* In fact, as will be made clear shortly, they have no reason to expect that present Government plans will provide them with something to do which will be both useful and decently paying. To the extent that they are demoralized, their attitude derives from an accurate perception of the future as well as from the terrible heritage of the past.

Several ideas follow from this initial analysis of the new poor. In the face of the massive, and in many ways unprecedented, indignities which they suffer, superficial liberals should stop telling them to pull themselves up by the bootstraps "like we did." And superficial radicals should stop thinking that the new poor will instinctively be more disciplined, cohesive and revolutionary than the workers of the CIO. But above all, and this point should emerge more plainly as I go on, this definition of the new poverty adds a crucial dimension to the demand that the Federal Government generate the jobs which will provide these people with economic hope. Such a program will not simply provide work for large number of individuals. It will, hopefully, provide the social setting in which entire groups of the poor will militantly organize themselves.

Having made this first definition of the new poverty, it is important to understand that it is, to an extraordinary degree, a youthful phenomenon. The problem of the poor is not automatically dying out with the older generation but is being most tenaciously posed by the youth.

In the 1964 Report of the Council of Economic Advisors, poverty was defined as an income of \$3,000 or less for a family. That was a bold way of putting the term and it gave a fair, if modest, estimate of the quantitative dimensions of our national scandal. But by omitting reference to family size and geographical location, the Administration was imprecise as to the exact qualitative composition of the problem. During 1964, the Social Security Administration refined the criteria and the new data became the basis for the 1965 Economic Report. The approximate number of the poor was not changed by these revisions. But, "most im-

portant, the estimated number of children in poverty rises by more than one third, from eleven million to fifteen million. That means that one-fourth of the nation's children live in families that are poor."

In short, young people in America are "more" poor than the population as a whole. A fifth of the country, but a fourth of the youth, live in the other America. Of the thirty-five million defined as poor by the Council of Economic Advisors, over 40% are young people. And one of the terrible things we have learned about present day poverty—it was brilliantly documented in a Department of Labor Study of Selective Service Rejectees in 1964—is that it is tending to be hereditary. Almost all of the old poor were children of people with little education. But they lived in communities which often made education an important community value; and they worked in an economy which, in the long run, provided a market for uneducated muscle. Both of these advantages have been profoundly modified in the new poverty and in a good many places they don't exist at all. A quarter of the young men who take the draft exam fail because they are not educated enough to train as privates in the army (they are typically in their early twenties when they take the test). And they are, to a depressing degree, the children of the poor.

If all other things remain constant, one could then expect these 25% of the youth who are poor to become heads of families—or, more precisely, heads of large families, for that is one of the patterns of poverty. And this would mean that impoverishment has a great future in this country. However, it is now the express purpose of the Administration not to let all things remain constant. These young people have been made the very crux of the Economic Opportunity Act and of Federal aid to education. So the question remains: faced by a poverty which is peculiarly corrosive in its impact on individual psychology and the internal resources of the various sub-groups of the poor, can the present Government programs provide the millions of impoverished youth "economic opportunity" in a period of automation and cybernation?

The answer to this question involves a manpower revolution and the fact that, even with the various Administration measures, the poor youth are so unequipped to meet this change that there is no present prospect that the majority of them will enjoy economic opportunity.

First of all, there is the manpower revolution itself (the phrase is taken from the 1964 Majority Report of the Senate Subcommittee on Employment and Manpower, chaired by Senator Joseph Clark). Between 1957 and 1963, the Senate Subcommittee found, there were substantial increases in output and even new industries in the nonagricultural,

goods-producing sector the economy—and yet employment in this sector decreased by 300,000 jobs. Indeed, the report continued, state and local governments provided approximately one-third of the increase in wage and salary employment. So that when one looked for those areas in which jobs were being generated, it turned out that the private, profit-making nonfarm economy had given rise to only 300,000 new jobs in the six-year period, virtually all in the non-goods-producing sector.

These developments were, of course, part of a long-range pattern. In 1956, 39.4% of the workers in the United States were white collar, 38.8% blue collar. By 1964, the proportion had reached 44.2% white collar, 36.3% blue collar. The assembly line, through automation and cybernation, was becoming more and more productive, capable of increasing output while decreasing employment or keeping it stable. The state and local governmental sector was growing because of the increasing complexity of urban life and an enormous increase in education brought about by the post-war baby boom. And the private service sector—private schools, hospitals, restaurants, hostelryes, etc.—was also burgeoning as a result of the general affluence.

The result of these trends was that chronic high rates of unemployment (above 5% on the official figures; nearer 10% when one computed in the workers “expelled” from the labor market, the part-time unemployed, and so on) often coexisted during this period with prosperity. And furthermore, the new jobs that were created tended in two contrary directions: occupations for the highly skilled with good pay; menial, janitorial employments at poverty or near-poverty pay.

In 1965, it seemed to some publicists that the 1957-63 figures described an aberration rather than a trend. From 1957 to 1962 they said, there had indeed been an average annual decline in blue-collar work of 120,000. But from 1962 to 1964, there had been a gain of 550,000 in this category. The crisis, they said, was over, and the manpower patterns of the late fifties constituted, not a revolution, but a temporary response to low growth rates. So the tax cut had done its proper work, and with some judicious training and retraining there would be work for the employable poor.

The President of the United States and the Department of Labor were not so optimistic. The 1965 Manpower Report noted that even with the extraordinary stimulus of the tax cut, goods-producing industries barely held their own as a percentage of total employment. And Mr. Johnson said, “In the long run, the need for semi-skilled production workers and for many types of unskilled workers will continue to shrink in relation to demand in other occupational fields . . . most of the em-

ployment rise and the greatest rates of increase in 1964 were not in goods-production industries but in trades, services, and state and local government activities."

In short, the blue-collar unskilled and semi-skilled jobs which had provided so many of the old poor their occupational exit from poverty are declining. Where there is an increasing demand for simple muscle power, in the public and private service industries, it is more often than not in low-paid janitorial or dishwashing occupations. This means that one of the most fundamental propositions of the old anti-poverty wisdom—that in the long run, the private economy will generate new, and better-paying, work—applies less and less every day. It is now possible to have prosperity and decreasing opportunity for the poor.

Even this analysis understates the problem. For the American economy labors under the pressure of increasing population. It is not simply that the poor are tragically youthful, but that the entire society is getting younger. And this could intensify some of these problematic manpower trends.

According to the Department of Labor, the United States will require over 101 million jobs by 1980. Between 1964 and 1970, the labor force will grow at a rate of one-and-a-half million a year. Just to accommodate this increase—and *without* reducing unemployment—would require job generation on a scale not even achieved during the Korean War. And if one adds in the absolutely reasonable goal (it should be axiomatic with the neo-Keynesians) of reducing unemployment, as officially defined, to 3% by 1969, that would take, according to AFL-CIO Research Director Nathaniel Goldfinger, 1.9 million new jobs a year.

The Government is extremely pessimistic about its ability to measure up to these extraordinary job quotas. In order to meet the 1964-1970 manpower requirements, Washington reports that an annual 4% increase in gross national product will be needed during the entire period. And it then says, "But at no time in our recent peacetime history have we been able to sustain a rate of increase in the gross national product of 4% for more than a brief period." That is to say, the welfare state and economic measures of the past are, by Administration admission, probably not equal to the labor force requirements of the future.

As in all things, this grim proposition will be truer for some people than for others: the poor, and the fifteen million poor youth among them in particular, will bear the brunt of the trend.

About a third of the American youth today drop out of education before they leave high school. They have an unemployment rate of 15% (and it is almost double that for Negro dropouts); of the 1963 dropouts

who did find employment, 45% wound up as laborers or as menials; and typically, these people, the Government tells us, do not upgrade their skills. This one-third of the youth includes a majority of the young poor. In a time of automation, they provide a reserve army for poverty.

But, someone might reply, this is precisely the reason for the considerable investments which the Government is now making in various education programs, from pre-school training under Community Action to post-school training under the Job Corps and retraining for middle-aged workers under Manpower Development and Training. This notion begs the question. For all of the training and retraining in the world cannot change the fact that the Government itself, in the 1965 Manpower Report, has no confidence that the requisite number of jobs will be generated.

The Department of Labor projections on the educational attainment of the work force in 1975 are even more revealing. In 1964, the Senate Subcommittee estimated that a young worker needed fourteen years of schooling—two years beyond high school—in order to have a really good chance for economic opportunity. But in 1975, when the skill requirements for the available decent jobs will presumably be much higher, more than one-fourth (26.6%) of the workers 25 to 34 years of age will be without a high school diploma. This society apparently plans that they will be either unemployed or janitors, i.e., poor.

Thus the newness of poverty, and the consequent obsolescence of so much of President Johnson's current program, can be defined in the following way. The decisive factor, the terrible novelty, of impoverishment today, is that it takes places in a time of automation. Under such circumstances, the systematically undereducated and undertrained (which is another way of saying, "the poor") are justifiably pessimistic. Thus far, the Government has offered them the possibility of further education and training but, at the same time, essentially says that it really doesn't expect to have enough decent jobs for its own graduates. All this reinforces the cynicism and resistance to organization which characterizes poor communities.

The situation is particularly acute for the fifteen million youth who are poor and the even larger number of young people (one in three) who are high school dropouts in the age of post-high-school technology. This is the "growth potential" of American poverty. There are liberal critics ("critical supporters" might be a better term) of the Administration's programs who have recognized many of these problems. They have consequently proposed what I would call a Third New Deal: that the nation politically allocate resources to the public sector (consciously directing,

rather than simply stimulating, at least a part of the economy) so as to create positive, useful jobs which would raise the quality of life of the entire society. These proposals are excellent as far as they go—but they do not go far enough. As a next, and a giant, step in American life, they are certainly worthy of support, but they raise issues and pose problems which have radical implications for the very structure of the society.

In brilliant testimony before the Joint Committee on the Economic Report in February 1965, John Kenneth Galbraith spoke of “reactionary Keynesianism.” This is the thesis that one promotes economic growth by expanding private, individual consumption through policies like the tax cut, but not by making planned investments in social consumption. “I am not quite sure what the advantage is,” Galbraith said, “in having a few more dollars to spend if the air is too dirty to breathe, the water too polluted to drink, the commuters are losing out in the struggle to get in and out of the city, the streets are filthy and the schools so bad that the young perhaps wisely stay away, and hoodlums roll citizens for some of the dollars they saved in the tax cut.”

Galbraith’s point is particularly relevant to the new poverty. When one cuts taxes and uses other methods to increase individual consumption, that allows individuals to choose how the public subsidy will be spent. Moreover, as Leon Keyserling demonstrated at length in regard to the 1964 cut, the rich will get the lion’s share of this decision-making power. The corporations will presumably spend their rebates on becoming more efficient, i.e., requiring fewer workers; and wealthy individuals will hardly invest theirs in slum clearance or public schools.

As Galbraith testified with considerable wit, this approach is, in the long run, disastrous even from the point of view of the well-off. For a “prosperity” which leaves slums and race ghettos standing and which creates a desperate generation of uneducated youth will be threatened, not by revolution, but by constant outbreaks of individual, nihilistic violence. In addition to discomfiting the good citizenry, such a situation costs them money. The announced initial cost of Mayor Wagner’s “war on crime” in New York City is greater than the first investment in his “war on poverty.”

But beyond this middle-class cost accountancy, the poor themselves are deeply involved in this matter. The Community Action Programs under Title II of the Economic Opportunity Act propose to ameliorate the educational, familial, and psychological ravages of slum life. But no one has yet proposed the most crucial and obvious thing: to do away with the slums altogether. The poor are, by income definition, not in the “free” housing market (I use the quotation marks because, as Herb Gans

pointed out, private residential construction—for the middle class and the rich—is subsidized by an extraordinary array of Governmental programs). There are not enough low-rent public housing units and those which do exist, while an advance over a crowded, rat-infested tenement, tend to be segregated by class and race and to have other disadvantages.

Thus, there is no reason to expect that the slums will disappear by the “natural” workings of the economy. Yet so long as they persist, Community Action will have a first aid, rather than a surgical, quality. And obviously, doing away with the slums will take a whole range of public responses: creating new towns, breaking the class and race barriers which block off the suburbs, rehabilitating structurally sound housing (but this project, which is sometimes put forward as a panacea, requires moving—and housing—three-quarters of the people who live in the present charming but miserable unit), and so on.

As the poor themselves have understood in several “urban renewal” battles, such an undertaking requires that the new, low-cost housing be supplied first and that demolition take place only after the site-dwellers have been rehoused. In any case, all of these new departures are theoretically possible. The only, and enormous, obstacle in their way is political. Now, one more argument can be advanced in their favor: that if the Community Action program of the War on Poverty is to work, a new environment for community has to be created. And that is a positive job-generating way of investing resources in social consumption as contrasted to priming the pump with tax cuts.

This one instance of housing points in the general direction of how the United States must go beyond the notion that poverty can be abolished by tax cuts and various new forms of vocational training. There must be a conscious governmental creation of a labor market in which the poor can find economic opportunity, and this can only be done by social investments which will also attack the very environmental structure of poverty itself. There must be, in short, a planned expansion of the public sector of the economy, particularly with regard to housing, education and transportation.

Such a program can be found on the democratic left wing of American liberalism. It is, in one form or another, professed by the AFL-CIO, Leon Keyserling's Conference on Economic Progress, the ADA, and many other groups, and it was the subject of Myrdal's *Challenge to Affluence*. It is, therefore, politically possible, a giant step forward in American life—and still this side of radicalism.

Essentially, this social investment approach would involve the adoption of some kind of indicative national economic planning. As far back

as 1945, the Democrats argued, in the Full Employment Bill of 1945, that the gross national product was too important a determinant of economic and social life to be left to the fates or the so-called free market. But their proposals were reduced to the statements of intent in the Employment Act of 1946. Now, there are once more serious proposals to catch up with what we almost knew as a nation twenty years ago. The Clark Subcommittee of 1964 thus favored giving the President and the Council of Economic Advisors the responsibility of developing a national budget for all sectors of the economy, public and private, of estimating the GNP and unemployment which would result from this projection, and if the figures pointed to a jobless level of 3% or more, coming in with programs to create a GNP big enough to fit the employment needs of the society. The Subcommittee further put forward an immediate proposal to reduce unemployment to below 3% by 1968 through annual increments of \$5 billion in social spending.

This tack was not taken by the Johnson Administration. With a strange fatalism, Washington in 1965 clearly implied that it had no confidence that its economic policies would reduce unemployment even to the 4% "interim" acceptable level; and, as noted earlier, the White House and the Department of Labor do not think that our current capacities and development will meet the needs of the manpower revolution during the next half decade. With ingenuity and brilliance we have predicted chronic high unemployment. And leaving that prophecy to come true, we propose to abolish poverty at the same time.

The nation need not passively accept such a contradictory perspective. Instead, we could move toward a more radical liberalism by means of programs and policies which are now advocated by the labor and liberal movements. In so doing, the United States would undertake its Third New Deal.

The centerpiece of the first New Deal was the business-dominated planning of the NRA and of the second New Deal, Keynesian intervention to stimulate the private economy. "Now," John Kenneth Galbraith has written, "Keynesian policies are the new orthodoxy. Economists are everywhere to be seen enjoying their new and pleasantly uncontroversial role. Like their predecessors who averted their eyes from unemployment, many are now able to ignore . . . the new problem, which is an atrocious allocation of resources between private wants and public needs, especially those of our cities. (In a sense, *the Keynesian success has brought back an older problem of economics, that of resource allocation, in a new form.*")" (Italics mine.) I would add only one comment to Galbraith's analysis. So long as the present situation persists, the poor will be the most

terrible victims of America's atrocious allocation of resources; and the moment something is done, they will be the first beneficiaries, both in terms of finding decent employment and of building a new environment for themselves.

In short, the essence of the Third New Deal is social investment, a conscious and political allocation of resources to meet public needs. Such a program can obviously be carried out within the general limits of the welfare state, i.e., it does not propose any basic change in the ownership of American industry. Yet it is also clear that the business wing of the Johnson coalition would be extremely hostile to a Third New Deal. Even more important than Henry Ford's reaction is the fact that a Third New Deal would pose radical questions about the nation's economy and social structure, which could signify both a culmination of liberalism and a most important point of departure for radicalism. I want to labor this point a bit, because it has implications for the political strategy of a real war on poverty, pointing up the necessity for the mobilization of a new and militant coalition which will include, but not be confined to, the poor.

The social investment approach assumes that the gross national product is not an economic fate played out on the free market, but a subject for political debate and determination. In the Clark Subcommittee proposals, for instance, if a projected GNP does not fit the nation's social aims, then the Government goes out and creates a new, more appropriate, GNP. A major instrument of such a policy is the expansion of the public sector. There are two arguments for such a tack: the private, goods-producing sector will not create jobs for the poor, so there must be a conscious generation of work in the public sector; in the course of providing the needed quantity of jobs through the public sector, we will be able to transform the quality of American life.

Now all this is compatible with the corporate ownership of American industry. And yet, the social investment approach takes liberalism to the junction with radicalism. It goes beyond Lyndon Johnson, of course; but more than that, it points toward the other side of the welfare state itself.

To begin with, this approach proposes a modest allocation of economic resources on the basis of social usefulness rather than private profit. As the Clark subcommittee and others have put it, this would still leave the great mass of the economy in private hands. Yet it is a most important opening wedge for establishing a principle which could be extended until there is democratic control of major economic decisions. As one socialist French planner said of the situation in his own country,

it opens up the possibility that the legislature could become the stockholders' meeting of the entire national economy.

But there is another possibility, and here the French present rather than its possible future is the model. If the big corporations were to be shrewd about all this and to join wholeheartedly in indicative planning, they could shape it to *their* collective ends rather than to those of the society. Thus, under Gaullist planning in France, there has been a redistribution of income in favor of the rich. The entire French economy has become more efficient and, in the absence of effective counteraction by the democratic left, the chief beneficiaries have been the largest shareholders. If there is a "reactionary Keynesianism," there is also "reactionary planning." If this is to be avoided, it can only be through the power of an organized popular movement against the political power and interest of the corporations. And this I regard as a radical undertaking.

It is in this context that one must place the importance of the self-organization of the poor and their participation in a larger coalition. The point of community organization today is not, as too many seem to think, "self-help," neighborhood uplift. In Harlem, Kenneth Clark points out in his *Dark Ghetto*, people on a block organized to clean up the street. That, Clark says, was a wrong thing to do, for it implied acceptance of the theory that the street was litter-strewn because its Negro inhabitants were at fault. In point of fact, the real culprit was the city administration which, in this instance, as in practically every other, provides inferior public services for Negro areas. And the real demand, Clark concludes, should have been political organization to force the city to give the street its due.

At the 1965 Conference of Mayors, various metropolitan chief executives understood these political implications of community organization, even if they were a bit hysterical in the doing. The right of the poor to participate in the war on poverty was, some of them said, "Marxism," the class struggle. This was an incredible overstatement of the present state of affairs but it at least had the virtue of understanding what might happen if the poor were no longer welfare dependent but militant activists.

Such militant activism among the poor cannot be wished into existence. If the argument of this essay is correct, one of the consequences of a liberal program for the generation of new jobs would be that it might well create the economic setting for a radical movement of self-organization among the poor. Such a mobilization could take place in two main areas: around the indignities of daily life in the slum in the form of community unions, tenants' councils, and the like; and through the pen-

etration of the labor movement into the American economic underworld in the form of unionizing and transforming poverty jobs. In any case, such new institutions of the poor would have an important place in the national (liberal-labor-religious-radical) coalition which would be required to make planning an instrument of the popular will rather than of the corporation.

Finally, there are in these liberal proposals for social investments radical implications which relate to the quality of American life. The issue is not simply providing a given quantity of work, important as that is to the new poor. It is also one of providing the right kind of socially useful work. And this will require that new occupational categories be consciously created. The middle class has defined some new pursuits for its children already: the occupation of graduate student as a first career; the foundation industry with its fellowships and consultantships; Peace Corps and Vista volunteer; and so on. And now, under the impetus of the war on poverty, there are tentative new definitions of work for the poor themselves.

The "indigenous" neighborhood worker—the slum dweller recruited for paid social work because of his existential training in poverty—is already appearing in various community action programs. Other possibilities are being explored: teacher's aide, community organizer, research assistant. Significantly, these new occupations tend to appear in the public and "human care" sector of the economy. This trend owes at least as much to technological necessity as to the popular conscience. For it is the private and goods-producing part of the economy which automates; and it is in the service, and particularly the public service, sector that new needs and opportunities appear.

But here again, the political dimension is extremely important. Governmental support of the indigenous neighborhood worker could turn into an excellent way of recruiting the best leaders of the poor into an apparatus controlled by City Hall. This would not be the case if a coalition were activated between the poor and other movements for social change. One of the important functions of such a coalition would be precisely to provide a financial base so that indigenous community organizers could be completely independent of government, and thus responsive only to their own constituents.

In short, a program of social investments in the public sector is a liberal, politically possible proposal with radical implications. At the outset, it leaves the corporate domination of the economy intact, but it also introduces the counter-principle of social usefulness into our economic affairs. Whether or not this principle will develop into the basis

of fundamental economic decision is a political question. It depends, above all, on the emergence of a new coalition which will see to it not only that planning and social investment are extended, but that they be extended in a democratic way. And these implications of the liberal proposals are clearly radical.

In considering the problem of poverty, then, I suggest that we raise the issue of the future of society itself.

The poor were, as noted before, the first part of the American population to cross the frontier of automation. Tragically, for them it meant entry into the new poverty. But these problems will not stop at a \$3,000 income line or be confined to thirty-five, or even fifty million Americans. For these trends point to the possibility that entire areas of work—union-organized work, clerical work, executive work, as well as poverty work—will be abolished. The Administration has been skeptical of such prophecies, but in the 1965 transmission of the Manpower Report, President Johnson implied that the real argument is not whether, but when, extraordinary transformations will take place. "New technology," the President said, "will not *soon* curtail need for human labor." (*Italics mine.*) In short, *someday* new technology could curtail need for human labor.

If this is the case, then the program outlined in this paper points deeper than reform and well beyond poverty. The problem is not simply the massive one of liberating thirty-five to fifty million people from their misery and providing useful occupations for fifteen million youngsters. This undertaking is but the first installment in the redefinition of work for the society as a whole. And the economy of the future will thus have to allocate resources and plan for an unprecedented situation in which work, as traditionally defined, will no longer be the main fact about human life.

There are glimpses of this futurism in current, and sober, proposals. There are now bills providing benefits which would allow workers to exit earlier from the economy into retirement (this is necessary because the new technology cannot read the Social Security fine print about aging starting for a man at sixty-five) and to permit young workers to enter it later (by providing everyone with at least fourteen years of free public education). These are not simply fragments of change; they could be steps toward redefining the working lifetime of society.

Thus, the immediate and politically possible need in the war against poverty is for a Third New Deal, a radical liberalism. This would involve the assignment of planning responsibilities to the Council of Economic Advisors, massive social investments, the creation of a new human care sector of the economy which would employ college graduates and high

school dropouts. To one degree or another, the considerable political forces of the labor, civil rights, and liberal movements are committed to taking this path. Radicals should join with them.

But at the same time, it is the unique vocation of the radical to point out that even a Third New Deal is not enough. The throughgoing reforms which the new poor need today if they are even to begin to catch up with automation merely anticipate the basic transformations which the entire society will require tomorrow if it is to make its revolutionary technology humane. For more and more resources will have to be allocated to education, to leisure, to the "non-productive" and socially useful sector.

The plight of the new poor is radical. To help these tens of millions out of their present misery demands at least a Third New Deal. And in achieving that, the society will be forced to think about, and to embark upon, a far more fundamental restructuring. Such a development will not occur automatically. There are now reactionary Keynesians, and there will be reactionary Third New Dealers who will want to use the new social techniques to maintain the old social subordinations. If they are to be defeated, the war against poverty will not be based simply on economic models and blueprints for change. Its driving force will be a new political coalition—the poor, the unions, the best of the religious movements, the liberals, the radicals—everyone whose aim will be the democratization of economic and social power.

John Schrecker and Michael Walzer

AMERICAN INTERVENTION AND THE COLD WAR

The United States today is an astonishingly powerful nation. Yet it is a nation increasingly unable to apply its power effectively or in a manner satisfactory either to itself or to the rest of the world. This is less because of the resistance of the world than because of our own misconceptions about the nature of international politics in the 1960s. For power is not an absolute quality; it is relative to its purposes, effective or ineffective within a perceived context. The main problem with American foreign policy today is that the basic perception which guides our actions, the cold war with Communism, is no longer either realistic or appropriate. Our purpose in this essay is to defend an alternative set of perceptions and to suggest the radically different uses of American power which would follow from them.

I

For almost twenty years now the United States has been fighting a cold war against the forces of "International Communism." We have seized and maintained strategic positions, negotiated alliances, built up our armed strength, given economic aid and extracted political concessions, fought wars and contrived at *coups* and revolutions—all in the name of the cold war. We have committed ourselves, as a nation, to the view that Communism is a monolithic ideology and that two great powers, Russia and China, accept this ideology and are bent on carrying out its messianic injunctions and expanding their own power at our expense.

The development of this perspective was partially the cause and partially the result of the power struggle with Stalin's Russia which began at the end of World War II and was fought out, largely, in Europe—although both the Korean War and the Cuban Revolution provided occasions for crucial confrontations. From the beginning, American economic, military and political power was vastly superior to that of the Russians, and once the battle was joined there should have been little doubt as to its outcome. Yet the American government functioned under

an extraordinary cloud of insecurity. "The Russians have placed any number of bets," Dean Acheson is supposed to have told a secret Cabinet session in 1947, "if they win any one of them, they win them all." That cataclysmic view of the cold war was never tested, for the Russians won none of their bets. They were successfully contained; none of the fears of American policy makers in the late 1940s ever materialized.

By the 1960s, partly as a result of the nuclear stalemate and the European detente, the focus of American foreign policy had shifted decisively from Europe to the "third world," the underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. The idea of a cold war with Communism, however, remained central to American thinking and was gradually transformed from a set of possible perceptions into a collection of dogmas, a kind of rigidified consciousness. We are still fighting the cold war today, though we now tend to focus our anxieties on China. We still fear the deadly threat of Communist expansion, still intervene against "subversion," still build up our armed forces, still proffer foreign aid chiefly as a buffer against Communism, and still maintain that any defeat would be a total disaster. But now our power is measured in a new way. It is no longer sufficient to be stronger than Russia or even than Russia and China. In transferring the cold war to the third world, the United States has had to identify all the internal convulsions of the underdeveloped countries with the long-term struggle between what President Johnson calls the "forces of freedom" and the "forces of slavery." And what that means in fact is that we measure our strength against the revolutionary movements of three continents.

Doubtless there are men in Washington who understand that what is happening in the third world is very inadequately described in cold war terms and doubtless, too, many of those who believe these terms useful know that they are not always applicable. Nevertheless the familiar model of the cold war is still our fundamental criterion for judging current events and for planning American policy abroad. In the Congo, Vietnam, and the Dominican Republic, for example, our actions have been consistently aimed at repeating earlier cold war victories. The United States remains, as Johnson, Rusk, MacNamara and Bundy have said over and over again in the past year, unalterably committed to "preventing the spread of Communism."

Besides the grip of the past, the single most important reason for the dominance of the cold war model in Washington is that the Russians and Chinese also use it, though of course in a somewhat different form. Their theorists, statesmen and generals believe, or at any rate argue, that an international civil war is going on between the forces of imperialism led

by the United States and the forces of nationalism and revolution, the leadership of which is disputed by Russia and China. Indeed, the two countries trumpet to the world their versions of the cold war ideology, driven now by their need to outdo one another in Leninist orthodoxy. Thus, both the propaganda and, to some extent, the foreign policies of the Communist states strengthen America's own anti-Communist predictions. The two views of a world at war reinforce each other: this is surely one of the most important forms of contemporary international cooperation.

But if this consensus between East and West has its primary basis in the two symbiotic ideologies, it has developed a secondary basis in interest, in the shared desire for undiminished national power. For as the United States, Russia, and China have acquired allies committed to the same struggle in which they are actively engaged, they have come to see that their own leadership and the unity of their blocs depends upon the continuation of the cold war. For example, with the establishment of SEATO and CENTO and the reorganization of the OAS—all as openly avowed cold-war blocs—American leadership has been recognized over vast areas of the third world. It would be very difficult for us to relinquish either the power or the responsibilities which that leadership entails, and so we are driven continually to reassert its rationale and to rediscover the crisis in which it was born. Similarly, Chinese and Russian hopes for decisive influence in the third world also depend heavily upon the continuation and sometimes the intensification of the cold war. The split between the two Communist powers has not caused either one to call into question the reality of the international civil war. Instead, China and Russia compete to lead *one* of the sides. Neither country can give up the cold war perspective without also giving up (to the other) such hopes as it still has of maintaining its grip on foreign Communist parties and governments.

The Russo-American detente has confirmed this view. A let-up in the cold war, dictated by a variety of reasons which together overrode the desire to maintain the old alliance system, this detente has contributed to the re-creation of a multi-national power structure in Europe. The Russian hold on Eastern Europe and the American hold on the West have both been loosened. Indeed, if the German question were ever resolved, both powers would probably lose their European blocs altogether; at any rate, the blocs would be radically reconstituted. In the third world, however, the rival powers still hope to construct a two-camp system, and so treat neutralist regimes with deep suspicion.

There is another reason for the readiness of Americans to impose

cold war patterns upon the third world. This is that the frequently justifiable attacks upon American economic interests in, for example, Latin America, can most easily be explained by investors and property owners in terms of Communist subversion, and most easily resisted by our government once they have been so explained. This saves us from having to face the actual local consequences of economic exploitation. But the ideological defense of private property abroad only serves to reinforce, it does not itself establish, the cold war perspective. So, indeed, does the fact that there exist in every underdeveloped country local "men of substance" quick to serve their own interests by labeling every domestic disturbance as Communist-inspired. These people pick up the vocabulary of the cold war and help to provide occasions for and justifications of American intervention. But that vocabulary carries conviction in Washington not because of the character of the local situation, but because of the genuine belief that international Communism, inherently expansionist, enormously powerful, with a worldwide network of zealous, disciplined agents, poses a deadly threat to American security. We are often tied to reactionary forces abroad both by politics and economics, by a common commitment to the cold war and a shared interest in free enterprise, but the crucial tie is the first of these.

II

It is always possible to find third world politicians willing to act out the cold war both at home and abroad, but in fact third world *politics* has very little to do with the struggle between Communism and anti-Communism. It may more usefully be explored in terms of that revolutionary process which Western theorists call "modernization." The use of this common term ought not to suggest, however, that this is a process necessarily culminating in something like American or Russian modernity. Instead, modernization is literally an open-ended, or, perhaps better, an unending development. The sorts of transformations involved can be suggested, but it is not possible even to sketch the shape of a transformed society. And it would be sheer folly to attempt to force all the upheavals, advances, and retreats which accompany modernization into just two categories, depending on whether they bring the country involved nearer to Communism or to some stable anti-Communism.

Modernization involves: 1) the winning of national independence, politically when that is necessary and economically when that is possible, and the creation of a unified state; 2) a social revolution displacing traditional elites and various colonial ruling groups; 3) the mobilization of the population for cooperative political and economic activity; and 4) a systematic national effort to achieve sustained economic growth. Obvious-

ly, these four elements need not all appear together; it is possible, for example, to imagine economic development led by an old elite, as in Japan, or the achievement of national independence without any subsequent attempt at popular mobilization, as in Nigeria today. The possible combinations are endless, as are the possible forms of independence, revolution, mobilization and development. And finally, of course, failure at all four is possible, and in some cases likely, though not a failure which prevents subsequent attempts.

Numerous ideologies are available to a country entering upon the modernization process. Nationalism is the most obvious of these and has been universally adopted; indeed, every other ideology has by now been decisively modified by various sorts of ethnic, religious, and patriotic passion. Partly for this reason, the connections between any given political creed, especially one which claims universal validity, and the modernization process are likely to be extremely complex. Leaders cannot simply *choose* the ideology which pleases them most, nor can they simply *use* the ideology they have chosen. Their choice is the product of local traditions, experiences, and struggles (the last of these probably having little to do with the great power conflicts). And once a given ideology has been adopted, it will have a life and influence of its own, even as it is changed in accordance with local needs.

Communism today represents one, or several, of the available ideologies. It has and probably will continue to have certain resonances with the revolutions in the third world, due largely to its historical connection with the Leninist attack on imperialism and its association with Russian and now with Chinese modernization. However, as the histories of these two countries suggest, Communism is by no means the "best" ideology for modernization (if such a thing could be found). It carries with it excess intellectual and political baggage which makes the national effort more difficult and more painful than it might otherwise be. It no longer offers anything like a clear set of programmatic injunctions, but only a variety of national experiences to be imitated—as well as a variety of errors to be avoided. Most important of all, although Communist ideology is no longer tied to a coherent international movement, it still implies a degree of subservience to a foreign power incompatible with modern nationalism. Thus, Communism is not today an easy choice to make, unless one of the great powers contributes to simplifying the alternatives, as we did in Cuba.

The other available ideologies are harder to categorize, but probably easier to choose. They range from modified liberalism and social democracy (India, Venezuela) through military nationalism (Pakistan, Iraq)

to various forms of authoritarianism (Egypt, Guinea). Viewing the third world as a whole, it would appear that non-liberal, non-Communist ideologies predominate and are likely to continue to do so. But new forms appear constantly and it is hard to tell what the future holds, especially hard because, even after twenty years of international activism, we know so very little about the internal politics of the underdeveloped countries.

Insofar as the United States, China, and Russia succeed in imposing the cold war on the third world and escalating local upheavals into international confrontations, they will succeed also in narrowing the range of experience and of possible ideological choices. And they will enormously increase the dynamism and rigidity of the chosen ideologies. Whatever happens, however, Communism will remain a possibility for all the third world countries. It is in the interest of the United States, then, to act to increase the number of choices, so that Communism is not one of two, but one of many possible ideologies. This would do more than simply decrease the likelihood of Communist success; it would also minimize the significance of such success when it occurred. For in a world freed from the compulsions of the cold war, nationalist adaptations even of American, Russian, or Chinese sponsored ideologies would not improve the position of any of the great powers—precisely because they would be *nationalist* and they would be *adaptations*. It is only in the context of the cold war that “victories” become absolutely uniform items in a deadly competition, added, subtracted, and multiplied by increasingly hysterical bookkeepers.

III

Cold war strategies were presumably designed to meet the threat of Communist expansion. And it must be said that American policies have been relatively successful in reducing the power of Communist movements and in limiting Russian and Chinese influence in many parts of the world. But these have not been the only consequences of our strategies. Based on ideological distortions and motivated by a needless fear, they have frequently had needlessly destructive effects upon third world countries. And fear and destructiveness have had damaging effects upon ourselves as well.

First of all, in countries where we have intervened most actively, in Greece, Iran, Guatemala, and South Vietnam, for example, the effect of our presence has not been simply to weaken Communism, but to weaken all revolutionary movements and sometimes, literally, to crush all modernizing initiative. And this result seems to follow from our policy as a whole and not from occasional or local stupidities. For though the United States shares with both China and Russia a deep-rooted distrust

of genuinely nationalistic radicalism, the two Communist powers often find it in their interest to support such radicalism, whether or not they can bring their own adherents to the fore, as they generally cannot. The United States, on the other hand, often acts as if our national survival depended on opposing every expression of indigenous radicalism, in part because we *can* bring our people to the fore and need not take the risks which nationalist or left-wing politics inevitably involves. Thus our very power, exercised within a cold war setting, continually leads us to support and form alliances with reactionary social groups. And as we strengthen such groups abroad we also limit the international significance of those very governments which even Washington acknowledges to be the brightest hope of the third world, such as those members of the OAS who objected to our recent Dominican intervention.

Secondly, the exercise of our power sometimes leads to armed clashes in which American military or paramilitary forces fight against local insurgents. Even when military escalation does not take place, the human cost of such "little wars" is terrible, far out of proportion to the actual victories gained. Nevertheless, the maintenance of the responsibilities which we have incurred in the past twenty years constantly pushes us toward these types of clashes: so many "anti-Communist" governments have received American support and now must be defended when they are challenged by domestic radicals. Indeed, so long as we are determined to fight the cold war, we have no choice but intervention. For there is no doubt that if we did not intervene militarily, many regimes considerably to the left of those now in power would be established and, occasionally, limited opportunities would open up for local Communists.

Thirdly, even beneficent intervention, such as foreign aid, is distorted as a result of the cold war. The United States may well hope to repeat the success of the Marshall Plan and bring development and political stability to the third world nations. We look forward to relatively quick results, under the auspices of "responsible" politicians. But the prospects for success in the third world are not very good. Marshall Plan aid was given to nations already developed, which only required capital in order rapidly to rebuild their economy. In the third world, on the other hand, complex political and social changes are required if development is to take place. Economic aid cannot and should not be expected to yield results overnight, and it would be disastrous if such aid were used to stave off the necessary transformations. But the cold war model demands political stability and "responsibility" and gives both priority over economic development whenever a choice must be made. And so our assistance tends to veer away from the goals of moderniza-

tion. It is inefficient because it focuses too narrowly on bolstering the army and the police and unproductive because it places money and power in the hands of those who guarantee order but who may oppose all change.

Today the United States is far more willing to underwrite short-term, or supposedly short-term, counterinsurgency operations than long-term economic development. The changeover from the Alliance for Progress to our intervention in the Dominican Republic bears witness to the futility of economic assistance based on cold war attitudes. Here is the clearest example of how the cold war imposes an utterly unrealistic urgency. As a result, a broad program aiming at social change was sacrificed for that hit-and-run interventionism which we have pioneered. The main difficulty with such a policy, in addition to the wasteful expense of life and resources, is that it so obviously bears repetition; indeed, it will have to be repeated over and over again, because it is incapable of generating either progress or stability.

Fourthly, our present strategy involves us in unnecessary confrontations with Russia and China. It may be true that certain sorts of great power confrontations are inevitable, even in a world in which bipolarity has been surpassed. But there is a considerable difference between ordinary power competition and cold war intervention. The first holds open the possibility of insulating international politics, as far as possible, from the effects of local upheaval. The second tends to absorb local into international politics, thereby destabilizing both. In an age of revolution, the difference may be only one of degree, but it is nonetheless crucial. In Cuba, for example, it was the American cold war response to Castro's radicalism which eventually helped to open the way for the placing of Russian missiles and the international crisis which ensued.

In the past, critics of United States foreign policy have often accused the government of merely reacting to Russian or Chinese moves instead of itself seizing the initiative. Today the initiative is clearly in our hands; America's capacity to act in the third world is unequaled by that of any other great power. Very often in the future, as occasionally in the immediate past, the decision whether or not to transform a civil war into a full-scale international confrontation will lie with us. And cold war logic presses American leaders towards a kind of political, if not always military, escalation. As President Johnson said in his important speech at Baylor University (May, 1965), civil wars and international wars have very nearly ceased to be distinguishable. This is not true, but it will often seem true if the third world is viewed only through the spectacles of cold war ideology.

Finally, it must be pointed out that we have become involved in what is really a very strange sort of conflict. We cannot win the cold war in the third world, and so it has no end. Yet it appears absolutely necessary *always to be winning it*. Because the struggle is thought to be total, a conflict not of nations or interests, but "ways of life," all the battlefronts are intimately related. As Acheson argued eighteen years ago, a loss anywhere entails defeat everywhere. This is the logic behind the domino theory. The notion that every domino must fall as soon as the first one is knocked over has been presented to us as a strategic doctrine relevant most recently to the Caribbean and to Southeast Asia, but in fact it has no specific or necessary geographic reference. It is a deduction from the cold war ideology. Given this theory, every political or military encounter, however minor, becomes a powerful magnet drawing endless quantities of men and materials and imposing commitments over a wider and wider field. In such conditions of ideological combat, all intelligent strategic planning becomes impossible.

Even insignificant concessions or realistic adjustments to an ever-changing balance of power are extremely difficult to explain and justify to a nation which has made the cold war its central perspective. The cold war ideology thus poses a permanent threat to rationality in our foreign policy. It has the simultaneous effects of breeding in the American people an extreme readiness to acquiesce in military solutions to complex political and diplomatic problems and of bolstering domestic conservatism and reaction. In the past there have been indications that government leaders wished to rationalize certain aspects of our policies, particularly our relations with China, but have refrained from doing so because of the fear of domestic repercussions. Liberal politicians, especially, seem driven by such fear to a kind of international toughness—presumably for the sake of their liberalism. And yet the cold war imposes extreme limitations on domestic welfare measures, the expansion of education, urban renewal, and so on, not least because of the enormous and potentially escalating costs which it involves. Here is the sort of dilemma from which conventional politicians, however skillful, cannot extricate themselves: because of popular feelings which elaborate petty "defeats" into political nightmares, it seems impossible to avoid or terminate cold war encounters, and yet the continuation or expansion of such encounters endangers valuable domestic programs.

IV

Thus the cold war has its price and this is far higher than we should be willing to pay, far higher than we need to pay. For there is nothing in the logic of international politics, or of third world

politics, which forces us to fight that war. Alternative and better foreign policies are available to us, if only we are willing to accept modernization as a complex and open-ended process and third world insurgency as a local phenomenon. These can be summed up very simply, whatever complexity their application would involve: *we must be willing to help economically when we can; we must not interfere militarily*. In part, such policies would simply commit us once again to the conventional procedures of international politics: diplomatic maneuvering and economic bargaining. President De Gaulle's activities during the last few years suggest what this involves, and it must be said that after the frenzies of the cold war, there is something very attractive in De Gaulle's intransigent conventionalism. But the United States is a far more powerful nation than France and need not be so concerned as are the French with national independence and prestige. We, and perhaps we alone, are capable of sustaining a major commitment to the modernization process itself.

We are capable of participating significantly in the transformation of the third world; indeed, given our power, we can hardly help but participate significantly. The only question is what form our involvement will take. We can inject ourselves into the third world as an uninvited anti-Communist policeman, with all the consequences that entails; or we can provide massive economic and technical aid for modernization whenever that aid is requested and without regard for the political auspices under which development takes place, so long as it does take place. There have been well-meaning American statesmen who believed that we could do both these things. But in most parts of the world, largely because of the new nationalism, the two tasks are incompatible. We can function as policemen only at the risk of alienating all those social forces genuinely committed to transformation. The idea that a local anti-Communist vanguard, working in the shadow of American military power, can rally popular support and modernize its country is one of the most unfortunate of cold war myths, unfortunate because it has led so many liberals to support policies which in fact had nothing to do with modernization.

All this is not to suggest that there are no economic or political criteria which might serve to determine what countries should get how much aid. Nor that such criteria would have nothing to do with international competition. Nor again that decisions about aid do not constitute interventions in the third world. But whatever the precise nature of the criteria, the effect of the interventions should be clear: not to overthrow governments or defend a spurious stability, but to assist develop-

ment. And this effect will not be achieved so long as America's primary political purpose is to ward off leftist transformations.

Military intervention in the third world is only justified when it is really counter-intervention, that is, when it represents a response to overt military action by one nation within the borders of another and not to so-called subversion or infiltration. The paradigm cases might be the role of the Italian army in Spain after 1936 or the full-scale invasion of South Korea in 1950. Except in cases like these, there is neither reason nor excuse for a unilateral military response. There may occasionally be reasons for some genuinely collective use of force which cuts across ideological lines, as by the UN in the Congo after the incomplete Belgian withdrawal or, perhaps, in South Africa in the foreseeable future. But that is another matter, and the legal procedures for such collective intervention are only just being developed. What must be stressed is that neither counter-intervention nor collective intervention ought to aim at particular political solutions, nor ought either to serve to disguise anti-Communism rescue operations. Both are ways of responding to aggression, aimless violence, and atrocity. Their only goal is to create or restore the necessary conditions for local self-government.

So far as American policy goes, then, there must be a choice between cold war strategies and those based on the realities of third world politics. And that choice should be clear. The United States should renounce unilateral military intervention and also CIA counter-insurgency. It is time to bring our policemen home. Our country and the rest of the world will be no less safe when we do.

V

Against the policy proposals just put forward three important objections can be made, which deserve to be considered in detail.

Objection 1: Even though we alter our policies, we have no way of making Russia and China alter their own. Thus, while unilateral intervention doubtless has its dangers, unilateral non-intervention is more dangerous still. It is nothing more than an open invitation to the Communist powers to overthrow non-Communist governments in the third world and to seize control of the modernization process everywhere.

In reality, however, it is extremely difficult to "export revolution" and it would probably make little difference in the third world if Russia and China continued to act in terms of their own cold war ideology. The American belief in the almost infinite potentialities of Communist "subversion" is one of the more amazing aspects of cold war history. Russia and China can and of course do send propaganda, guns

and even men into Africa, Asia and Latin America (though they can afford far fewer of all three than the United States), but this infiltration has not been at all successful. There is probably no country in the third world where internal Communist success, such as it is, can be attributed to external subversion. Indeed, the American CIA, for all its much publicized ineptitude, has been far more successful in overthrowing governments than have any agents of "International Communism."

Even those vaunted Communist guerrillas, against whom so much of our present foreign policy is directed, have never overthrown a minimally effective national regime and have been particularly useless across national boundaries. In fact, they have only succeeded in the very special circumstances arising out of World War II, when they fought against German or Japanese occupation forces and then moved into the political vacuum left by the withdrawal of the conquerors. This was the background of Tito's victory in Yugoslavia, of the near-success of the EAM in Greece, and of the two Communist triumphs in Asia: China and Vietnam. But in the years before the Japanese invasion, the Chinese Communists themselves were being defeated, and that by the weak and inefficient Kuomintang government. After World War II, guerrillas in South Korea (1948-50) and in the Philippines fared badly against relatively ineffective governments which nevertheless were able to muster some local legitimacy. When the guerrillas represented a national minority, as in Malaya, even a colonial regime was able to suppress them. There is simply no reason to anticipate the success of Communist insurgents, especially if they are foreign, except in conditions of massive political discontent or total administrative breakdown. Hence, it will probably continue to be true that only those governments will fall to guerrilla forces which are in any case both morally and politically indefensible.

Assume for the sake of argument, however, that in a given country Communist guerrillas, with some minor assistance from China or Russia, seize power. There is still no reason to assume that the local revolutionary forces will be controlled in any significant way by either of the great Communist powers. To control those forces which *resist* revolution, which generally have a very small popular base and are fundamentally dependent on foreign support, is certainly much easier. Yet even that is difficult enough, as we ought to have learned from our experience with Rhee in Korea and Diem in Vietnam: in both cases we became the prisoners of our own kept men. To hold the reins on a popularly supported revolutionary leadership is virtually impossible; nationalist

feelings almost immediately overwhelm Communist "internationalism." Thus, Russia has not been able to dominate any of those countries whose Communist parties came to power on their own; nor is it likely that China could dominate a Communist Vietnam. Moscow is finding it increasingly difficult to control even those East European governments raised to power by the Red Army.

There is, of course, the possibility of open Russian or Chinese military intervention on the model, say, of American action in the Dominican Republic. This might occur if anti-Communist revolts broke out in North Korea or, again, in Eastern Europe. But here the lesson of Hungary in 1956 ought to be clear: given the cold war polarization, there is nothing that the United States can do in such a case. Once that polarization is overcome, however, the intervention itself becomes less likely and numerous opportunities for a bold and inventive diplomatic response are opened up.

It should be added that the premise behind this objection, that if we stop acting in cold war terms, the Communists will not, is by no means certain. It is probably far too pessimistic; for with the development of polycentrism there are indications that certain Communist powers would like, if they could, to pursue a less ideological, more traditionalist foreign policy, in the style perhaps of the French.

Objection 2: Even if subversion and infiltration are not real threats, Communist parties or movements may come to power through purely internal political struggles. There would then be many more Communist countries in the world and, whatever differences they might have among themselves and despite the inability of either China or Russia to establish its hegemony, they would all be united in opposition to American interests.

First of all, it is very doubtful that there will be "many more" Communist countries. Once again we encounter that strange phenomenon of the cold war, the tendency of Americans to accept uncritically the ideology and propaganda of the Communist leaders themselves. But just as the Communists are not omniscient subversives, so they are not omniscient politicians. The record of their mistakes since World War II, in one country after another, is long and impressive. There is no reason for us to credit their boast that this is "their century" or that "history is on their side."

Assume once again, however, that a few Communist governments do appear, thanks in part to American non-intervention. The effect of this would certainly be to produce new forms of national Communism, but by no means necessarily a stronger Communist alliance aimed at

the United States. For ideology has proved to be a vastly more successful unifying force in domestic than in international politics; it creates nations out of committed individuals, but not blocs out of committed nations. Nor is Communist ideology an exception to this general rule. Indeed, united action may well be hampered by Marxism-Leninism which, with its doctrine of a single truth, makes the cooperation of equals and the toleration of even minor differences of opinion extremely difficult. In any case, the varied foreign policies of the present Communist states, which have developed in spite of the cold war, indicate that there is no reason to expect a monolithic attitude toward the United States in the future.

Still, a number of new governments hostile to the United States might appear and there is no reason to be happy about such a prospect. But there is also no reason to believe that the hostility of such new governments would be permanent, particularly if the United States had not been involved in opposing their accession to power. Nor is it necessary to assume that they would pose any serious military threat. Communist regimes might permit the establishment of Russian or Chinese bases on their soil, as Castro's government did in Cuba, but they are likely to do so only under extreme duress. For such bases call the independence of the host country severely into question, and Communist countries seem to guard their independence, when they can, as jealously as non-Communist countries. Only implacable American hostility, as manifested at the Bay of Pigs, or some other threat like that which a resurgent Germany might pose to Poland, could force a proud, nationalist government to offer its territory to one or another of the great powers.

Objection 3: Even if Communist governments pose and are likely to pose no threat to American national security, it is still our responsibility to establish or preserve democratic governments whenever possible and to intervene whenever necessary to save millions of people from the terrors of totalitarian rule.

There have indeed been interventions in history which, while not primarily altruistic, assisted the triumph of liberal or democratic regimes, like the intervention of the English in the sixteenth century Dutch war of independence and of the French in the eighteenth century American war of independence. But it is one thing to help a people struggling to throw off an imperialist yoke and quite another to inject oneself into the middle of a *civil* war in which no other great power is actively intervening. In practice, this second sort of intervention is likely to prove incompatible with its supposedly democratic purposes. For democ-

racy obviously requires a local foundation; it is uniquely dependent upon popular acceptance. And it has not been the case, at least in the recent past, that the presence of American troops in a fiercely divided country generates any great desire for democratic institutions. What it generates in fact is that familiar polarization which leaves no stable foundation for the American presence except local political rightists or military leaders.

But it is almost always these same right-wing and militarist groups which pose the greatest internal threat to democracy. There has never been a successful Communist revolt against an even moderately democratic government, except in Czechoslovakia, which had already been consigned to the Russian sphere of influence in a series of diplomatic agreements and where the Communist *coup* took place in the shadow of Russian guns. But in republican Spain and Weimar Germany, and over and over again in Latin America, democratic regimes have been overthrown from the right. And in Latin America, at least, the right-wing rebels have often included army officers and police counterinsurgents trained in the United States for the war against totalitarianism. So the argument for democratic intervention is not very plausible. It simply doesn't happen that way; what happens is quite different, and is usually disastrous.

But there is another question here, and that is whether the United States has any right whatsoever to assume responsibility for saving, not merely the world, but this or that particular country as well, from Communist control. Such an extraordinary assumption of responsibility ought to stimulate all those capacities for ironic and detached comment which were once employed against the somewhat similar notion of a "white man's burden." For American anti-Communism conceals, or rather does not quite conceal, chauvinism and condescension. Asians, Africans, and Latin Americans, all these backward peoples, we suggest, are likely to be deceived, subverted, infiltrated, and duped by Communist agents. Somehow we must save them, against their will if necessary. In fact, of course, the new nations of the third world have produced politicians as canny and tough as any ever raised in the West. They will often require our economic and technical assistance, but only rarely our political advice and never our political policeman. Given half a chance, they will guard their own.

VI

In the aftermath of World War II, the United States extended a kind of hegemony over a large part of the globe. In the coming years this hegemony is going to be challenged by the competing activities of

other great powers. Even more importantly, it will be challenged by the appearance of a great variety of movements and regimes, nationalist, generally leftist, committed to modernization. Unless present American policies are changed, we are likely to resist both types of challenges, often with armed force. The crucial rationale for our resistance will be the cold war ideology. We will argue that any weakening of American power is necessarily a strengthening of international Communism.

But this is not so. In the world today, a defeat for one side is not necessarily a victory for the other side, because there no longer is a single "other." The triumph of leftism or neutralism in, say, Latin America, would not be a "defeat" for the United States, unless we so recognized it and responded to it. We can, if we have the proper vision, accept the coming reduction of America's cold war position as an opportunity to open up the most varied political possibilities throughout the world and to apply our vast economic resources to the most significant problems facing humanity today. We can devote our energies and resources to modernization, to the struggle against misery and poverty in the third world. Here is the real moral issue of our time, and also the issue far more likely than the cold war to determine the politics of the next century.

Benjamin Schwartz

MODERNIZATION AND THE MAOIST VISION

Some Reflections on Chinese Communist Goals

What can be said at this point about the broad goals and motivations of the present Chinese Communist leadership? The question is, of course, distressingly imprecise and begs further definition. Is the leadership a monolithic group? Have its goals remained constant and unchanging? Is there a rigid Chinese Communist "goal structure," etc.?

On the question of leadership I shall simply adhere to the conventional hypothesis that Mao Tse-tung and those closest to him have played a leading role in determining basic policy shifts during the last fifteen years. There may have been moments when his presence has receded from the center of the stage. In the early years after 1950, his role may have been somewhat inhibited by the awesome presence of Stalin. His influence may have flagged at the Wuhan meeting at the end of 1958 and after the retreat from the great leap forward. On the whole, however, one perceives the imprint of his outlook (probably developed in close collaboration with Liu Shao-ch'i) at almost every crucial turning point from the land reform campaign of 1950 to the present frenzied drive for "socialist education."

On the matter of goals, while there is certainly no rigid static "goal structure," while the relationship among goals has undoubtedly been enormously complex, problematic and shifting over time, it may nevertheless be possible to speak of a certain range of broad goals which has remained fairly constant and which may have set certain outer limits to the possibilities of policy choice. This does not mean, one should hasten to add, that the whole history of Communist China during the last fifteen years can be understood in terms of an unproblematic implementation of the leadership's goals. Unyielding objective conditions,

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unforeseen events and contingencies, and the recalcitrances of human nature have certainly been just as decisive as the goals of the leadership in shaping the history of China since 1949. Interpretations of events in Communist China have often swung wildly from the view that China is an inert clay in the hands of the leaders who shape it as they will to the view that everything that has happened is a result of an iron "objective necessity" which shapes all the leadership's decisions. All that will be urged in this article is that the goals of the leadership have been one of the factors shaping the course of events.

There has been much discussion of Chinese Communist goals during the last decade and a half and there is a certain range of broad assumptions which can be discerned in most analyses of the Chinese scene whether written by academic experts poring over Chinese Communist media or visitors who have been there. One such widely shared assumption is that the overriding, indeed, all-embracing goal of the Chinese Communist leadership is to achieve the modernization of China or—put somewhat differently—everything that is happening in Communist China is an aspect of the process of modernization. There is also the assumption that the basic goal of the leadership is the achievement of a certain vision of society spelled out in the scriptures of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism. This vision may involve aspects of what is called "modernization" in the West, but modernization is conceived of as a part of a much larger whole defined by the ideology. This view of the goals of the leadership is, of course, the avowed view of the leadership itself but is also shared by many others who may be ardently attracted to the vision or violently repelled by it. Another view places central stress on nationalism—on the goal of national power and prestige and on the achievement of world power status as quickly as possible. It is of course true that to the protagonists of the modernization school nationalism is simply an "aspect" or "function" of some all-inclusive modernization process and hence not to be considered under a separate rubric. To others it must be considered as a force in its own right. There is another view which may be said to concern motivation more than goals—namely, that the Chinese Communist leadership is essentially engrossed in the limitless "totalitarian" aggrandizement of its own power, both within China and in the world at large. There are undoubtedly other assumptions which can and have been made concerning the goals and motives of the leaders, but I shall confine my attention to these.

Power

Turning first of all to the view that all the policies and decisions of the leadership are designed to maximize its power, we find that in recent

years, particularly since the death of Stalin, there has been a distinct decline in the popularity of the "theory of totalitarianism" or all theories which stress the power drives of the leadership. There has, in fact, been a tendency on the part of some to brush aside the relevance of power considerations entirely on grounds which are a shade too facile. Power, we are told, is not an end in itself. It is functional to goals which lie beyond it or it plays a certain function in the larger social system, etc. It must always be explained in terms of "larger" social, historic and economic forces of which it is the mere instrument. One might say that for the whole course of human history power has always been "functional." It has always led to objective results, bad or good, which have survived its pursuit. This is just as true of Rameses and Ch'in Shih Huang-ti as it is of Mao Tse-tung. This by no means precludes the fact that it has also been pursued as an end in itself and that this pursuit has played its own role in human history. "Objectively" Macbeth may have been a most successful Scottish "state-builder" but this by no means proves that the side of him which Shakespeare chooses to depict is irrelevant to a discussion of his day-to-day political behaviour. Power has always been functional and always been demonic and the end is not yet in sight. What vitiates the narrow "power approach" is the assumption that a concern with the maintenance or expansion of power is necessarily incompatible with the pursuit of more general goals. If the Chinese Communist Party is conceived of as the sole effective instrument for achieving a certain vision of the good society or for making China a great world power or for consummating the process of modernization, then the general goals and power considerations may actually reinforce and enhance each other.

Those who deny the relevance of power considerations might at this point maintain, however, that if power considerations and objective goals often move in the same direction why assign any particular causal weight to power considerations? In fact, however, at given points in time they may by no means move in the same direction. If one assumes that one of the basic domestic aims of the "hundred flowers" campaign was to provide the intelligentsia (a term which, of course, includes both professionals and academic and literary intellectuals) with an opportunity to participate more fully and freely in the economic and scientific development of China; if a reasoned judgment had been made that further economic and scientific development required the more positive participation of the intelligentsia, one can hardly say that the experiment was given time to prove itself. The fact that Mao Tse-tung was still vigorously supporting the program in February 1957 only to allow him-

self to be won over to the opposition (which had undoubtedly been strong in the Party from the outset) within the next few months can hardly be due to its failure to produce spectacular economic results in the early months of 1957. The drive was speedily terminated when it seemed to involve a threat to the unlimited political power of the leadership. Similarly, while the purges of Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih in 1954 and of P'eng Teh-huai in 1959 undoubtedly involved policy differences from the outset, it is quite clear that in the end these "anti-party elements" were associated with a threat to power. The vehemence with which the ideological remolding of the army was carried on in the 1960-62 period can hardly be disassociated from this threat to power.

All of these instances, of course, involve not so much a concern for the expansion of power as for the preservation of power in being and it may well be one of the defects of the theory of totalitarianism that it dogmatically assumes that the concern for power must always be a concern for its maximization. It makes no allowance for the possibility that a concern for the maintenance of power in being may, at times, outweigh the concern for its maximization in the future. Nevertheless, the power approach reminds us that we are dealing with a group of men who know and savor power and its uses as much as any ruling group that has ever existed. They are not merely the embodiment of a social vision, or the destiny of China, or the process of modernization. Mao's spectacular projection of his own authority in the Communist bloc and the world at large and the present hysterical cult of Mao in China may serve a certain vision of the world or be in line with certain policies but also admirably feed his limitless *hybris*. The factor of power is relevant to a discussion of all these policies and shifts in policy. Indeed, at points where the implementation of policy may seem to endanger power interests, it may be the most relevant factor of all.

Modernization

If the ever-present concern with power by no means precludes the pursuit of broader goals—what are these broader goals? One widely accepted response is that the goal is the modernization of China. One could, of course, devote volumes to a discussion of the meaning of this term and yet there does seem to be a kind of common core of shared meaning which is implicit at least in most American discussions. In general, it tends to mean something approximating Max Weber's conception of the process of rationalization in all those spheres of social action—economic, political, military, legal, educational—which lend themselves to the application of "*Zwecksrationalität*." It involves the sustained

attention to the most appropriate, "rational" and efficient methods for increasing man's ability to control nature and society for a variety of ends. Economists often treat it as being co-extensive with industrialization and it is indeed in this area that the meaning of the term "rationalization" can be most concretely elucidated. Weber himself in spite of his tendency to use the cover term "capitalism" (presumably an economic category) was just as much concerned with political bureaucracy, military development and legal "rationalization." It tends to involve the notion of a highly developed division of labor of "functional specificity" with the corollary that men should have a degree of autonomy and authority within their various areas of competence. It also involves a stress on norms of universality rather than ascription and thus, should involve social mobility—the opening up of careers to talents. Looking at the whole concept from the point of view of China, one is inclined to stress that it also may involve a sober respect for objective conditions. The technician and, for that matter, the professional bureaucrat will be very conscious of the limits imposed by his materials and by the imperatives of the situation within which he operates.

Actually one can distinguish two versions of the concept of modernization which may have quite different implications. One version treats the "process of modernization" as a vast, indeed, an all-embracing impersonal historic force. Revolutions, ideologies, nationalism and the policies of governments are all surface eruptions of this underlying process which is independent of the wills of men and operates behind their backs very much like Hegel's *"Weltgeist"* or Marx's "mode of production." In the other version, modernization becomes a conscious project or consciously entertained goal of large or small groups of men. The two versions may have quite different consequences for an analysis of the behavior of the Chinese leadership. If modernization is an all-enveloping force which controls all the acts both conscious and unconscious of the leadership, all their acts must be explained as a "function" of the modernization process. The leadership may explicitly profess concern with other matters; it may even sincerely be concerned "subjectively" with other matters. In fact, all its behavior is determined by the imperatives of the modernization process. If, on the other hand, modernization is a goal consciously pursued, it is not impossible that it may compete in the minds of the leadership with other goals. In fact, the decisions of the leadership may have something to do with shaping the order of priorities and strategies of the modernization process itself.

The adherents of the monistic modernization theory seldom if ever raise questions about the goals of modernization itself. It is assumed

that the goals are immanent in the process and that we know what they are. Among many Americans there is in fact the latent assumption that a fully modernized society will look exactly like the United States with all its social and cultural specificities. Even if we assume that modernization is leading in the end of days to some universal homogenized human condition, *in processu* it is quite compatible with quite different conceptions of the priority of ends to be served. A highly advanced industrial society may be able to lavish equal resources on state power and prestige and welfare. A less developed society will have to make choices in this area and these choices may have a most profound effect on the strategy of modernization.

Nationalism

Viewed in this light nationalism may be much more than a "function" of the modernization process. Where it occupies a central place, it may actually determine the strategy of modernization. To assume that Stalin's lop-sided emphasis on heavy industrial development was a function of Soviet nationalism seems to make much more sense than to assume that it was the only rational strategy of industrialization in an underdeveloped area. Similarly one must assume that the apparent priority granted to nuclear development in China through all the recent shifts in economic strategy is related fundamentally to its nationalist goals rather than to any obvious imperative of the modernization process.

The Chinese leadership's unquestioning adoption of this model after 1950 was due not simply to the fact that it was the orthodox Marxist-Leninist model of economic development but also to the fact that Stalin had in this model already bent Marxism-Leninism to national power purposes. As perfervid Chinese nationalists the Chinese leadership shared the preoccupations which lay behind Stalin's own choice of model. They were genuine Stalinists in their whole-hearted acceptance of Stalin's accommodation of Marxism-Leninism to the interests of a nation-state. It is thus entirely meaningful to stress that the speedy achievement of nationalist goals has been one of the unchanging central goals of the leadership which has shaped the priorities and strategy of the modernization process itself. This does not mean that the leadership is not committed to the welfare goals which we associate with modernization—with living standards, public health, literacy, etc.—but the relative priorities seem quite clear.

During the years from 1949–56 there can be little doubt that the goal of modernization *on the Soviet Model* was assiduously pursued by the Chinese Communist leadership in many sectors. After the Korean

War we have a gradual implementation of the Soviet model of economic development. There is a movement towards the creation of a state structure with a modern bureaucratic apparatus and the professionalization of the army on a Soviet model is vigorously pursued. It has indeed become the tendency among some to regard this eminently Soviet phase of Chinese development as the "modernizing" phase *par excellence* as opposed to the irrationalities of subsequent phases. Yet as we know, the relationship of the whole Soviet development to the supposed prerequisites of modernization has itself been the subject of endless, unresolved debates. Ideology is also deeply implicated in the whole Soviet development. What is mainly implied is that the Soviet model involves a stress on professionalization, on a degree of autonomy for professional hierarchies, particularly in the industrial, state administrative and military spheres. Franz Schurmann has, for instance, stressed the emphasis during this period on the Soviet conception of managerial responsibility in industry (without necessarily regarding it as pre-eminently rational).

One of the most striking facts of recent Chinese Communist history (particularly since 1956) has been the gradual departure from the Soviet model of modernization. Some have leaped to the conclusion that this marks the departure from a "rational" approach to modernization. Yet it might well be argued that, in part, the departure from the Soviet model of modernization was due to the realization that this model was not applicable to China's real situation. The Chinese could not reduce the peasantry to a subsistence level and then ignore the agricultural sector. To keep their vast population alive at the barest subsistence level it became obvious that a maximum attention to agriculture was imperative. In the strictly economic sphere one might argue that the economic policy pursued after 1960 with its emphasis on "agriculture as the base" has been much more rational in terms of China's conditions than the model of the 1953-56 period. In fact, one might argue that during the whole period from the "Hundred Flowers" campaign to the present campaign for "socialist education" all policies have borne some relationship to the problems of modernization.

The Maoist Vision of the Good Society

It nevertheless seems to me that if we are to understand some of the modes of response to these problems which have emerged since 1956, we must introduce another broad goal area which might be called ideological but which I shall refer to as the Maoist vision of the good society.

The vision involves not only a conception of the good society of the

future but also a sanctified image of the methods by which this vision is to be achieved. Certainly Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist ideology is one of the main sources of this vision, but this does not preclude the possibility that in some of its aspects it coincides with certain traditional Chinese habits of thought and behaviour. It draws above all on the actual experience of the Communist movement during the thirties and forties, and the interpretation of this experience enshrined in the Yen-an writings of Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-ch'i. As has often been pointed out, the "Yenan syndrome" seems to occupy a central, hallowed place in the vision of Mao Tse-tung and most of the elements which form part of the Maoist vision first appear, at least in their embryonic form, during this period.

The phrase "Maoist vision" seems to describe a static frame of reference and almost suggests something like an "operational code" which may provide a key to all the shifts and twists of Party policy since 1949. On the contrary, there is absolutely no reason to assume that it provided Mao with any prevision of the circumstances which were to give rise to the "Hundred Flowers" campaign or the "great leap forward" campaign, or to the circumstances which were to lead to their abrupt demise. Not all elements of the vision have been equally prominent at all times and some of them have only been made fully explicit in the course of time. Many elements of the vision are highly ambivalent ("dialectic") lending themselves to the support of quite opposing policies. And yet when viewed in the abstract, there is a kind of rough coherence among them.

Not only has the pursuit of this vision often cut across other goals of the leadership but has with varying degrees of intensity conditioned the manner in which these other goals have been pursued. Some elements of the vision have had an obvious and almost unremitting impact on reality. The enormous energies invested since 1949 in the effort to achieve the spiritual transformation of the entire Chinese people whether in the form of "study" (*hsüeh-hsi*), "thought reform," "remolding," "education through labor" or "socialist education" is one of the most obvious instances. At another level, some elements of the vision have been invoked and made most explicit in connection with certain specific campaigns—such as the notion of "contradictions among the people" at the time of the "Hundred Flowers" campaign or the emphasis on "subjective forces," "revolutionary romanticism" and "man as the decisive factor" at the time of the "great leap forward." One is tempted to say that, when invoked in this way, these ideological themes simply serve to confirm the infallibility of the "thought of Mao Tse-tung" in the

face of all shifts and twists in line, and—particularly since 1956—to confirm ever more emphatically the autonomy and originality of the “Chinese path.” Undoubtedly they do serve this purpose. Yet while these themes are hardly the “sufficient causes” of the campaigns of 1956, 1958 or other new departures, the genuine belief in the assumptions implicit in them may well explain the high confidence and élan with which these campaigns are pressed. One simply has to peruse Mao’s comments in such works as *The Socialist Upsurge in China’s Countryside* (1955) to appreciate the fervor of his belief in those “facts” which seem to support his vision. At another level, however, elements of the vision are obviously manipulated simply as ideology in the narrowest sense. Thus the fact that the slogans of the “Hundred Flowers” movement and of the great leap continue to live on into periods when they no longer apply is obviously a device designed to prove that Mao’s contributions to the storehouse of Marxism-Leninism are irrevocable and cumulative.

Consensus and Collectivism

What are some of the essential elements of the Maoist vision? There is first of all the overriding commitment to a society united by something approaching a total consensus and a society marked by radical collectivism. It may seem superfluous to speak of the collectivist goal of a Communist society, and yet the image of collectivity which has emerged in China, particularly since 1958, seems somewhat different in kind from that projected in the Soviet Union. The emphasis on the individual’s total self-abnegation and total immersion in the collectivity as ultimate goods; the frequent reference to the model of military life with its nostalgic allusions to the heroic and idyllic guerrilla bands of the past are particular characteristics of the Maoist projection of the future. Lenin’s own projection of Utopia in *State and Revolution* still draws heavily on Marx’s own meager and vague descriptions which, as we know, speak in terms of the total liberation and self-fulfilment of the individual. Whether this language makes Marx a sort of ultimate liberal as some of his interpreters would have us believe, may be open to serious doubt, yet there is the fact that the individual and his situation does play a central role in Marx’s Utopia. While the Soviet official ideology has been as deeply suspicious of the whole notion of alienation in the young Marx as the Chinese, a somewhat crasser form of the concern with the interests of the individual can nevertheless be discerned in its projection of Communism. The Maoist version on the other hand projects a kind of collectivist mysticism. Commenting on the European and Soviet discussions of Marxism, Chou Yang states “that in advocating

the return of Man to himself they are actually advocating absolute individual freedom and asking the people who live under Socialism to return to the human nature of bourgeois individualism and to restore the capitalism by which it is fostered."¹

Even more characteristic has been the enormous emphasis on the power of spiritual transformation (indoctrination seems to be far too weak a term) to bring about this society of collective man. The hope is that of a kind of internalized total consensus achieved mainly by spiritual methods. The ultimate roots of this emphasis may be sought in Lenin's own emphasis on the conscious factor (further extended by Stalin) perhaps fed to some extent by the Confucian faith in the power of moral influence. Its more immediate background is to be sought in the circumstances of the Yenan period when the methods of "remolding" were first applied to members and prospective members of the Communist Party. The notion was later vastly extended to include the whole "people" including the "national bourgeoisie" however defined. The doctrine that all can be saved—even some "counter-revolutionary elements"—has, of course, always been heavily qualified by the retention of the class notion. People of the wrong classes are not easily transformed, and continue to generate poisons of wrong thought. Yet they *can* be transformed while those of good class background *can* be led astray. In the end the main criterion for assigning persons to the "people" or "non-people" is to be sought in their spiritual attitudes rather than in the facts of their class origin. The doctrine of salvation stresses simultaneously that almost all men may be saved; that salvation is enormously difficult for all men, and that backsliding is an ever present possibility. Paradoxically the emphasis on spiritual transformation may lend itself to quite disparate policies. The "Hundred Flowers" campaign may have been predicated on the genuine belief that the intelligentsia had been basically transformed during the 1949–55 period, while the "anti-rightist" campaign of 1957 was based on precisely the opposite assumption. The "great leap forward" may have been based on the assumption that the "masses" (unlike the intelligentsia) had been basically transformed and that their "subjective forces" were at the disposal of the leadership while the present campaign of "Socialist education" seems to be predicated on the assumption that there is still much work to be done.

"Populism"

The emphasis on spiritual transformation is closely linked to the "populist" theme. Because the whole people (defined as a union of

¹ *Peking Review*, "Fighting Task of Workers in Philosophy and Social Science," January 3, 1964.

four classes) can be transformed, the whole Chinese people can participate in the building of Socialism and Communism. This doctrine finds its formal institutional expression in the coalition structure of government, and can, of course, be harnessed to the nationalist goals of the régime as well as to project the Chinese model to the "emerging world" where there is such an obvious political need to "unite with whom one can unite." The obverse side of the formula—the notion that the "people" is not homogeneous but composed of different classes which still engender "non-antagonistic" (and even antagonistic) contradictions, has, however, been of equal importance. It has justified the need for constant vigilance and unremitting indoctrination, but was also used to justify the vaguely defined legitimate area of "blooming and contending" of the "Hundred Flowers" period. On this side, it is particularly closely linked to another element of the Maoist vision, namely, the enormous stress on struggle, conflict and high tension as positive values. Mao Tse-tung's commitment to these values probably preceded his conversion to Marxism-Leninism and has, as we know, even colored his vision of the utopian future which he seems reluctant to think of in terms of stasis and total harmony. When directed against those defined as the outer enemy, struggle makes for solidarity "within the people." On another level, however, the enemy must be conceived of as ever present in the minds of the people itself in the form of "bourgeois thought." The struggle against this bourgeois thought is not only a negative factor. "Fighting against wrong ideas is like being vaccinated—a man develops greater immunity from disease after the vaccine takes effect. Plants raised in hot-houses are not likely to be robust."² At the time when it was uttered, this doctrine was linked to the lenient policies of the "Hundred Flowers" period. One can easily see how the same doctrine can be given a much more draconic interpretation.

Another element of the vision which is closely linked to the emphasis on spiritual transformation and collectivity is the stress on man rather than weapons or tools as the "decisive force in history." By transforming men's minds and consolidating their collective energies one can achieve enormous results in spheres where others have relied on material power. Here again the Yen-an experience provides the shining example. Where one has mobilized the collective energies of men, motivated by the Maoist vision, economic advancement, national power and social transformation are no longer purely dependent on "material prerequisites."

Another theme which has been stressed, with varying degrees of

² "Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People," Bowie and Fairbank, *Communist China 1955-59* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962), p. 289.

intensity, is the necessity of contact with the masses, and "participation in physical labor" on the part of intellectuals, students, professionals and lower bureaucrats. This may reflect the genuine belief that "participation in labor" is a form of thought reform which will induce respect for physical labor and keep these elements from over-weening pretensions. At the same time it is made crystal clear that one is not free to find among the masses any view of reality which contradicts the Maoist vision.

The Role of the Communist Party

Finally there is the enormous pivotal role of the Communist Party as the "proletarian" vanguard of society. Again, we seem to be dealing here with standard Marxist-Leninist doctrine, but as has been pointed out by many, the Party has probably played a more crucial and concrete role in China than in the Soviet Union at least during the lifetime of Stalin. The transformation of the Chinese people must be carried out by the Party. Ideally speaking, the Party maintains its supremacy not simply by dint of its organizational machinery but by its ability to internalize its "proletarian nature" into every party member. The "proletarian nature" of the Party no longer resides, of course, primarily in the industrial workers but has become a kind of spiritual essence embodied in the Party and yet still endowed with all those transcendental and universal qualities which Marx attributes to the working class. It is this idea of the "proletarian nature" of the Party which sets strict limits to the whole populist drift of the Chinese vision. In fact since the beginning of the Sino-Soviet conflict, the Party has stressed its proletarian nature more than ever. The Party does not derive its transcendent moral status and historic role in China or in the world at large from the fact that it merely represents the Chinese people, but from a higher source. The Party may serve the interests of Chinese nationalism but it does so from a supra-national stance.

Within China itself the Party ought to be the nervous system of society and should play a commanding role in every sphere of social and cultural endeavor. The ideal Communist cadre is not only a paragon of selflessness but potentially omniscient. Ideally it is also the Party which is in direct communication with the "worker-peasant-soldier" masses and which reflects what the masses want and need or rather what they ought to want and need in a Maoist universe. Thus whenever there is a stress on the "mass line," one may assume that the decision-making function of the local party fraction is being stressed. Yet all of this still leaves open the possibilities that the Party ranks, as opposed to the Supreme leader, are vulnerable to error and backsliding.

Mao's Vision and Modernization

These it seems to me are some of the more salient elements of the Maoist vision. What have been the relations of this vision to the goal of modernization?

The official view of the present leadership is that the vision—no matter how its interpretation may fluctuate—not only provides the most effective means for achieving modernization, but is also an end in itself. The only desirable modernization is a modernization which can be incorporated into the Maoist vision. At the other extreme, we have the view that the vision runs completely athwart the prerequisites of modernization or that it is a sort of rationalization of the failures and difficulties of modernization in China. One makes a virtue of necessity according to this view because the necessity is intractable. Where weapons and capital are scarce what is to be lost in stressing the organization of human energies? Where material incentives are not available, why not stress the “Communist ethic”? Oddly enough, the official ideology also seems to stress the relation of necessity to virtue. It was, after all, the peculiarities of Chinese conditions which made possible the stress on guerrilla warfare. It is the “poverty and blankness” of China, Mao insists in 1958, which makes possible the achievement of Communism long before the insidious corruptions of capitalism and revisionism have set in. The fact that “virtue” is associated with necessity by no means implies that the belief in virtue may not be genuine and fervent particularly since the belief is also linked to the power interests of the leadership.

Surveying the history of the People's Republic since 1949, we find that various elements of the vision play an enormous role in the enormous effort of the first few years to bring about political and ideological consolidation. “Study,” “thought reform,” “confession,” etc., were applied on various levels not only to prospective party members but to the “people” as a whole. The “small group” technique and the technique of mass organization were universally applied. The Party seemed to be proving that totalitarian consolidation of a people could be carried out effectively by relying on “man” rather than technology. Except for those defined as counter-revolutionaries and reactionaries, there was considerable reason for belief that the spiritual transformation was succeeding. Some parts of the vision seemed, and seem, to be quite compatible with certain aspects of modernization. Many tasks of public health, police work, social control and even economic undertakings, which depend primarily on labor intensivity, lend themselves to Maoist methods.

The Relevance of the Soviet Model

However, while the vision did permeate large sectors of political and social activity, in the areas most crucial to the modernization effort—particularly as related to state power goals—it was the Soviet model which was followed. This involved some retreat in the concept of Party omnicompetence, considerable emphasis on a “rational” division of labor and professionalization and some emphasis on the need for a professional state bureaucracy. This does not mean that one should see an absolute antagonism between the Soviet model of modernization and the Maoist vision. Obviously the gravitation toward the total nationalization of industry and the collectivization of agriculture was entirely in line with both. In fact, it may well have been high confidence and exuberance (as well as a desperate sense of haste) induced by the success of his vision in the political and social spheres which led Mao and those closest to him in 1955 to feel that collectivization could be speedily consummated in China without the dire effects it had produced in the Soviet Union. The fact remains, however, that on the whole Mao modestly deferred to the “superior experience” of the Soviet Union in these areas.

With the beginning of the “Hundred Flowers” experiment, the picture becomes more complex. On the one hand the experiment seems to mark a further concession to the requirements of modernization. This can be discerned in the effort to give professionals and specialists a greater sense of security and freedom, in the rectification campaign directed against the Party with the implied admission that in some areas the specialists knew more than the Party and even in the new concern with legal codification. The campaign also seems to have coincided, however, with some dawning doubts about the complete applicability of the Soviet model of modernization to Chinese conditions. These doubts were certainly encouraged by the death of Stalin and the new winds blowing in the Communist bloc itself. This new emphasis on the requirements of modernization as well as the doubts about the Soviet model did not, however, necessarily diminish the role of the Maoist vision. On the contrary, the “Hundred Flowers” formula was presented as a precious new contribution of Mao Tse-tung (the first since 1949) to the storehouse of Marxism-Leninism and it is, of course, quite easy to see how many ambivalent elements of the vision lent themselves to the “soft” interpretation of this period. In fact, Mao may have genuinely believed that in the course of thought reform “the political outlook of the Chinese intellectuals has undergone a fundamental change.”³ The

³ Lu Ting-yi, “Let Hundred Flowers Blossom; Let a Hundred Schools Contend,” Bowie and Fairbank, *op. cit.*, p. 154.

growing doubts about the complete applicability of the Soviet model of modernization may have even encouraged the view that the Maoist vision was applicable in areas where "Soviet experience" had hitherto reigned supreme.

In fact the "great leap forward" and commune movement of 1957–1959 mark the high tide of the application of the Maoist vision to the very tasks of modernization. If the intelligentsia had shown its fundamental untrustworthiness, the subjective forces of the masses⁴ were still available for heaven-storming feats. The emphasis on man as the decisive factor, on the negligible role of "material prerequisites," on the superior efficacy of collective subjective forces and on the omnicompetence of the Party all enter into this experiment, and give it its utopian, apocalyptic flavor.

Contraction and Revival

The retreat from the Great Leap in 1960–62 again seems to mark a return to a sober estimate of the requirements of modernization but no longer on an exclusively Soviet model. It also seems to mark a contraction in the influence of the Maoist vision even though the new economic model with its emphasis on "agriculture as the base" was quite distinctly Chinese. One may, in fact, argue as has been suggested that the modernization policies of this period are much more "rational" in terms of Chinese realities than the policies of the Soviet period. They have led, it would appear, to a substantial economic recovery. Yet, as we know, ever since the end of 1962 there has again been a rising crescendo of emphasis on "socialist education." At this very moment the Maoist vision, in one of its most extreme formulations, again occupies the center of the stage. The beginnings of this new revival are perhaps to be discerned in the crisis surrounding the army in the 1959–62 period. As we know, P'eng Teh-huai, who seems to have become the spokesman of military professionalism and perhaps of professionalism in general, had also become an "anti-party" element, that is a menace in the realm of power, while the crisis of morale in the army revealed in the *Bulletin of Activities (Kung-tso T'ung-hsun)* documents suggested that the threat to the vision, at least in this sphere, was also regarded as a threat to power. Thus the campaign of "Socialist education" was begun very early in the army, and having been judged a success, we find the army projected as a model for society as a whole. Here again we note what Stuart Schram

⁴ Whatever may have been the discontents revealed in 1956–57, the peasants had, after all, been collectivized without producing anything resembling the effects of collectivization in the Soviet Union.

has called Mao's "military deviation"—his tendency to think of a well-indoctrinated army as providing a paradigm of Communist life.

The return of large numbers of students to the countryside involving as it did the frustration of hopes for advancement in urban society, also created a serious problem of morale which seemed to call for drastic therapy in terms of spiritual transformation. Beyond this, the growing intensity of the Sino-Soviet conflict has strongly impelled the leadership to project the Maoist vision onto the world at large as the very embodiment of "true Marxism-Leninism."

Above all, however, there is the fact that the aging Mao and those closest to him are genuinely concerned with the survival of the vision. The whole current fervid campaign of "Socialist education" is permeated more by a kind of pervasive anxiety than by a mood of high confidence. The leadership may be quite optimistic about China's present economic situation and posture in the world at large, but it is precisely in the ideological sphere that one detects a mood of concern. The intelligentsia had shown its unreliability at the time of the "Hundred Flowers" campaign. Even the masses had shown their inability to live up to Mao's expectations at the time of the "great leap forward." Indeed, it is now implied that the spontaneous inertial movement of things runs counter to the vision. "The restoration of capitalism," states Chou En-lai (and here he is undoubtedly the spokesman of Mao Tse-tung), "is not inevitable. In China we have a firm and fighting Marxist-Leninist Party, a proletarian Power which is increasingly consolidating itself, a powerful and revolutionary People's Liberation Army, an enormous number of cadres, a people of high political consciousness and a glorious revolutionary tradition. Of especial importance is the fact that our Party and State can count on a leading nucleus guided by the thought of Mao Tse-tung. All of this makes the restoration of capitalism very difficult in our country."⁵

There is here, of course, an oblique implication that the Soviet Union lacks these reassuring features. The whole thrust of the passage suggests, however, that what mainly stands between China and the "restoration of capitalism" is the Maoist vision. It is noteworthy that there is no reference to the "Socialist structure" of Chinese society as one of the factors preventing such a restoration.

While the "Socialist education" campaign has, however, fallen with an enormous weight on the literary, artistic and cultural spheres and perhaps on all non-vocational areas of social life, while the cult of Mao has been raised to unprecedented heights, it is still not clear whether it

⁵ "Report on the Work of the Government," *Peking Review*, Jan. 1, 1965.

has again been allowed to affect the strategy of modernization, particularly in the economic sphere. In fact, one may speculate that in the areas of highest priority—such as nuclear development—the Maoist vision has never been allowed to interfere with the requirements of technology. As far as one can judge at the present, experts are now expected to be diffused with redness even while devoting a maximum of attention to expertise and the system of higher education is more oriented than ever to the production of experts. Yet all this may change. It would certainly be the gravest of errors to assume that because the 1960 economic strategy has proven fairly successful, economic considerations will necessarily override the concern with the “succession to the revolutionary heritage.”

The leadership's concern is probably justified. It is difficult to believe that the vision will survive at least in its present extreme form. It is difficult to believe not only, or even primarily, because in some of its aspects it runs counter to the requirements of modernization. Even more immediately, it involves such a constricted and terribly simplified view of human life that one is inclined to doubt whether it is humanly viable. In terms of modernization, however, it is difficult to believe that the vision will be allowed in the long run to interfere particularly with those aspects of modernization most relevant to the achievement of national power. While the vision may retreat, however, we are in no position to foresee the extent of the retreat or to predict what will remain. Modernization may not be fully compatible with the Maoist vision but neither has it been fully compatible with Jeffersonian democracy. China may depart from the Maoist vision yet still move into a future uniquely its own. As long as Mao and those close to him remain at the helm, we may expect them to be as much concerned with the vision as with any of the other goals of the régime.

POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE

Michael Rustin

Labor in Britain: After Ten Months

In the Winter, 1965 DISSENT, Michael Rustin and Michael Walzer, writing in the immediate aftermath of the Labor Party's October victory, outlined a strategy for socialist advance in Britain. Now Rustin discusses the actual events of Labor's first, hard months of power.—ED.

After ten months of Labor Government one has entirely lost that confidence so widespread on the Left prior to the election, and reflected in our earlier DISSENT article. There we sketched a version of Labor's strategy, an optimistic view of what Wilson's "center-left" was about. We suggested that a stress on an expanding social sector, on unionization and the incorporation of white-collar and white-coated workers in a new working class, on the enlargement of *political* modes of decision-making and control, could become the basis of a socialist transformation. Such a strategy could connect, we thought, with structural changes already taking place in British society.

There was a confusion in this article between the optimum strategy which might be derived from Labor pronouncements and the likely actual strategy. Of the three major priorities we suggested, only one, the stress on social spending, was prominent in the intentions of Labor politicians. The

Party has no awareness of the political importance of unionization, no conscious strategy for converting the decline in the proportion of manual workers into an enlarged class of "workers by hand and by brain." And on the issue of democratization, Party leaders are not only indifferent but actively antipathetic. The Labor Party's modes of internal control and of government in general are increasingly managerial and *dirigiste*.

For the time being, this gap between optimum and actual strategy seems unbridgeable. Inner-party debate is at a low ebb and the pressures of office make it unlikely that the Government can be influenced by outside discussion of alternative options. The strategy for Labor we suggested was perhaps potential in the situation; the Wilson Government has in the event made a disastrously different set of choices.

The situation is now gloomy. The Party has an overall Parliamentary majority of two. The local election

results in May, before the recent deflationary measures were announced, were spectacularly bad. The "swing" then, if repeated in a general election, would give the Tories a majority of 190 in the Commons. Since then, the Government has run into further economic difficulties and has announced postponement of many of its social welfare programs (the minimum incomes guarantee, local authorities' building programs, lower mortgage rates, etc.) until the sterling problem is solved. The Conservatives' choice of Heath as leader, in imitation of Wilson's tough, technocratic image, has already paid off in a Tory lead in the latest Gallup poll figures.

The Government's survival now depends on a degree of luck. If one Labor MP from a marginal constituency dies in the next few months, its overall majority could be reduced to one. This would probably be unmanageable and the Government would then be forced into a general election at a time of almost certain defeat. The alternative of a pact with the nine Liberal MP's has its own hazards, mainly because of the incompatible programs and constituencies of the two parties. To make such an arrangement, Labor would be under pressure to bargain steel nationalization for Liberal support. And if the Liberals were ever in a position to risk an election (which they currently are not), Labor could face the choice of abandoning all pretense of a socialist program or losing office.

Such are the difficult electoral prospects and Labor's tenuous grasp of power. The key to understanding how this unhappy situation has come about

lies to a considerable extent in Labor's economic predicament on coming to office.

Labor inherited from the Conservative Government a severe balance of payments crisis, immediately exacerbated by speculation against the pound. Two main causes explain this. There has been a structural failing in the British economy for many years, expressed in the inability to achieve a favorable balance of visible trade and also in a steadily declining share of export markets. Secondly, there is the incubus of the sterling area which involves high and unrestricted capital outflows both in the short-term and in long-term overseas investment. (Expenditure on military bases in Aden, Singapore, Kenya, etc., is not unconnected with the defense of these investments overseas.)

Labor came into office with long-term plans for dealing with the visible trade balance though these were not in any advanced stage of preparation—the Government's first economic plan is not due until September. These plans called for increases in domestic investment, state action to increase research and industrial training, modernization of selected key industries. They also involved a plan to stabilize incomes and prices—the incomes policy—which has so far had little if any effect. Many unions, though not the Transport and General or the more militant white-collar unions, have given formal assent to the incomes policy. But the Government has itself awarded increases above the stipulated norm in the public sector (an improvement on the Tories, who enforced restraint *only* in the public sector), and it is doubtful if even the unions which

officially endorse the incomes policy will in fact accept smaller wage increases as a result. In any case, improvements in the growth rate and in export competitiveness resulting from these directly *industrial* measures will not be noticeable for some time.

All this has left the Government with its sterling crisis and a choice of *financial* measures to deal with it. Wilson rejected devaluation, which, as he recently said, could have bought a year's time (though at the price of possible disruption of the international currency market) by restoring more favorable terms of trade. Initially, the Government chose import controls and a mild measure of deflation. In spite of a large IMF credit, however, this did not solve the problem and in the Spring a second series of measures—raising the bank rate and restricting bank lending and mortgages—intensified the deflation. Up to this point the effect on consumption was slight and there was even disagreement among liberal economists about the extent of the deflation and, crucially, the degree of unemployment that would be caused by it. Economists sympathetic to Government policy were still arguing in May that no increase in unemployment would occur for another year.

But in July the final point of ignominy was reached by emergency budgetary measures directed in particular at public expenditure. Earlier, the Chairman of the Bank of England, Lord Cromer, had been rebuked by Wilson for urging a reduction in public spending “to maintain confidence among overseas holders of sterling.” The Labor Party's whole economic attack on the previous Government had

rested on criticism of deflationary measures as a means of maintaining the value of the pound and a stable balance of payments. Wilson had argued that these “stop-go” measures, while apparently meeting the problems in the short-run, actually slowed down innovation and investment and weakened the economy in the long-run. “No more stop-go” had become a wearisome Labor slogan in the election, so often was it repeated. Yet the cumulative effect of these recent restrictions will be the most severe deflation for many years and they will certainly cause a sharp increase in unemployment.

The cuts in public expenditure have the appearance of a ritual sacrifice. They are intended to meet a short-term drain on reserves, yet will not take effect until well into 1966. In fact, they must be explained by their effects on confidence, notably that of overseas bankers. Though they are selective (public housing, schools and factory building being exempt), the result at home will be to prevent further increases in local authority house-building, curtail urban improvement, and slow down the motorway and hospital programs. Most serious from a welfare point of view, Labor's minimum incomes guarantee, only the first instalment of its pensions policy, has been postponed. The renewal of obsolete social capital and the provision of a decent standard of living for everyone have been sacrificed to the stability of the pound.

Why has this happened? Labor inherited a crisis the effects of which would not be felt by the public until well after the new Government had

taken power. The Party faced this crisis with a majority of three, that is, without the security which would enable it safely to face a year or two's unpopularity and later reap the benefits of successful social programs. Caution and weakness are heavily built into this situation. At the same time, a Labor Government experiences stronger pressures than the Conservatives in any given economic crisis. The reason it is still struggling to maintain overseas confidence in the pound after three successive deflationary budgets is that bankers can demand evermore conservative policies from a leftist government in a weak trading position, as they did earlier from the Italian center-left regime. Much of this pressure is essentially political. It is duplicated by pressure at home. Because the conflict of interests between the City of London and the long-term needs of industrial growth is not widely recognized in industry, any attempt to sacrifice the pound (by devaluation) in favor of continued expansion would have meant taking on a large part of the private sector in a bitter fight.

Finally, the Labor Government has to come to terms with Britain's key role in the international monetary system. Britain could only have devalued at considerable risk to the dollar and to the stability of international liquidity arrangements. Devaluation, or rigorous exchange controls, might have precipitated the international monetary crisis, and possible recession, that has threatened in the background for some time. The furor that greeted the Government's temporary import controls—primarily from the European Free Trade Area countries—shows how unwilling other nations are to recog-

nize that the immediate burden of righting Britain's balance of payments must be shared by them at some stage, if Britain's economic decline is not to continue.

Labor's crucial failure was that it did not take financial measures, most plausibly devaluation, in the early days of office, that would have (temporarily) ended the sterling crisis and given the Government time in which to set going its long-term program for industrial expansion. It was a failure to face up to conflict with the City of London and with overseas financial interests. With such a small majority, of course, such a conflict would not have been easy. But Labor had an opportunity in March, when the opinion polls were favorable, to increase its majority through a quick election. It does not seem impossible that the Government could have successfully phased both another election and tough non-deflationary measures to hold the balance of payments position. If that course involved risks, it could hardly be more ignominious or dangerous than the Government's present policy.

Alongside the economic retreat, there has been a kind of moral collapse in the Labor Party. Thus the Government has given almost unlimited verbal support to the United States in Vietnam and the Dominican Republic. In part, this follows from the decision to defend sterling, both because US support of the pound has its political price, and also because it is those segments of the sterling area lying "East of Suez" which produce the largest favorable balances. So economic and moral weakness are inter-related. And both are defended by the argument, often heard here, that it

doesn't really matter what Britain does. Yet American radicals have looked longingly for British opposition to US policy in Vietnam, an opposition that would certainly have a greater effect inside the US than that, for example, of France, and that would also produce a stronger international alliance against the present war.

The image of moral collapse is seen even more sharply in the Government's almost total capitulation to racist pressure and its restriction of Commonwealth immigration to 7,500 per year. Immigration from outside the Commonwealth, almost all white, now runs at 42,000 per year and is not to be restricted; nor is the net immigration of about 30,000 per year from the Irish Republic. Clearly, economic arguments about overcrowding, unemployment, etc., are a bogus facade for essentially racial demands. The Act of Parliament against racial discrimination was also radically changed to meet Conservative specifications. Discrimination, in certain public places only, is to be referred in the first instance to "conciliation courts" instead of to the criminal courts as was originally announced. And the legislation in no way covers housing or employment.

There have been other setbacks and defeats. The Steel Nationalization Bill has been postponed, thanks partly to opposition within Labor, from two MP's of the extreme right. Comprehensive schools are to be introduced at the local authorities' own initiative and speed, and there is a proposal being put about that the "public" schools should be integrated into the state system "by agreement with their headmasters." The bill for the public ownership of building land has yet to

appear and "practical considerations" seem likely to limit its scope to merely "selective" ownership. The Government's proclaimed revitalization of the permanent civil service ran into immediate silent obstruction. Academic advisors, brought in to provide a nucleus of socialist officials in Whitehall (Labor supposedly profiting from its earlier experiences with the civil service), mostly found themselves on the margins of power. Balogh, economic advisor to the Cabinet Office and rudest advocate of a purge in Whitehall, watches the Treasury lay down economic policy. Only Kaldor, ghost author of the Finance Bill, has had some visible influence on policy.

In spite of Wilson's mastery of Parliament, the Labor Government has shown a singular and disastrous incapacity to evoke a popular response to its policies. During the election campaign, the Party had captured the political initiative and found an audience for its radicalism. Soon after winning power, it lost that contact with the public. No attempt was really made to retain it and Richard Crossman even commented, characteristically, that the Leyton by-election defeat might really be a good thing if it taught Labor that lesson. Apparently it hasn't. Wilson has abandoned the role of the threatening, aggressive radical of the public platform, which he performed with such success in the campaign, and taken up instead that of the responsible statesman. He has virtually left the field of domestic politics, where his own reputation was built, to his unimpressive deputies Brown and Callaghan, and devoted himself to negotiations with foreign presidents. The party machine has

been left to stagnate, its poor organization unimproved (despite rumors last year of impending radical transformations) and its research department, key source of new policies in the previous ten years, has been largely replaced by the civil service.

This withering away of the functions of the "movement" is of course related to the retreats on policy. The radical option suggested above as the best way of confronting the economic crisis was probably open only to a Government which regarded its communications with its supporting movement and with public opinion at large as a major priority and which worked to maintain a high degree of popular involvement. But Labor soon lost its initial momentum and also the sustenance of active goodwill. As it did so, it seemed less and less likely that Wilson could successfully spring an election—so one has watched his political bluffs begin to be called.

The leadership's reliance on political gimmicks has not helped. The earlier imitation of the Kennedy style (with an ill-fated Hundred Days, getting Britain moving, and all the rest) has now given way to Johnsonism and the image and techniques of Consensus. Alarmingly, the controlling theme of Wilson's speeches has been that of modernization and "ending restrictive practices." This is a language that can more easily be cashed in as measures against the unions than as coercion of business. And there has continued the nationalist exhortation that was always one of Wilson's worst traits as a politician. "East of Suez" is only an extreme version of what he has said so often about Britain "being tired of being pushed around."

The reactions of Labor MP's and party workers to this depressing scene have been, at best, of troubled and defensive loyalty. Though Wilson has a majority of three, there has been only a single instance of leftist revolt in the House of Commons, by one MP. Yet there is not even a pretense of democratic decision-making in the Parliamentary Party and unconditional support in this situation is merely an invitation to a Labor Government to give in to all the other and stronger pressures on it.

Opposition from without has also been disorganized and fragmented. CND can now call out only its core of activists and a small auxiliary army of teenagers. There are beginnings of an academic teach-in movement on Vietnam, which may grow when term resumes in the autumn. There are some signs, in nominations to the Labor Party National executive, that constituency activists are seeking a new generation of leaders, less dominated by the Parliamentary ritual and its endemic defeatism. But meanwhile the active, critical discussion generated in recent years by the New Left is sadly lacking.

Against this depressing situation, we must weigh Labor's few positive measures. Pensions were increased and taxes mildly redistributed in the first weeks in office. Evictions were stopped and rents restricted. Steps have been taken towards increased company taxation and fiscal control of the private sector. Even the restrictions on public expenditure have been selective to a degree and local authority housing for rent is to be increased as a proportion of total housebuilding. These are small but real benefits and will no doubt be

followed by others if the Government survives.

But they do not come to grips with Britain's greatest problem. Indeed, after ten months of Labor government all the major political and economic battles wait to be fought. For certainly either the City of London and its foreign allies or the powerful trade unions must be attacked and subdued

if Britain is to achieve faster economic growth. Labor has for the time being utterly failed to grapple with the problems posed by the holders of sterling. If it later does so, or if the Conservatives under the technocratic Heath attempt to make the unions the scapegoats for modernization, there could yet be a sharp polarization in British politics.

15 August 1965

Lee Kuan Yew

Why Has Asian Socialism Failed?*

There was a time not so long ago, at the end of the Second World War, when people expected the whole world to go Socialist. Throughout the world there seemed to be an inevitable trend toward a more egalitarian society. When a Socialist Government in Britain, shortly after it assumed office in 1945, decided to liquidate its empire in Asia, there were hopes that the future would mean a more just and equal world where governments of Socialist leanings varying from progressive liberal, Social Democrat or democratic Socialist, to Communist, would soon take charge of the destinies of mankind in nearly all countries of the world.

Today, two decades later, we have a much more sober realization that automatic progress toward an equal and just world is not something that

can be taken for granted. We meet as Asian Socialists, first to reestablish our bearings, next to find common ground and common interests, and then to formulate not dissimilar attitudes on world problems. But we are conscious that the world consists of more classifications and permutations than just the capitalists, the Communists and the Socialists. Throughout the world, national survival, the advancement of purely sectional interests within a nation, have confused the course of development.

It is not only in emergent nations that nationalism has found its strong expression. Even between the industrially advanced nations of Europe and America, almost all capitalist in their economic system, there is a clear divergence of interests and of views between the Western allies. And at the other end of the spectrum, we have discovered that even with Communists whatever their ideological claims to

* Extracts from the opening speech made at the Conference of Young Asian Socialist Leaders held in Bombay on May 6-9.

international brotherhood, the working class is riven by even deeper claims as national Communist groups attack each other in ferocious dialectical ritual to justify the pursuit of their own separate national interests.

But however disappointing it has been to those who seek the ideal world where all men are brothers, these developments have given corroboration to the major premises of democratic Socialism. For decades the Communists have maligned the democratic Socialists or Social Democrats as betrayers of the working classes because of their petty bourgeois shortcomings.

Like you, my colleagues and I have been vilified as betrayers of the working class by the Communists in Malaysia. They have foretold doom and perdition awaiting us when the moment of exposure comes, when, as they predicted, we would stand before the eyes of the masses stripped of all pretense, revealed as stooges of foreign capitalists, imperialist interests, and then rejected and destroyed. Yet ironically enough, true to form, it is the Communists in Malaysia who are leading Indonesian saboteurs and guerrillas into the country in subservience to a line laid down by foreign powers, helping to undermine the integrity of their own country, helping to sell out the workers they claim to lead, all in the name of Communism.

It is twelve years since the first Asian Socialist Conference in Rangoon in 1953. They have been twelve years of many disappointments and few successes for democratic Socialists. Many of the leaders who foregathered on that occasion are now no longer able to lead their countries toward Social-

ism. Quite a number are in jail, put there by governments that assert themselves as equally if not more Socialist and nationalist than the people they have displaced. Why have these things happened? Why have the hopes of inevitable progress toward a Socialist world so lamentably failed to materialize in Asia?

How is it that some manifestly non-Socialist governments in the region have made more economic progress and increased their Gross National Product more rapidly than countries in Southeast Asia that have had Socialist governments?

True, the capitalists, and in particular the Americans, have poured in aid and investments—and perhaps a part of this massive economic transfusion has to some degree benefited the workers—and for a long while Americans preferred to support only anti-Communist governments. Indeed they used to find it difficult to distinguish Socialists from Communists. Why then did not the advanced countries in Europe with Socialist governments give corresponding assistance to their counterparts in Asia? We knew that the Communists would never help the democratic Socialists. But what of the democratic Socialist governments in Europe? Perhaps they did not have the abundance of resources to have helped the enormous populations of South Asia to any appreciable degree. But the fault was nearer home. The democratic Socialists who were in charge of some of these governments in South Asia lacked the managerial and technical expertise in administration, management and the technological and industrial skills to be able to realize their plans for economic transformation. The lack of these instruments of pol-

icy implementation could have been made up by borrowing expertise from abroad. This could have helped these countries tide over the period of transition when local men were acquiring the training and skills. Indeed some of this was done on an appreciable scale as in India, with technical assistance from both U.N. agencies and direct from government to government. But the most grievous indictment against the democratic Socialists for their failure to put up a better showing is that in preaching individual human liberties and human freedoms, they forgot to insist, as the Communist and the capitalists did, on the individual human duty to work hard and give his utmost. For in the last analysis the better life is produced only by sustained and intense effort.

As democratic Socialists we should uphold all individual human liberties. Perhaps we have underestimated the human problems of finding the techniques of organizing men for production, and of persuading men to accept the disciplines of modernized agricultural and industrial production, if we are to fulfill their dreams. If we want to mobilize human resources, to pitchfork our countries and backward economies into the industrial and technological era, then no person has the right to slack. The capitalists make people work through monetary incentives which we call sweated and exploited labor. The Communists do it by regimentation and exhortation and a systematically induced state of semi-hysteria for work, using both the stick and the carrot. The democratic Socialist is less ruthless and consequently less efficient, torn between his loathing for regimentation and mass coercion and his inhibition to making more effective

use of the carrot by his desire to distribute the rewards more fairly and equally too soon.

I am an unrepentant Socialist. But in my own state, I have to concede that because it takes a long time to inculcate the high value of public duty and sense of service to the community, performance has been best only when workers are offered high incentives for high performance. Our building programs have progressed rapidly because we allowed the individual worker to earn as much as he can over his fellow workers by working as hard as he likes. Our lowest productivity level is in many sections of our own government services such as our publicly owned dockyards where managers are on salary scales instead of the profit-sharing and bonus schemes of private industry, and where our workers are on wage rates which apply equally to the proficient hard-working man and the mediocre and not-so-hard-working man.

We have had to recognize these faults. It has not changed our belief in the basic tenet that no man should exploit his fellow man. We believe it is immoral that the ownership of property should allow some to exploit others. But in order to get economic growth we have had to base our policies on the principle "From each his economic best; to each his economic worth." The ultimate ideal "From each his best, to each his need" can only be relevant after we have moved away from ignorance, illiteracy, poverty, and economic backwardness.

Reflecting on the past decade of few achievements and many omissions is a sobering exercise. But the fact that we are today gathered in Bombay to

discuss these problems is in a small way a tribute to the tenacity of the democratic Socialist. If we re-evaluate and reformulate our thinking and policy to make a more effective contribution in the next decade, we can still make a contribution to Asia's and Africa's advance. The biggest contribution we can make of course is to the peace, progress and prosperity of the peoples of Afro-Asia. Democratic Socialists in the advanced countries are fortunate in that the relatively comfortable state of their societies makes it possible for them to maintain their tenets of tolerant but progressive society against more totalitarian creeds.

For us in Asia and even more so in Africa the acute pressures and conflicts of mass poverty, hunger and despair, and, worse, the obscene and often also the ostentatious display of individual wealth in the midst of grinding poverty, is a constant incitement to sudden and violent revolution. Those who want a social revolution without destroying individual human values find this setting makes the task an intensely difficult and delicate effort. And if we approach Asian problems of poverty and underdevelopment through the rosy spectacles of the Western European Socialists we are sure to fail.

The War in Vietnam

It is no use talking of the ideals of democratic Socialism when the situation has degenerated into naked brutality between competing power blocs as in South Vietnam, with both sides engaged in brutality and cruelty all in the name of the highest ideals for the freedom and liberty of man. Even here in Bombay the shadow of what is going on in that corner of South-East Asia

casts gloom over all of us. We know that what is happening is wrong. We know that if the Communists are able to advance their frontiers to envelop South Vietnam it will be only a matter of time before the same process of emasculation by military and political techniques will overtake the neighbouring countries. On the other hand, we know that any extension or escalation of the war is dangerous and contrary to the ideals we claim to espouse. We have been unable to advance a more constructive alternative than to talk of unconditional negotiations hoping that negotiations may lead to a neutral South Vietnam. However, we know that this is hardly likely to be the end result of negotiations. For what is required to keep the rest of South-East Asia free from going through similar tribulations is not just a neutral South Vietnam.

As Asians we must uphold the right of the Vietnamese people to self-determination. As democratic Socialists we must insist that the South Vietnamese have the right not to be pressured through armed might and organized terror and finally overwhelmed by Communism. So we must seek a formula that will first make it possible for the South Vietnamese to recover their freedom of choice which at the moment is limited to either Communist capture or perpetual American military operations. Then after the South Vietnamese are able to exercise their collective will without duress from either side, ultimately, be it after five, ten or twenty years, they must have the right to decide their final destiny, whether or not they choose to be reunited with North Vietnam and on what terms.

NOTEBOOK

Stanley Diamond

Black Farce, White Lies

A Note on Sonny Liston and Cassius Clay

White ignorance of the Negro is always good for a laugh. That, of course, is to be expected. What upper class has ever known members of its lower class? Knowing them would break up the game. It is their functions, not their persons that count—the function of a lower class is, after all, to sustain an upper class.

Upper and lower are linked, throughout civilized history, in a hellish minuet, but only the lower know the meaning of the steps. What master knows a slave; what colonial administrator, a native; what domineering husband, a wife? That is why the lower race, the inferior sex, the lower class cheat so well and, in their very physical movements, satirize so skillfully, even when the penalties are high. Doesn't the fury of the white southerner flow from a feeling that he knows he doesn't really know "our niggers"?

It comes to this. How can one know persons who are treated as objects, for, on the part of the master, in order to maintain the heady position of exploitation, the lower person must be regarded as an object, as in the case of the Negro slave who saw his mistress naked but was not conceived as

having eyes. This need not be a conscious process; it is quite the same as other social rationalizations in the service of personal gain. On the part of the mastered, when one is perceived as an object, the reflex is to behave in ways that mask rather than reveal the self. We owe candor only to those whom we respect and those who respect us. The vicious cycle of dependent and reciprocal identities begins in treating persons as objects. This is the mechanical technique of magic, of animal command, of words that have degenerated into mere signs, standing for an extinct universe of things.

When the lower order, race, class, person, sex, animal, treated as an object, responds as treated, that is, by acting other than he is, attempting to survive in the absence of good faith, the higher order is locked with the lower into a circuit of mutual distortion. The upper must be and is anesthetized by viewing the lower as an object, and fears to take responsibility for its own social role, lest the social mechanism which it commands come to a stop. The lower prefers to go through the fires of hell rather than reveal the self which the upper has denied. In this minuet then, there are

no selves, only statuses waltzing with statuses, only the simulacrum of self. It is a socio-pathic world in which any emotion can be imitated and therefore, any emotion can shift to its opposite in order to meet some imperative of social etiquette. In such a cultural universe, emotions are tactics

Our relations with Negroes, as a pivot of our social pathology and our magical rage to command others, condemns us to ordering our experience in one particular way—not tragically, not comically, not even satirically, but farcically. Farce encompasses the fixed and limited gesture in the minuet of statuses, and also the quicksilver, meaningless shift in posture, meaningless in the sense that such posturing reveals an internal vacuum of meaning, which we seek to fill by our mere tactics, by appearances. The so-called “theater of the absurd” is, of course, a theater of farce, not so new after all, but enlarged in our time to the point where one is ready to conclude that life follows art. For we and the Negroes, locked in each other’s grip, have been acting out this farce for three centuries. Farce is not profoundly comic, a laughing at, not a laughing with. In this the Negroes have been more inventive than we.

The code is about as subtle, and as hard to decipher, as pig-latin, or, better, pig-latin spoken by adults in the presence of children, not difficult, but difficult enough. Observe, for example, the Harlem Globetrotters improvise basketball, the perfect exercise in patterned evasion. Note how skillfully they fake, feint, shuffle, break every rule and make a mockery of the game, and with what finesse they burlesque the Negro as athlete, and how they

run through the whole gamut of Negro stereotypes. The white audience roars with laughter, but the Harlem Globetrotters are well paid, well traveled, from Wichita to Moscow, and they *always* defeat their foil, an all white team, the Washington Generals,* no matter how funny the game is. Negroes caricature Negroes, disdain to take seriously a sport in which they have developed a tradition of skill, not one of the more socially exclusive sports, and defeat whites within the confines of a game whose rules they reinvent, while entertaining a white audience—the sum of these involuted elements is farce of a high order. The criticism is the more devastating because it is in the doing—not cerebral, but spontaneous, mimetic, issuing out of the ambivalent experience that every actor has of the act and of reality. Were Negroes to speak to us directly of what they know, not in exhortation, not in threat, but about our shared cultural fraudulence, I think we would laugh until our throats rattled.

Let us try laughing at one of their more obvious cultural *double-entendres*, the heavyweight championship affair between Sonny Liston and Cassius Clay. First of all, both men are self-acknowledged professional outsiders, members of what one might call the “establishment of the outside.” Liston is an ex-con and scofflaw, at ease, like most lower class Negroes, in the underworld. Clay (Muhammed Ali), the star performer, is a Black Muslim who has made the pilgrimage to Mecca and a celebrated trip in Africa. Like Liston, he is unschooled,

* The Generals recently recruited a Negro player, who plays it straight.

although obviously clever, and manifestly rejects the white world. He even managed to fail the Draft Board intelligence test, twice. Appropriately enough, Clay had been a United States Olympic champion boxer, and understood what it meant for him to fight in the name of our country.

Born in the South, Clay had successfully turned himself into an Aesopian, a fabulous character. His famous rhymes and manufactured rages against opponents have a bowdlerized folk quality. Liston, for example, is compared to a bear, Patterson to a hare. Neither becomes angry. The personification of traits in the guise of animals is, of course, an aspect of farce—the form of each creature is frozen by the role played. One senses a kind of reverse “Uncle Remus” in Clay’s act. The characters fight among themselves but they always outwit the *man* (bear-Liston with the obliterating look; rabbit-Patterson, the trickster who disguises himself after two defeats by “the bear”; Clay, “the greatest,” the Negro as “superman”). Clay embraces them all and draws them into his fabled world, precisely because, he, alone, in his exuberance, exposes the absurdity of their professional lives in white society. He can do this because he is young, rich, and has, by means of his new religion, apparently withdrawn from the phantom circle of statuses conferred by whites. Following his first successful affair with Liston, he was even able to bring hitherto skeptical reporters into his act. “Who’s the greatest?” the new champion shouted in his dressing room. “You’re the greatest!” responded the press in chorus.

Patterson lives, ridiculously, as a worthy bourgeois in a white suburb,

an unhappy man who has it made, muttering about honor where there is and can be no honor. Liston simply plays it cool, speaking astringently and tersely when questioned, uninterested even in appearing interested in the conventional opinion of mankind—the three of them champions, arrived, glorified puppets of the white crowd, but puppets who have learned to pull their own strings, each in his peculiar way.

The event was banned in Boston, and elsewhere because it turned out, after Liston’s first defeat, that he owned a substantial part of the corporation that staged the affair and owned the right to promote a rematch. It was therefore assumed that Liston had nothing to lose from Clay’s continued success. Moreover, a secret return match clause seems to have been part of the initial contract. These details had the effect of exiling the principals to Lewiston, Maine, where the performance took place in a small hall that became, in effect, a stage for the positioning of the apparatus of mass communications, including a relay through the near reaches of outer space via the Early Bird satellite. But the partial ownership of Clay by Liston, or later, more technically, by a member of Liston’s family, is a type of interlocking control that is encountered in our society generally, and should not be regarded as the necessary prelude to an actual “fix.” It merely helped to generate a warm climate of mutual interest in which events unfolded. The end of the game was profit; originally, Liston had been the major breadwinner, but at Lewiston the principals *split* their percentage of the receipts from television and radio coverage. The take at the gate was of no con-

sequence; their live audience was miniature. So far as their behavior on stage was concerned, intuition, improvisation, and mutual interest provide the clue; no precise battle plan was necessary.

The affair began under a flood of extremely powerful and hot television lights and was over about two minutes later. At first, no one, not the referee, nor Clay, nor the various announcers and ringsiders knew what had happened. The only thing clear was that Liston had fallen to the canvas; seventeen seconds later activities were halted. Since no one was capable of describing events, much less their meaning, as they actually occurred, they had to be reconstructed, which immediately converted all observers into historians. It took several days before the confusion at Lewiston, compounded by millions of listeners and viewers, and by additional information from the principals and other interpreters, dissolved into a more or less transparent image.

When Clay was asked, immediately afterwards, what punch knocked out Liston, he allowed that it was either a left-hook or a right-cross, but refused to commit himself before he saw the video-tape. After viewing the tape, which was shown him immediately, he explained that the curious little punch which did the ostensible damage had been taught him by 'Step'n Fetchit,' who had learned it, as a boy, from the great Negro heavyweight boxer, Jack Johnson. Fetchit, the movie actor, who had made a fortune out of, and immortalized, the stereotype of the shuffling, "yes, boss," slow-thinking, but sly, Negro, had been Clay's con-

stant companion in training. One might not have expected Fetchit to appear in the camp of the Black Muslims, unless we are aware that the man who responded to that signal could not possibly have been the personality projected; and then it seems inevitable. He became a central figure in the little myth into which Clay was turning the Lewiston affair.

When Liston collapsed, the referee, Walcott, who had been a poor, famished, and desperate fighter in his own right, failed to count, obviously because he had failed to see the miraculous little punch, and did not believe that anyone had been knocked down. The timekeeper, who later insisted that the affair had lasted for only a minute, which would have made the state of Maine the locale for a record, had to inform an unbelieving referee that Liston had been knocked out. Liston, in the interim, lay prone for a few seconds, and then got up on one knee, as if listening for a count; we can imagine that, not hearing one, he collapsed again, waiting for the rule to take hold. After a while, apparently confused by what was happening and not wanting to rest too long, he stood up and, quite efficiently, began ducking a very fast punching Clay, who kept missing. While Liston was down, Clay had refused to retreat to a neutral corner, but had called him a bum and demanded that he get up and fight; the crudity of Liston's performance may have bruised even Clay's aesthetic sensibility. It was only later that he offered a logistic analysis of the power of his punch (he was moving in so it was like a head-on collision, etc.). And he accepted the victory by hopping around the ring, shouting

about his secret powers, acting out, almost over-acting to the end. Liston likewise remained faithful to his role, except that his expression was now relaxed. In the interview, afterwards, he appeared cool, poised, mild, satisfied, successful, and unmarked. After all, if he had gone down for no visible reason, he had aesthetically outwitted Clay, the showboat, also.

The question remains why the whole affair was executed so unimpressively, so transparently. But that was part of the farce. In retrospect, it appears as a near-perfect burlesque of a heavy-weight championship fight. There was no visible punch, no bruises, no count. The actors knew their audience. They have known it for generations. The audience will fill in what it pleases. As usual, we will ascribe to the Negro

behavior which fits our assumptions. We will insist that the affair was either a fix, or a mysteriously authentic fight (one veteran white sportswriter described the perfect punch in detail; a well known sporting journal tried to photograph it as such). What we will resist seeing is that two physically tremendous men put on an entertainment for a society in which they do not believe. With due consideration for themselves, they refused to batter each other into the ground for the pleasure of a predominantly white audience, according to white rules of the game, for prizes which they had already achieved by other means.

Joe Louis, afterwards sounding like a spokesman for the B'nai Brith, said he was sorry that it had to happen in Maine. The Governor, prolonging the minuet, declared the fight authentic.

Carl Oglesby

The Teach-Ins: A Student Response

Most of our teachers were not intellectuals, they were only experts. They had no engagement, only careers. When one was found in the strange state of political motion, he most often seemed to feel a bit fallen: "I speak not as an expert, but as an ordinary mortal." As if expertise were an Olympian virtue and the bomb could not also incinerate the groves of academe.

Now Vietnam. And since March, we begin to feel a blushing difference. Our teachers dare at last to be more than they were. The price is a stiff one, and they have only begun to pay it. But already they have known abuse of an unaccustomed kind. No longer above it all, therefore no longer so privileged and innocuous, they have allowed themselves not to apologize for their new anger. Taking position

on the left, where a Western intellectual belongs, the careerist-expert undergoes a breakthrough of sensibility: without becoming a politician, he becomes political.

How far will this go? How long can it last? What happens later when the chips are really down? How much can it change things? All in one: What is the nature and the probable fate of the teach-in movement?

One way not to be silenced by so impossible a question is to inventory the criticisms already aimed at the teach-in, these falling of course into the main categories of right-wing vengeance and left-wing doubt.

Rightist criticism, predictably ulterior, has tried usually to undermine the intellectuals' protest by aiming past its substance at its genesis, form, and style. A fair sample, almost a catalog of other attacks, is Irving Kristol's piece in the August *Encounter*. Those who support the Vietnam war will be satisfied by these attacks and those who do not will be amused.

The leftist criticism of the teach-in has more body and is more subtle. It raises questions about the political assumptions of the teach-in, of which there appear to be three:

First, Americans require their government's foreign policy, like domestic, to be rational, liberal, and effective. When it fails on any count, it should be repudiated.

Second, policy is created by individuals who are free to create different policy. There is nothing in Johnson's job that *requires* him to fight in Vietnam. If he thought it sensible to stop fighting, for whatever reasons, he could stop.

Third, if it is not possible to change Johnson's policy by suasion directly applied, it will still be possible to change it through the creation of widespread popular dissent, itself created through suasion.

Thus, the teach-in seems to picture the war as flowing from a decision made by men who are continuously obliged to reexamine it in terms of liberal value commitments and their role as servants of an expressive citizenry. The decision for war is never final. It is in need of periodic rejustification. If at some point no justification can be produced, the decision will be reversed.

Radicals, or some radicals, are not so sure. Must policy be rational, liberal, and effective? The power of the *fait accompli* being evidently supreme, perhaps it need be only effective. Is it made by individuals who could as easily make it differently? Perhaps Bundy did not exist and was therefore invented. Can an aroused population force a change? How is it aroused? By what means does it demonstrate its arousal? By what agency does it invade the "power structure"?

Such objections are clearly not indubitable. But they are strong enough to create uncertainty about the teach-in's political significance. And if this uncertainty holds, what follows is the more menacing objection that the teach-in's main result is merely to provide the "totalitarian liberals" with yet another mask, for they are now in a position to say: Ours is a free country where those who dissent are even met cordially in the White House, where there is honest competition between all views, and where the citizenry, convinced that all sides

have been heard, can now retire to its slumber, confident that the right decisions will be made. One point of the radical critique is simply that the rulers of at least one 20th Century superstate have found out that talk is nothing to worry about.

If this line is at all valid, what can the teach-in do? Consider first some of the things it already has done.

- *The teach-in has legitimated dissent.* This is hard to quantify. But it appears that more people now find it more possible to think more unthinkable thoughts than before. In fact, the Administration's cooperation with the teach-in has implicitly confessed that there is something to argue about. Who can say that it was not partly the teach-in movement that made more possible the excellent ABC documentary, "The Agony of Vietnam?" To make such public dissent possible in so combustible a national atmosphere, when Congress itself exudes such constant, crazy silence, is not just a small accomplishment.

- *The teach-in has created an umbrella of a kind for the militant protest of the radical students.* I mean simply that the students are now not as lonely as they were, and this is all to the good. In spite of some student discontent at the teach-in's "respectability," the opening toward the liberal center that this entails represents for the students a fresh tactical opportunity: with some right-flank security, they are in a better position to consider their civil disobedience. The faculty intellectuals support them at least by explaining them, by making their action more intelligible to

on-lookers. Protest politics being so doomed to symbolism, this service is probably crucial.

- *The teach-in has created the possibility, and perhaps the fact, of an international alliance of intellectuals against the Cold War.* "Teach-in" is already part of the international language. The Tokyo teach-in of August 15 had much of the spirit of the Michigan original (and at 4:00 AM was still being watched by 500,000 on national television). In early October, the Toronto International Teach-In will make it possible for the first time for North Americans to hear for themselves a systematic development of America's, Russia's, and China's positions on the dominant struggle of our time, backward-nation revolution and advanced-nation response.

Maybe just as important, the teach-in has created community where before there were only individuals, and in its best moments, a peculiarly exquisite death-of-God *élan*, one would almost say a stone-sober merriment, where before there was only resignation or even despair.

So again: What can the teach-in do? It can try to fulfill the promises it has already made credible. It can recruit more troops, deepen and make more permanent its analysis, and continue the task of turning the protest's achieved legitimacy into unanswerable necessity. It can reach further both toward the students, who supply its basic political power, and toward the Establishment, where such changes as we are able to force (whether we like it or not) are going to be made. It can broaden its issue base until its subject matter becomes not incidents,

not wars, but modern history. To gaze for long on Vietnam's ruination is to gaze quickly on American Sinophobia and at last, dimly now, into the heart of the Cold War. It then becomes insufficient to decry our Vietnam war or even our over-willing co-authorship of the miserable history of these last 20 years. We need nothing less than a severe, even heartless reinterpretation of the 20th Century and the utmost

clarity about the 21st. Nothing less can break the Cold War.

This means that the teach-in movement must change the American campus from an assembly line for managers and technicians into the seat of a new American learning, a resilient and self-conscious scholarship turned inwards upon our institutions, outwards upon their impact on the world, and broadcast everywhere.

Otis L. Graham Jr.

Reconstruction and Indecision

I never met a colleague in the teaching of a college history course who expected to learn very much from grading a batch of blue books. Yet an untidy pile of essays on my desk—essays designed to persuade me that my students knew something about the Reconstruction period—has just offered me a glimpse into the divided mind of white America. One expects a certain consistency in outlook from a Southern white—or a Negro—and usually gets it. But what I saw reflected in these tests (written by Border/Northern students) was a curious confusion which goes to the very sources of commitment and judgment in the Negro problem. Not that my students were passive or uninterested—nor even disinterested. In fact, they crowded forward with crisp judgment, and they knew their history well

enough. But they were on both sides of the question at once, and as I read, it was hard not to guess that their divided mind is a general one, and perhaps I understand now why this thing is so hard.

"Who made mistakes, where, and why?" they were asked, after several sessions and considerable reading in the Reconstruction era. "Reconstruction was too harsh on the prostrate South," they almost invariably began, reflecting here the classic interpretation for which William A. Dunning's *Reconstruction: Political and Economic* (1907) may stand as the scholarly, and Claude Bowers' *The Tragic Era* (1929) as the popularized prototype. These histories blamed an unsatisfactory Reconstruction on the very idea of a forced alteration of Southern social arrangements. Special blame fell

to men like Thaddeus Stevens and Charles Sumner, Northern "radical" Republicans who insisted on bayonet-backed reforms in a section of the country foreign to them. My students struggled through that argument well enough: the Reconstruction Acts (providing for military reconstruction, dividing the South up and placing her under five Major Generals, etc.), were ill-advised; the Negro was not fit to assume political, let alone social, equality; the Scalawag and Carpetbagger were unscrupulous meddlers, etc. In the language of one essay, "the radicals didn't understand Southern conditions, and forced the Negro [usually capitalized] on the white before either was ready. Negroes roamed the roads, unfit for the life of freedom . . ." And so on.

So the mistakes were made by those who conceived of a social reconstruction in the first place. They were made by those who were concerned for the Negro (occasionally you get from a student, just as you get from historians such as Charles Beard and Howard K. Beale, the view that the radicals weren't doing it for the Negro primarily, but for business and/or party interests) and who used force permanently, but somehow unnaturally, to strengthen the position of the black American.

Fine, I can take that. For while my own position is akin to that of most Negro and liberal historians, to every man his own view of the Negro and his treatment. When I get a logical exposition of the "Reconstruction itself was a mistake" theory, and some supporting data, I am—at least in my pedagogical role—satisfied.

But no, the students aren't finished.

This isn't 1907, nor even 1947, but post-*Brown* decision America. I read on in these papers and find that new trends in historical writing have made their impact—or, the same forces that move modern historians have influenced my students. Among historians, Dunning's pro-Southern view came under attack in the 1930s and has never been quite the same. From Negro historians like W. E. B. DuBois and John Hope Franklin to Southerners like Francis B. Simkins, Reconstruction no longer appears a simple blunder by radical politicians and illiterate Negroes. Thanks to new studies of the various state experiences with Reconstruction, and of such special topics as the Negro in politics or the Freedman's Bureau performance, it now appears that Reconstruction was not so lamentable after all. Its gains were real, its flaws reproduced outside the South during the same period, and most importantly, it was a reform of Southern society admirably begun and regrettably abandoned. I suppose Carl Degler's fine synthesis of American history, *Out of Our Past*, is the best example of recent perspective.

My students, having assimilated this new angle of vision, proceeded to reverse their field. Another mistake, they went on to say, was that nothing lasting was done for the Negro! He was left to the devices of his racist ex-masters in 1876, deserted by the "radicals" who simply traded him for a bunch of railroad stock and Rutherford B. Hayes. Why, they complain, wasn't something enduring accomplished, so that our current problem would never have arisen? Why this inexplicable fatigue among Northern humanitarians, this loss of commitment?

At a time when the "Negro question" might have been solved for good, while Southern defenses were down, why didn't the Republicans press for an equitable social order in the South—arranged, naturally, at the expense of the former slaveholding class?

And so the essays straggled on, each to its divided conclusion. I was left with this schizoid effort, and expected to attach an appropriate letter "grade" to the whole.

You can't have it both ways, of course. In 1866 the choice was precisely this—either a commitment to the Negro, backed by federal law and force, or an accommodation through abandonment of the Negro. Most of the participants saw this clearly, and decided one way or the other. The discouraging thing in these essays was their blithe combination of *both* these views. My students cherished states' rights and the welfare of the Negro, and criticized Reconstruction for not remaining loyal to both.

In a man who sees each of these courses of action as flawed, who takes a stand for federal nonintervention and Negro equality, for let-alone and for social justice, you do not, I think, have a sort of determined and calculated duplicity. You have a divided mind. That sort of person is no strong supporter of intervention to change Southern society, but neither is he willing to leave the Negro to his fate without casting about for some forceful remedy. He winds up being, therefore, a confused moderate. He is either unwilling or unable to see that the "right" path is forked before him, and that, having but one body and soul to commit, it is time for choice. Instead of possessing at least that much clarity, he wishes both sides well, and at that fork, with all the good will in the world, he squats. As we decide this question, we will have to do it without him.

And he is most of us.

THE "NEW RADICALISM"

In our last issue we began a discussion of the "new radicalism" with articles by Irving Howe and Staughton Lynd. That discussion now continues with the following articles, as well as some letters in the Correspondence section. We invite further comments from readers, preferably of modest length.—EDITORS

David T. Bazelon

The Kids and the Cockers

The surviving socialist generation had no sufficient reason to expect that the new fellows should or would follow their lead. The fact that this may be very much to the disadvantage of the young activists, does not alter the character of our reasonable expectations. Also, a good part of what we would offer them they need like another hole in the head.

The simple fact of the matter is that we ourselves made the tradition unavailable. This was accomplished through strenuous intellectual effort; which unfortunately succeeded far beyond our worst fears. If some little smidgeon of the energy devoted to the pietistic tending of the Eternal Flame of Doctrinal Purity had, instead, gone into actual thought about the structure of American power (or even compulsive precinct work)—if we had *helped* Marx a little—then we might be in a position to complain. As it is, however, while viewing with dismay we had better include ourselves in the

landscape. It *has* to be in part our fault that after two thousand years their best idea of political action is a Central High rendition of the Sermon on the Mount.

The incredible idealism. What primitives. Etc. The *alta* Marxists are correct, certainly: what a comedown from *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon* and *The Civil War in France*. On the other hand, so is *DisSENT*—which is also, admit it, even a bit of a comedown from the early *Partisan Review*. Why? We aged, and so did the doctrine. The one event was unavoidable; the other could have been handled somewhat better. It wasn't, because of the same impulse toward purity (covering over analytical ineptitude) that may be observed now. In our time, we asked the same question they repeat endlessly today—*Mirror, mirror on the wall / Who is the most radical of all?* It is just that the mirror has been changed. You liked the old one better? That figures.

Idealism is a device of self-creation appropriate to young people who are in the heat of the process of creating themselves. Piety, however, is an ideal self-protective device for cockers who didn't manage the self-creation of their youth as well as they intended. (Don't worry, fellows: we may not live to see it, but these kids will stumble into their own set of pieties, when the time comes.) But the big difference remains that we had the European tradition of socialism—which perhaps could have been adequately modified and made relevant, instead of alternately enshrined and abandoned. We flubbed that opportunity; and these kids are, very irritatingly, the living proof of that fact.

They come from the pacifist tradition, and other remnants of Christian idealism. A lesser tradition? One that we were raised to believe Marx had laid low long ago? You betcha. Suckers for another Popular Front gang-shag? You betcha. So what should we do about it? Weep, brother, weep.

The intellectual life of the cockers was initiated or focused by socialist writings, confirmed either by the October Revolution or by the Depression; theirs was created, however, by the Horror of the Bomb and the Shame of Segregation, and confirmed by Everything. Notice that mere moral assertiveness has been effective in fighting segregation and was inevitable in opposing the Bomb, since nothing much else was available—certainly nothing in the socialist tradition. But moralism, thus confirmed, oozes into neighboring brain-cells; so also did the virus of doctrinal distinctions work its way in our poor battered brains.

Beginning with the Bomb as the fundamental fact of life, rather than economic exploitation or other elements of Marxism (as we did), the new fellows come upon this item called "Communism" merely as a manufactured road-block: many of them heard about it first from McCarthy. What was for us a monumental historical tragedy, is for them a rhetorical inconvenience. They are just not interested in adapting our trauma to the framework of their current perceptions. This could be a serious loss, each in their own way, for both the kids and the cockers. I don't know what to do about it: they won't listen.

But I think they will be damaged more by their impossible idealism, than by their eventual rediscovery of the existence and effect of rational authoritarianism and irrational anti-Americanism on the left. In this, they will be quintessentially American-as-usual. The curse of our national life has been the disjunction of idealism and practicality—and the consequent excessive tension and overblown stature of each: each is dominant in its own good time. Note that the Great Events at Berkeley represented, at most, a revolt against a particular style of administration by a particular group of young administrators-in-training. I will be most interested to see how much of their idealism they take with them into the darker reaches of the administrations they will inhabit later in life. Or were they just getting it out of their system? My sharp preference is for practicality among idealists, and idealism when living with the practical people. This is both the true and the useful point of application of individual effort; and this way,

the opportunities for creative trouble-making persist for a lifetime.

The youth are not to be opposed because they are foolish. On the other hand, their vital foolishness should not be taken as a second chance for us to be young again. They should be criticized with cutting kindness, as benign as one can manage. When, as they age, some of them refuse to grow up, and their soured idealism turns them vicious, we can drench them in I-told-you-so's and other invective. And maybe they will in fact be the first

generation to experience nothing but moral triumphs, with no necessity for learning the uses of practicality. Even if they do not reach the top of that mountain, we can continue our efforts to ensure that they will not fall too low—will never sing the song of the Russian labor camps, where twenty million died in twenty years:

*They finished me, bastards, they
finished me,
They destroyed my youth;
My golden hair has turned white,
And I am on the brink of ruin.*

Arthur I. Waskow

The New Student Movement

In the last few months, especially since the war in Vietnam and protests against it have both escalated, a number of commentators from many wings of opinion—right, center, and socialist—have expressed a great deal of doubt about and disapproval of developments within the student movement. Most of these commentators have been from an older generation of American political activity. For what it is worth, it may be useful to compare their perceptions with the perceptions of someone whose basic political ideas were formed before, but only slightly before, the student movement received its great impetus from the 1960 sit-ins; who considers himself a “liberal”—a

real liberal—rather than a “socialist,” a “radical,” a “progressive,” a “New Frontiersman,” or a “Great Society” man; and who has had a chance to get to know many of the student activists reasonably well because of his work on the issues that exercise them most—racial conflict and world peace.

First let me try to get clear my own estimate of the student movement—or movements. (The ones I know best and will be talking about are SDS and SNCC.) I will try to sketch both their ideological commitments and their organizational structures.

1. They seem to me in revolt against labels and roles, though some are wea-

rily convinced that they will probably have to settle (at best) for the coining of fresh labels and the invention of new roles. Among the labels they revolt against are those habitually used by Stalinists, those habitually used by democratic socialists and other independent-left people, and those used by the Establishment. (One of the few left-descriptive words they respond to warmly is simply "radical.") To them this revolt against labels means that they have learned a great deal from the corruptiveness of Stalinist techniques—but what they have learned is that they should not act like Stalinists, not that Stalinists should be purged.

2. They seem to me to be making by no means a rigidly or vulgarly Marxist "class" analysis in the sheerly economic sense, but to be more interested in all the "left-outs" rather than in just the economic "have-nots." (This isn't my distinction, but Sid Lens's.) The left-outs seem to be those who have been kicked off the bottom rungs of "status" and "power" ladders as well as those on the bottom rungs of the "class" ladder. Thus students think of themselves as left-outs even though they come from affluent families. And their reaction seems to be that no one ought to be "left-out"—that all human beings belong in the polis—that it is an outrage for *anyone* to be napalmed, starved, ignored, or segregated.

3. They analyze the reasons for the present exclusion of some people from the polis as partly but not wholly economic: partly the wish of the Establishment to make more money, but partly its grasp for power aside from wealth and partly a kind of disease that comes from focusing upon the machine the Establishment thinks it is

running rather than upon the people who are really being run ragged. As the students see it, this disease involves the love of order, because the machine must run smoothly; anger at those who create disorder (though sometimes a willingness to buy order back at the price of placating the disorderly); and a willingness to treat people who do not fit the orderly assumptions as if they were not part of society at all.

4. For these reasons, the students seem to believe that "the revolution" of which they speak must not only include a redistribution of wealth and the grasping of a share in power by those who presently have no power at all and the acceptance of all as entitled to human dignity, but also the reconstruction of society so that it does not act *or seem like* a machine, but *is* always and always *looks like* people. This is the real hope and meaning behind the slogans of "participatory democracy," "decentralization," "university reform," "the Third World," etc. Otherwise, there is not much detailed content to these slogans yet.

5. In foreign policy, where some of the students have been criticized as anti-American or non-anti-totalitarian, their hope of a non-machine society seems to have some special impacts. For example, "peace" seems important to them not for the sake of survival alone, or even chiefly, but because the war machine *is* a machine, perfectly calculated to treat three billion humans like things. And indeed "peace" or "disarmament" *per se* has recently come to mean much less to the students unless it is closely tied to a decent world for the hungry nations. And "decency" is closely attached to

the hope that the Third World can create "human" societies that avoid the "machine" mistakes of the West, Russia, and possibly—they plead ignorance—China.

6. Indeed, those who attack the students for not opposing totalitarianism in the Third World should understand that many of the students have in mind something quite special when they think or speak of "totalitarianism." They mean the generally machine-like, dehumanizing quality of great bureaucracies, not the specially dehumanizing system of secret police and thought control. This is one of the most important aspects of their thought, and is why some of them can in one breath damn the University of California as "totalitarian" and deny that Cuba is. For Cuba seems to be "turned on," live, unbureaucratic, full of sex and unexpectedness, even if its government controls the press; but the multiversity is gray and chilly. Given a choice between repression and suppression, the students would choose to be suppressed. And this is not simply a leftward favoritism: the students fight the racist and anti-civil-libertarian government of Mississippi, but they save their deepest fury for the cool, gray way in which the Justice Department in Washington refuses to come to their aid. And they find a joy in working in Mississippi, beatings, jail and all, that they would never find as cool gray bureaucrats in Washington.

7. The students seem to me to be ready to respond to a wide range of issues in explicitly "moral" terms rather than strategic or technical ones. "Is it right?" not "Will it work?" "They are disgusting" not "They are

stupid." I think there is a strong component of Gandhi, or Gandhianized Christianity, or Gandhi-Camus existentialism in this. Not that they are pure Gandhians by any means. But they tend to believe that it is not always, or even usually, possible to work out the impact given means will have on hoped-for ends, and thus to choose means on some intrinsic moral principle—if not absolute nonviolence, then a "not quite violent" ethic. They have not much understanding of the real meaning of Dewey's pragmatism as regards the relation between ends and means, as far as I can tell; and they seem to be dubious of spelling out their ultimate ends, partly because of an existentialist focus on *Now* and partly because spelling out goals might result in the mistaken exclusion of some people whose ends would grow and change if they shared in action instead of being excluded.

8. They seem to me to be self-activating. Unlike SANE and CORE at one level of the political spectrum, ADA at another, or the Emergency Civil Liberties Committee and the Progressive Party at still another, they seem *not* to have been put into motion by an older generation of people who had very clearly worked-out ideologies and who, at least for a long time, kept basic control of the organizations they created. For both SANE and CORE, for example, I would say a very special group of Gandhian-socialist-pacifists was extremely important in getting the organizations going. Indeed, the Fellowship of Reconciliation had a major role in both. For ADA, the equivalent group was an alliance of New Dealers and labor Socialists: Eleanor Roosevelt, Reuther, and Du-

binsky. For ECLC and the Progressives, an alliance of Stalinists and fellow-travelers. I do not need to suggest my ethical choices from among these groups; the point is that in certain sociological aspects, the organizations may be much alike. The interesting point is that if I am right, the student movements are different from all of them in that the group that created them is at most ten years older than the *youngest* of the members, and that the founder group is still working out its own ideology. In SDS there is now a cadre with opinions and analyses much more "sophisticated" than those of the new entrants—but the cadre itself is under 30 and is still creating its own ideology. It is this whole atmosphere of self-creation that makes for the self-confident feeling among the students that no one else could "infiltrate" or control them. It is far more likely that the student movements will end up creating and giving the basic tone to and thus perhaps for a long time "controlling" other organizations e.g., the Mississippi Freedom Party, the Newark Community Union (in the slums), even conceivably *f a c u l t y* groups that take both their *élan* and their office workers from their students—than that anyone will be able to control them.

9. Their ideology and rhetoric urges them to work toward decentralizing their own organizations and to avoid imposing their own ideas on the groups they are organizing—especially the ideologically defenseless ones in the slums and the Delta—but in fact, of course, there are enormous internal pressures to assume that they are right and to make the new groups in the images that seem appropriate to the

founders, as the founders tried to make SANE and CORE and Turn Toward Peace. Nevertheless, it always *tends* to be "legitimate" among the students to uphold decentralization and oppose a central bureaucracy, and always "illegitimate" to want to read somebody out for disagreement on what needs doing or how to do it. (Not that it never happens.) This results, on the one hand, in its being difficult to "control" the student organizations themselves. On the other, it results in things happening that look to some outsiders like "infiltration," and that no one in the organization will repudiate because of respect and tenderness for the "commitment" and world-view of others.

10. For a long time as the students count time (i.e., for the three years I have known some of them) one of the strongest of their commitments—both in general ideology and in their own organizational work—seemed to me to be the ethic of personal warmth. That is, deep respect (not just tolerance) for personal peculiarities, an atmosphere of love and gentleness toward each other, and an unwillingness to interfere with love affairs, dress, or personal oddities even if these seemed to be getting in the way of the movement as a political thrust. Efforts to advance the personal happiness of the members of the movement seemed as important as formal victories in the society. Asceticism was a matter of individual choice or of scarce resources, not of puritanical discipline. The ethic of personal warmth may be declining—I think I detect this, but I'm not sure—as work in the ghettos gets tougher and the demand for superhuman energy and commitment grows.

But some of the students have already seen this "danger" and are trying to counteract it by bringing artists, actors, and other specially non-puritani-cal or non-political people into the ghetto projects. Again, what they fear worst is grayness and sameness.

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Having sketched my own perceptions of the student movement, I should like to suggest how (and to some extent why) they differ from those of the older generation of New Dealers and democratic socialists. For the perceptions are clearly different. Where I have described a free-wheeling, loosely knit, decentralist, and warm-toned movement with a flavor more like that of the Wobblies or the communitarians of the 1840s than of any other American politics, many of that generation whose political ideas were formed by, during, or in response to the New Deal and World War II see the students as hostile, bitter, and—especially—ready to turn themselves into totalitarians. Some of the older generation also fear that the students are now being or will easily be "infiltrated" by or "controlled" by Communists of the Chinese if not the Russian variety. Even those who concentrate on the fear of indigenous, self-grown totalitarianism among the students regard with deep foreboding any friendly connections they may have with "old far lefties"—a foreboding that has a tinge of the "infiltration" fear about it.

There are three ways in which one could define the fear that is expressed by many of those who see the student movement as moving toward totalitarianism:

1) As "infiltration" or "control," either organizational or through personal influence, by either the old Communist party or the new Progressive Labor party, in or over the major organizations or important people in the student movement;

2) As an ideological commitment by the students to a vanguard party with "democratic centralism," to the need for a violent revolution followed by a dictatorship of the proletariat (or of the good guys), to the need for full support of the Soviet Union and/or China, etc., or

3) As the growth of a Stalinist personality tone (extreme rigidity, political and personal paranoia, puritanism, etc.) among the students.

Although I fully agree that it is not utterly impossible for the students to become "totalitarians" in one or another of these ways, I do not see any important signs that this is happening.

The conditions that would make it more likely are easily specified: (1) more ventures in foreign policy that look to the students either like classic American "imperialism" (like the Dominican affair) or like "neo-imperial" strategic interventions (like Vietnam) but in any case have the effect of messing up other people's societies for the sake of American interests or even of *their* interests as defined by Americans; (2) repression of part or all of the student movement. The reasons that the second situation might result in an "underground" mentality and the emergence of Stalinist connections, ideologies, or personalities are

obvious. Such reasons may not be so obvious for the first situation if it were somehow not to be combined with the second—but my own impression is that a series of “imperial” adventures would seem to a lot of students to confirm the Chinese interpretation of America and the world.

It might well be agreed that the students themselves have a responsibility in the present to prevent their own approach in the future from becoming corrupted in this way, even if they *were* to suffer from repression. To discharge that responsibility, the students probably need to deepen their philosophic understanding of and commitment to their present view of the world. (For example, they probably need to work out more fully either their vision of the decent future or an ethic by which to measure the means they are willing to use in moving toward that future—or both.) But the point is that whatever they do or fail to do under the pressures that might be applied to them, my estimate of their present mood and tone is that they are absolutely unlike the old Stalinists, as well as uninfluenced by them.

If this estimate is right, why do some leaders of ADA, Turn Toward Peace, LID, etc., get so nervous about the “totalitarian mood” of the students or about totalitarian “control” or “infiltration” of them? Why should my estimates be so different from theirs? I could hardly blame them for thinking that I—and the students—are novices at Stalinist-spotting; and that the guys who fought Stalinists in the ‘thirties and ‘forties can recognize both the people and the mood better than I can. But I’m stubborn, and I

think I could “explain” what I regard as distortions of perception on the part of the old-line socialists and pacifists.

I think that for some of the old-liners, the major factor in explaining their reaction is their participation in “controlling” organizations in ways roughly comparable to (partly because competitive with) but more benign than the Stalinists’ way—and the resulting assumption that whatever social movement appears must be similarly “controlled” by somebody; if not by them in their comparatively benign and open way, then by their old opponents the Stalinists in their much more conspiratorial and destructive way. Since to many of them it is inconceivable that social movements could appear “indigenously” not only in the sense of not being foreign-controlled but in the sense of not being older-generation controlled, and since they know *they* do not control the students, they suspect the Stalinists or neo-Stalinists must.

For others of the old-liners, I think the major factor may be the way in which they were deeply and permanently scarred, by the emergence of Hitler and Stalin, into the belief that Totalitarianism had a capital T, was unchangeable and diabolical—that is, that it was a total departure from and beyond history: a belief which not only, in foreign policy, ratifies the assumption that Vietnam is the same situation as that of Czechoslovakia (because the Totalitarian Mao is identical with the Totalitarian Hitler) but also, in domestic life, ratifies an *absolute* fear of the absolute power, cunning, and resistance to change of the Totalitarians. The Stalinists not only

always want the mimeograph machine, they always know exactly where the mimeograph machines are *and they always get control of them*—unless the only opponents who know anything about it, the old anti-Stalinists, are ranged in full battle order against them. (Or, among those who believe that the “siren song” of Stalinist ideas or friendly influence is the danger rather than organizational control, it is assumed that the siren song is so beguiling that only a crafty Socialist Ulysses can guard against it—not the untutored student sailors on their own.)

Finally, among some of the old-liners there are real and unblinkable differences in interest, as well as in style, from the students. If the highest priority of the AFL-CLIO is the repeal of 14-B, requiring help from the Speaker of the House, and SNCC's highest priority is unseating the Mississippi Congressional delegation, requiring opposition to the Speaker, there are bound to be real political clashes between them. If ADA is pressing for more money for urban renewal and SDS is encouraging slumdweller to oppose particular urban renewal projects, there are bound to be real political clashes between them. Conceivably such differences could be dealt with in true coalition style, by each member's calmly accepting on the part of the other that on particular issues they will disagree whereas on others—perhaps on organizing the Mississippi Freedom Labor Union, for example—they can work together.

But that kind of coalition would impose a terrible strain of self-control on its members, and both sides (the generation of “orderly reform” and

the generation of “creative disorder”) frequently find it easier to regard their erstwhile partner's particular defection or disagreement as evidence of some sinister plot. Some students frequently believe the reformers must have “sold out” to the Establishment; and many of the reformers can only explain the students' disagreement, and criticism, by postulating Stalinist or neo-Stalinist influence over them. Thus what I regard as the old-liners' major misperception of the students is fueled by their important clashes of interest with the students.

In listing these three reasons for the old-liners' misperceptions I do not mean to sound sarcastic—an attempt to “explain” ideas in terms of their social roots always sounds like an unmitigated and vicious attack—and I do not mean to say that there are not among the students, as probably among us all, some social and psychological tugs toward making a totalitarian analysis of American society or adopting totalitarian prescriptions for dealing with it or getting first help and then direction from some totalitarian group or totalitarianizing our personalities. But the students seem to me to be the best among us; in some ways, the least vulnerable rather than the most to such tugs, and unlikely to succumb.



There has been much recent talk of “coalition” on the left. Many of the students have translated this to mean the subordination of their own values and interests to those of the older, more powerful, and better established reform institutions. But one could see the real need as a kind of meta-coalition between the generations: on one

side the "creative disorder" people, SDS and SNCC; on the other the coalition that Bayard Rustin has described between labor and the liberals, ADA and LID, and the older civil rights movement.

And I would argue that the meta-coalition between "the movement" and "the coalition" is indeed what is desperately needed. For if, as SDS and SNCC sometimes seem to demand, all left politics were in the streets and in the ghettos, I think the distance between active politics and the government would widen so rapidly that there would be a repression of creative disorder. If, on the other hand, as ADA and LID sometimes seem to be saying, all the students' energies went into elective politics on the left of the Democratic party, I'm afraid the Democrats—without the spur of disorder in the streets, the Delta, and the ghettos—would simply absorb it and make very few important legislative changes. In other words, a relatively small number of highly committed people can bring about more change by using the techniques of disorder than those of order; but they need to have some protection from others who keep the institutions of order just a

few steps, instead of a few miles, behind them.

The question then is whether there will be (1) active enmity between the two generations so that LID and ADA spend most of their energy not on left-Democratic party politics but on trying to crush SDS and SNCC (and SDS and SNCC spend most of their energy not on activating the Delta and the ghettos but on attacking LID and ADA); or (2) tacit alliance in actual fact, punctuated by various snarls in both directions whenever the two generations get unbearable to each other; or (3) active coalition in which enmities and fears in both directions get resolved by what Dave Bazelon calls a kind of "action psychotherapy," with knowledgeable and sympathetic "politicotherapists" helping translate between the two sides and suggest where each can move forward in its own way without trampling the other.

I'm afraid the situation just now is degenerating from (2) into (1), rather than moving from (2) toward (3). How can that be stopped? *That*, I believe, is the real question—of which the argument over the student mood is mostly a symptom—and the one we should now proceed to answer.

BOOKS

Daniel M. Friedenberg

On the Anatomy of Castroism

CASTROISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE, by Theodore Draper. New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 280 pages. \$5.95.

Theodore Draper, the noted historian of the Cuban Revolution, has grouped his most recent thought in *Castroism: Theory and Practice*, a series of essays, some already printed in various magazines and now recast, others written specially for this occasion.

The first essay, "What Is Castroism?", points out that Castro's ideology before attaining power—mainly expressed through *History Will Absolve Me* and *The Manifesto of the Sierra Maestra*—was the contrary of his present position. This is lamentably true, but not uncommon. If Castro is to be condemned for changing his course after coming to power, if this of itself is a basis for condemnation, we must do the same for Abraham Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt, not to mention our present epigone.

To Draper's credit, he points out much evidence to support the view that Castro was not initially a Communist. The first Castro-Communist alliance took place in 1958, but it was a tactical move against Batista rather than a fraternal embrace. In the next two years, however, this alliance moved toward fusion even while Cas-

tro, intermittently, was calling the Communists vile names. Following the Bay of Pigs invasion, in the famous speech when Castro admitted to being a Marxist-Leninist, he claimed he had been a victim of "imperialist propaganda" during the earlier period.

As usual, Draper's facts are correct but do not really answer the questions raised, since such policy shifts cannot occur in a vacuum. The exegetic method, if it is to be fair, must examine the total context. If parallel with the various statements of Castro in one column, date by date, we could run another column consisting of inflammatory remarks from U.S. Senators, editorials of leading American papers, advice from former ambassadors to Cuba like Messrs Gardner and Smith, and CIA briefings at bases created to invade Cuba (of which Castro was informed), then the picture might be clarified. One can almost hear Che Guevara reading inside reports and saying: "See, it is just like Guatemala all over again."

Despite many disclosures, we know only the surface of U.S. pressures. But even the circumspect reports on CIA movements in Cuban exile training

centers, as well as recent actions in the Dominican Republic, put matters in a larger frame. If President Kennedy, against his better judgment, was compelled to launch the Bay of Pigs invasion, one can imagine what was happening in the other camp. It is thus factually correct to quote Fidel, but does not add much to our knowledge.

The conclusion of the essay "What Is Castroism?" is "Historically, then, Castroism is a leader in search of a movement, a movement in search of power, and power in search of an ideology." This is correct—but it also defines much more than Castroism. Much the same could be said about Sukarno, Nkrumah, the late deposed Ben Bella, Sekou Touré . . . and even de Gaulle, Bourguiba and Kenyatta. For the world is a higgledy-piggledy place in the 20th century, a gigantic laboratory where social experiment is rife. We choose in ideology and interest, our culture and pocketbook convert themselves into passions and philosophy. But Castro's Cuba "historically" is not that unique; to the contrary, it is quite typical of a time when the old order has collapsed and radical youth is willing to experiment. The present writer, with memories of Stalin and Hitler, has a violent prejudice against the police state and hence abhors Castroite Cuba. In economic terms, Castro's experiment is a complete failure, suppressing personal freedom (or what went under that name before Fidel) and not gaining in exchange economic freedom.

But this should not blind one to the drama which took place. Perhaps Draper's definition of Castroism could be deepened by putting a suffix to

each phrase of the sentence. "Historically, then, Castroism is a leader in search of a movement to destroy American control of Cuba, a movement in search of power to initiate state socialism, and power in search of an ideology to garner Russian support without being completely dependent." This new definition, too, has its weaknesses—but at least it touches the larger reality.

The second essay, "The Déclassé Revolution," starts with an analysis of Che Guevara's theory of peasant guerrilla action as the way to achieve power. It is Mr. Draper's contention that Castro subscribed to this ideology in order to fill a hole left when "Cuban humanism"—both bread and liberty—declined to the sterner realities of little bread and no liberty. The peasants in Castro's Sierra Maestra army, directed by urban intellectuals, fought for land. They never dreamed their efforts would lead to state farms which in some respects would come to resemble the large estates of former absentee landlords.

If a revolutionary peasantry did not spearhead the Rebel Army, neither did the working class. In classic Marxist theory the motor power of revolution, the working class, played a very minor role in Castro's triumph.

Theodore Draper states, and it is generally accepted, that the middle class—now the number one enemy of Fidelistas—was the actual cause of Batista's overthrow. This occurred in both a positive and negative way. As Juan Marinello, an important Communist leader, admitted: "It was clear that the triumphant revolution was directed by the 'radicalized' urban petty

bourgeoisie—students, members of the liberal professions—with important participation by the national bourgeoisie.” But the negative aspect was probably still more important, for it was the mass desertion of the middle class, more than any military victory of Castro’s guerrillas, that led to Batista’s internal collapse.

The revulsion against Batista’s rule was so universal that it was an entire people who celebrated his flight. Contrary to Che Guevara’s thesis, the revolution was not a peasant movement. Contrary to classic Communist ideology, it was not based on the working class. Fidel Castro himself said the battle had been won “with the help of men of all ideas . . . of all social classes.” It was only later, for his own purposes, that various myths about the origin and inner meaning of the revolt were concocted.

The last essay, “Castro’s Economics,” is an excellent study of how a rich land can be upset by ideological fanaticism. The flight of the administrative personnel from Cuba left the operation of the economy to theoreticians like Che Guevara, impulsive rhetoricians like Fidel Castro, oldline Communists like Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, and young men with great enthusiasm but no knowledge. Furthermore, the watchword of the revolution was forced industrialism in a country superbly blessed by nature for agriculture.

Chaos ensued. The small peasant landowners sold on the black market or sowed less. The state farm administrators were so incompetent, 80 per cent of them had to be removed. Partly by deliberate policy and partly

through ignorance, the important sugar crop fell off radically—42 per cent in ground cane and 33 per cent in unit yield from 1961 to 1963. The Cuban simplicists were astounded to learn that finished goods are made from raw materials, and factories bought on credit from Russia and Eastern Europe had no ready access to such materials. In many cases, the necessity to import both raw materials and the factories meant that the total cost of production was much higher than importation of the same finished goods. Curiously, Mr. Draper does not mention other very heavy expenses in this same period—such matters as the building of schools and hospitals and cooperative housing throughout the country, and the guaranteed wage and paid vacations for peasants. Without such a balance of both stupidity and idealism, it is incomprehensible how the regime could have lasted.

But such an economic policy cannot continue without unlimited credit. And by 1962 Russia began to ask questions about its aid-money. The answers quite evidently were not reassuring—the system was described as “bureaucratized anarchy” by a prominent Castro sympathizer—for a crackdown started. Suddenly sugar again became important to Cuba and forced industrialization was shunted aside. Che Guevara, with his usual honesty, spoke of the “fundamental error” of “a declaration of war on sugar cane,” while Castro lashed out against “socialist administrators” building “in the air,” of “revolutionary infantilism,” and of “illusionism.” The new emphasis was on the cash crop of sugar, more and more sugar while industry took a back

seat. As Theodore Draper tartly remarks: "It would appear, then, that Guevara and others have been enrolled in one of the most expensive courses ever given in elementary economics."

This decision has even reversed the diversification of the Cuban economy that was taking place during the Batista era, for now sugar—by direct decree from Castro in July 1964—is reclaiming land that had been given over to other crops. If Castro has his way, by 1970 the economy of Cuba will more closely resemble that of 1920 than the year he took power. And parallel with the reemphasis on sugar production was the decision to introduce compulsory military service, recruits getting 7 pesos a month, where the drafted men will be sent for three to four months a year cutting sugar cane or picking coffee beans. This is merely a gimmick to get cheap forced labor.

The great virtue of Theodore Draper as an interpreter of the Cuban Revolution is his insistence on supporting judgments by facts, almost unique in writings on the subject. Mr. Draper has insight, knowledge and the ability to communicate. Nobody stands near him as an interpreter of events in Cuba. Yet for that very reason, the weakness of his method can be seen more starkly. This may be expressed on the general level by restating the old definition of genius as an ability to intuit hidden relations. In this case, the relations are Cuba and the United States, the revolutionary young and their resigned elders, and the rejection of 19th century myths of progress—evo-

lution, parliamentary democracy, capitalism, and the tutelary function of the Anglo-Saxon nations—on the part of many new leaders. Unless the general *climate* of revolutionary opinion is felt in the bones, rather than the head, any study of Castroism is bound to be insufficient.

Fidel Castro is all the things that Mr. Draper describes: contradictory, dictatorial, ruthless, ignorant of economic methods, insanely ambitious. But this does not explain why he stays in power with a good measure of popular support—despite the exodus of the trained professional and administrative groups, despite the American economic blockade, despite the savage new concentration camps, despite the totalitarian panoply of press and politics, despite the general mess he has created.

The great study of the meaning of Castroism still has to be written. It will incorporate much from the writings of Theodore Draper. It will also incorporate much not there, or merely hinted at. In a footnote, for example, the author writes, "We now know that President Eisenhower authorized the training of a stand-by Cuban exile force in March, 1960," and then goes on to state candidly: "Only a U.S. government which had grossly miscalculated the forces at work or did not care any longer for other reasons would have made the break so easy." When attacking Senator Fulbright's view that we should treat Cuba as a "distasteful nuisance" rather than an "intolerable danger," Mr. Draper referred to the idiocy of not coordinating an internal uprising with an invasion at the Bay of Pigs. Is he not aware of recent

revelations (which had been told to this reviewer over two years ago by Manuel Ray, head of the left opposition to Castro) that the CIA did not want an internal uprising because its leaders feared democratic socialists might take control instead of the old line politicians?

Mr. Draper recently wrote a brilliant essay condemning the American intervention in the Dominican Republic, an essay with the single grave weakness that it failed to link up U.S. policy with the economic interests of American investors on that

island. Not to see this connection is to abort the analysis. I for one happen to prefer American-style hypocrisy because I have an aversion to demagogues and concentration camps. But I am not too sure, if I were colored, poor and ambitious for my children, that that would be my option. It still might be, but at least the option *exists*, which already puts the matter on a different level. Not to understand this larger framework is the major weakness of all Theodore Draper's analysis of the Cuban Revolution.

Understanding Comes First

THE SPRING TIME OF FREEDOM—THE EVOLUTION OF DEVELOPING SOCIETIES, by William McCord. New York: Oxford University Press, 1965. 330 pp., \$6.

Favelados, the slum dwellers in Sao Paulo's shantytowns, are the subject of a moving autobiography, *Child of the Dark*, by Carolina de Jesus. In a book which—as university press books go—is no less moving, Professor McCord argues that to help the favelados, we must not merely urge our financial aid and political advice on them, but first must make an effort to understand them and respect their institutions and traditions. All too many Western “liberals” are content to declare that these natives cannot be trusted to find their own road to salvation but must be guided by strong dictators who, moreover, should be thoroughly imbued with the “Western” spirit of efficiency. Besides, these Western apologists for Nasser, Sukarno and Nkrumah assure us, the natives neither could make democracy work

nor do they care for individual liberty.

Mr. McCord is impatient with the perverted Western intellectual who first extols the ancient village democracy which colonialism destroyed, and then applauds the new dictators for abolishing the “parochial” relics of tribal control. Among others, two contributors to *DISSENT* come in for attack: Stanley Diamond who asserted that “the [Ghana] revolution can hardly tolerate an opposition,” and Sid Lens who opposed strikes for higher wages because they would divert money from Nkrumah's revolutionary white elephants, such as Russian jet planes (“which proudly cross Africa with two lonely passengers aboard”), a six million dollar remodeling of Christinaborg castle, a super highway leading nowhere, and, of course, a modern army. In Ghana, by

the way, the charge of "parochialism" directed against the opposition is utterly false; the opposition of the commercial class seems cosmopolitan in comparison with Nkrumah, who deliberately revives tribal symbolism such as animal sacrifice and public incantations, not to speak of the cult of the *osagyefo* himself.

Of course, McCord is not blind to the advantages of authoritarian government in underdeveloped countries. He honestly relates the beneficial measures which Nkrumah or Nasser were able to accomplish because they could override local, tribal, traditionalist resistance. Yet he also mentions that many of these measures had been initiated by the preceding regimes; that under the umbrella of the dictatorship abuses and errors are as frequent as they are incapable of correction; and, finally, that the more omniscient a dictator is reputed to be, the costlier his mistakes will prove in the final reckoning. The Germans under Hitler, the Russians under Stalin and the Argentines under Peron also thought that the price of freedom was not too high for effectiveness in decision-making, speed in development, and the emotional gratification of a national renaissance. Too late they discovered that in the absence of public freedom no one was aware of the total *real* cost

of this "efficiency." Mr. McCord nowhere claims that democracy in itself guarantees justice and well-being; but he states that development may depend on a variety of factors, one of which is the availability of public controls, and that a dictator invariably forgets that justice is one of the factors defining well-being.

The meaning of justice here must be taken broadly, encompassing not only equality before the law and equal opportunity, but respect for the customs of the people and participation of the governed in the procedures of government. The dictator and his "realistic" Western advisers sacrifice human dignity to efficiency; they uproot people from their traditional moorings without offering them new links of fraternity. They boast of the increase in city population, but these new proletarians often turn out to be favelados who depend for all social support on the dictator and his machine. Meanwhile, independent organizations are suppressed or prevented from arising.

Moreover, this lack of regard for people has an economic foundation: the dictators prefer big industry to the development of a consumers' market; they acquire an airline before people can enjoy a bicycle ride; they want nuclear physicists before they train sorely needed schoolteachers; and of course, they build arms forges before they forge plows. Their political aim, having a nation of proletarians rather than consumers, coincides with their economic aim, which Bismarck expressed in the words: he who has iron also has bread.

It is true that without the militancy and restiveness of these destitute masses, the dictators could hardly pose as

DISSENT is a journal devoted to the ideas and values of democratic socialism. It seeks to serve as a forum for writers devoted to these ideas and values, while also welcoming a wide variety of other opinions. Each writer speaks for himself; there is no effort made to exact editorial consensus or uniformity.

"revolutionary," and without threatening "revolution" (which at times means little more than the expropriation of foreign-owned factories) they might not be able to pressure Western governments into giving them steel mills, power dams and air lines—the new status symbols of dictators in underdeveloped countries. But Mr. McCord points out that these may be costly displays of power, for some primitive economies cannot yet support such heavy supra-structures which may thwart rather than promote the development of a balanced consumer market.

To the illusion of rapid, forced development under the dictatorial whip, some have opposed the other illusion that, perhaps with the aid of foreign investment, underdeveloped countries can sail into the modern age without major shocks and pain. Mr. McCord is quite aware of the difficulties that must be overcome and of the sacrifices that must be demanded of the population. He is all the more concerned to make the adjustment less painful and to spare the people unnecessary deprivations, particularly those which are caused not by the aims of development but by the particular policy aims of the dictators. In a bleak chapter McCord describes the heroic up-hill fight of men like Mehta, Betancourt, Busia, Awolowo who deny that bread and freedom are mutually exclusive, and that disorder can be overcome only by fascist-type governments. He has seen these men, has inspected their work on three continents, has talked to people who benefited from their efforts or who have devoted themselves to carry their plans to fruition.

But what an uphill fight! The book is full of horrid examples of backward-

ness. The ancient village civilization is less ready for the modern age than most of us think, and an awesome gulf separates the more enlightened leaders from the masses. How does one teach birth control to a nation where the traditional salutation to the bride is "may you be blessed with 16 children"? How does one instill love of national political institutions in a village where people ask each other: is Congress a man or a woman? How does one make a nation out of people who call "foreigner" anyone observing a different ritual? How is democracy possible in countries where traditionally a hierarchy of patrons, caciques, chiefs or bosses wields influence? No doubt, to become a modern nation, these people must be yanked loose from their old orientations; this means that, along with much oppression, they also are to lose their security—a process that can only be painful.

Yet, it is precisely on these old village institutions that Mr. McCord and the moderate leaders in some underdeveloped countries would found the democratic framework for a policy of balanced, consumer-oriented development. In these institutions they find the natural organs of control and possibly also the natural instruments of execution. The experience which he cites to this effect, however, so far has remained inconclusive. No one can deny that India is developing less rapidly than China, and the example of Japan, which Mr. McCord uses to demonstrate the success of "village oriented" industry, certainly cannot at the same time be used to demonstrate democratic development. Other examples of village-based development are too scanty to be convincing, and this reviewer remains somewhat unim-

pressed by the assorted but undigested information which Mr. McCord provides on this very important point.

Where McCord is convincing, he speaks of something else: a village-based, consumer-oriented development is more helpful to projects which the grand-scheme of the dictators tend to underrate, such as education. These, too, are needed to guarantee a balanced, all-round development, and it cannot be stressed too often that development is not a question of investing capital and erecting giant industrial plants or of transferring Western equipment to the Southern Hemisphere. If industrialization is not to lead to totalitarian dictatorships, or simply if it is to succeed, it must be accompanied by basic changes in the mode of life; but this necessarily is a comparatively slow process. McCord here might have quoted for support the greatest authority on development problems—Paul Hoffmann of the U.N. Special Fund, who certainly is impatient to see the backward nations take off as soon as possible, but for this very reason is putting more and more money into education and other phases of “human development” before industrial development.

McCord is not prepared to wait for the improvement of human resources until industrialization has increased the material resources. He rejects the pseudo-Marxist theory that democracy is a product of abundance as milk is a product of the cow. Ideology always has played a significant role in the modernization of a country; abundance, on the other hand, never was among the conditions needed to assure democracy.

Nor, vice versa, is it true that “democracy cannot exist” in retarded

countries as Potter and Kalman Silvert assert. “Retarded” is a relative term which makes no sense unless in comparisons. Retarded with respect to what? The American economy? The same country a hundred years hence? By present standards, all European countries were “retarded” precisely at the time when democracy there was on the march. It simply is not true that the Dutch or the Swiss first grew prosperous and then developed democracy, as a sort of luxury which rich countries can afford. In fact the Swiss were then so poor they had to hire themselves out as mercenaries. Much easier to prove than its contrary is the thesis that democracy as an ideology and as an institution *preceded* the rise of industrial wealth everywhere, and maybe was its condition.

This observation, however, brings up the one point where I differ with Mr. McCord. In his picture of underdevelopment, the traits of ideological hatred, of resentment and solidarity are missing. The dictatorships, after all, are not the invention of the dictators or of European intellectuals who advised them; a Sukarno, a Nkrumah, a Nasser are popular dictators, and their success is not explained away by dismissing their followers as “emotional.” Moreover, no one can deny that a nation's creative powers are unleashed precisely by the type of revolutionary emotions to which the dictators appeal. McCord himself cites Nasser's successes in this respect.

But he chooses not to understand. He tries to talk economic sense while the masses are craving for economic nonsense. He asks the highly relevant question: “Would Bolivian tin miners let their union become simply one more organ of an all-powerful party?”

I am afraid they would, provided they felt that the government was theirs. At all times people have gone hungry for governments that seemed to respect their feelings, and have rebelled against governments that merely tried to feed them. McCord himself relates the story of an Indonesian who told him: "All party leaders drive in Cadillacs, but the Communists ride bicycles; they'll win." The twentieth century revolutions are puritan and nationalistic; they are not proletarian and materialistic. Some still try to speak the nineteenth century language of "efficiency," but paradoxically such claims often are mere "justifying ideologies." What people really like about Nasser, Nkrumah, Sukarno is not their economics but their style, their anti-Western, anti-bourgeois, anti-capitalist, maybe even anti-materialistic rebellion against that nineteenth century which they are trying to skip.

What Professor McCord has done is both more and less than to engage in a dialogue with these forces. In his own words, he has shown the leaders of the emerging countries that their task is complex and their problems are manifold; that they cannot deal with them on a completely ad hoc basis; that many of the assumptions which inform their policy have little basis in reality. He is pouring cold water on some of their cherished dreams, but he also shows them how to approach the problem of poverty on a realistic basis, how to plan what is within their reach and how to avoid the pitfalls of totalitarian illusions. In a climate where it is considered a sin to talk back to ill-advised nationalism, that requires courage. Mr. Mc-

Cord might easily be accused of being cold and rational where it is so much easier to be enthusiastic and thoughtless; he has in fact been called a "colonialist" in a socialist magazine. But those who resort to name-calling in the face of facts only betray their own lack of sensitivity; for it is impossible not to feel, behind the impressive mass of documentation Mr. McCord has marshalled in support of his thesis, a deep-felt, warm concern for the peoples of the Southern Hemisphere, not just in terms of their material well-being but in terms of respect for their individuality and tradition. That is more than most professional anti-colonialists can claim. McCord does not belong to those who think that white men's breast-beating over the sins of their colonialist fathers will help the backward nations very much; he offers concrete advice, and he does not fear to call a dictator nefarious even if his skin happens to be brown or black.

To be sure, Mr. McCord's projects are not grandiose and his predictions are not glamorous; his methods of progress are narrow-gauge projects. But in return for a little restraint he promises a more certain success, and he holds out a hope which is not founded on desperation. He does not believe that the fate of developing nations has been pre-ordained, that there is some fated necessity for them to emulate the Chinese. He rather believes that "their rise and fall depends on the choices their leaders make at this point of extreme crisis." He denies that bread and freedom are alternatives, and he goes even further: he spells out the conditions under which such choice can be avoided, as

well as the conditions which make such choice inevitable. It seems to this reviewer that such an approach is the only scientific one and that Mr. McCord has done an outstanding service to the "third world" by refusing to shove its real problems under a heap of revolutionary slogans. He also has shown, at least to this reviewer's satisfaction, that the problems of development will be even more formidable if the narrow-gauge devices should not work.

Still, the burden of proof is on

those who reject these suggestions. "Transitional man" will either liberate himself from all kinds of thralldom, or he will fall back into the inertia which brought on his plight in the first place. He has been told so often that he cannot do it; McCord for the first time holds out a hope that may be guarded and conditional, but which at least is based on a faith in man-free man.

The Favelados have a world to win—provided they lose their benefactors.

HENRY PACHTER

Technology and the "New Samurai"

THE NEXT GENERATION: THE PROSPECTS AHEAD FOR THE YOUTH OF TODAY AND TOMORROW, by Donald M. Michael. Vintage Press. xxvi and 218 pp. \$1.65.

This is a curious book. Written originally as a report to an agency of the federal government, it presents educated guesses as to probable trends into the future that awaits us. But the author is also a critical thinker who probably traces his intellectual ancestry to Veblen or Galbraith. The book therefore suffers from a kind of built-in ambivalence. Michael foretells a future which he views with evident distaste, yet seems to counsel adjustment to it.

Michael expects technology to be the major shaping force of the future. Within the next twenty years we will develop a hitherto unimaginable capacity for the manipulation of the material and human environment. Cybernation and related techniques

will not only lead to rapid increases in productive capacity but will revolutionize the ability to collect and use information. Today's computers still need to be programmed; their lineal descendants will be able to do much of their own programming. These computers will provide decision-makers with unprecedented powers of anticipation and planning. Society will be rationalized to a degree that even a Max Weber, who fifty years ago spoke about the "cage of the future," could hardly have anticipated.

The rationalization of techniques will require a corresponding rationalization of men. The new society will put a premium on high skill; hence its educational system will be geared to the demands of technology. Michael

predicts the emergence of a three-tier educational structure whose "output" will be channeled into the three major strata of the new society..

In the meritocracy of the future, the top elite of planners and decision-makers, a kind of *New Samurai*, will have the educational background to deal with complex technological, scientific and managerial problems. Their power will be rooted in their expertise. The next layer, the skilled technicians, will be excluded from decision-making powers but will be rewarded by larger opportunities for leisure. The badly educated underclass, finally, will receive improved welfare benefits, but since post-industrial society will have a large reservoir of competitors for the remaining menial tasks, they will be a socially disinherited group of largely superfluous men.

The sorting-out process through which people will be channeled into the main three strata will start early, since the kind of education received will largely determine a child's future. Those preparing for professional careers will have to discipline themselves at an early age. They must learn to avoid distracting concerns with personal values and experiences and prepare themselves methodically for getting to the top. Skilled technicians, on the other hand, will not have to submit to similar rigorous educational training.

Able to choose their careers later than the pre-professionals, they will have more time to "play around." The skills they acquire must be flexible since they will have to adapt themselves to rapid changes in techniques; but they will not need the sustained immersion in highly specialized studies

which mark the professionals. Later on in their careers they will be well paid and have more leisure than their professional betters. Being highly mobile and adaptable, they will need less inner discipline and rigor. The unskilled and under-educated, finally, will be poorly prepared and motivated for the technological society. They will also be poorly paid. A disproportionately high number of this unskilled work force will be Negroes, if for no other reason than that Negroes will not, at least in the immediate future, receive an education that equips them for the more demanding jobs.

Michael focuses attention upon the impact of technology on education and class structure, but this book also deals with a host of other matters. He discusses, though often very sketchily, the impact of readily available oral contraceptives on sexual morality, the effects of traffic congestion and fresh-water shortage on urban planning. A fascinating chapter is devoted to expected break-throughs in biology and medical techniques. "Many people will live with sensors permanently imbedded in their bodies, transmitting information through them to the outside. Some physiological measures taken by the sensors may be read to the doctor by the patient, even as people now read thermometers." Michael considers it plausible that in the next twenty years a baby's sex may be predetermined or, at least, that the probability for it to be of a chosen sex can be increased. Organ transplants may become feasible so that organ banks, similar to blood banks, may become standard equipment. But enough; the mind boggles at all the

gifts the technological cornucopia will offer in the near future.

Michael concludes that "the picture we have surveyed is not a tidy or a very pleasant one." He finds it depressing; "overtones of Orwell and Huxley lurk in much that we have examined." Yet one feels throughout the book that the author sees no way to escape the very technological determinism which appalls him. He has no taste for the upbeat endings with which the Vance Packards and William H. Whytes usually conclude their descriptions of decay. He does not believe that a resurgence of the Protestant Ethic can halt the drift. But this leaves him with no more than an injunction to adjust to an inevitable situation. If you can't beat the trend, join it. One wonders how the young men of the future, to whose problems this book is addressed, will react. Will the Berkeley students be satisfied with this counsel of despair?

I do not wish to sound smug. I am not at all sure myself about the appropriate attitude to take toward these future trends. Michael's is an ambivalence which most of us probably share to one degree or another. It seems entirely wrong to suggest that we "smash the machines," in face of technological developments which promise a tremendous release from human toil and misery, even as they do raise the spectre of 1984. Many of the utopian proposals of Paul Goodman and others seem too remote from the realities of technological drift to offer much of a chance for its reversal. One can therefore sympathize with Michael's perplexities. One even understands why he states that the poorly educated increasingly will develop

their own values and beliefs justifying withdrawal from or violence toward the rest of society, while suggesting at the same time that "Without enormous and carefully planned and programmed efforts, it will become steadily more difficult to convince these people it is in their interest and within their ability to share the values and viewpoints of the society which has so grievously deprived them."

Perhaps Michael's difficulty stems from his almost complete neglect of political factors. He makes it appear as if the future he predicts will be hardly affected by political decisions. No matter what party or group will hold the tiller, the course will be determined by the technological drifts and tides. But technological determinism has proved inadequate for an understanding of the past, and I am not convinced it is adequate for a prediction of the future. Granted that technology will impose certain limits upon human action and will condition it to a considerable degree; yet this is not to say that it will be its only and sufficient cause. Political action, the deliberate use of political power to counteract the drift, must not be discounted. Might we not put our cautious hopes in the chance that a combined revolt of the underclasses and of those youths who refuse to accept the lures of meritocratic education and rationed comforts might yet help to master the drift? Perhaps what is happening at Selma and Berkeley right now holds more hope for us than many of the technological marvels Michael so vividly projects upon the screen of the future.

LEWIS A. COSER

Alienation and Factory Workers

ALIENATION AND FREEDOM: THE FACTORY WORKER AND HIS INDUSTRY, by Robert Blauner. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964. \$7.50.

"Alienation," an increasingly fashionable word, is in danger of coming to mean nothing more than the vague sense of malaise many people feel, thereby dissolving the connection which the term has traditionally implied between the state of mind and the structure of society. Also lost is the concept of alienation as a measure of how far the social and economic realities of a society fall short of permitting the realization of human possibilities. One of the many merits of *Alienation and Freedom* is that the societal aspects of alienation are not altogether ignored.

Blauner specifies alienation as a condition of powerlessness, meaninglessness, social isolation and self-estrangement. He argues that the level of alienation among workers will vary from one industry to another. Therefore he examines the effects of craft work, machine-tending, assembly lines, and automated technologies—and relates them to the division of labor, bureaucratization, and economic structure of a given industry. For his data on attitudes of workers, Blauner re-analyzes the 1947 Roper Survey of job-attitudes, and supplements it with case studies of work in particular industries. Blauner's recourse to such tricky data—though he handles it well—testifies to the general apathy with which social scientists regard problems of work.

The results of Blauner's examination

are not very startling. As one might expect, the highest levels of alienation are found among assembly-line auto workers, while printers are the least alienated. On the other hand, workers in an automated oil refinery show considerably less alienation than "common sense" would lead one to expect. Although suitably cautious about over-generalizing on the basis of one case, Blauner permits himself some mostly unwarranted enthusiasm about the prospects for reduced alienation as a consequence of automation.

What is distinctive about Blauner's study and what makes it important is his attempt to examine systematically the possibilities for alienation intrinsic to different technologies and organizations of work within an industrial society. As Blauner points out, only about five per cent of all production is on the auto assembly line model; for not all production processes can use this kind of technology. Similarly, while automation will increase in many industries, there are large and important sectors it will not touch. Thus it is only sensible that Blauner should try to discover exactly what combinations of technological and social factors produce alienative effects. For example, from the available data Blauner concludes that there is relatively little self-estrangement among machine-tending textile workers whose traditionalistic communities produce no

expectations or aspirations regarding control over work or self-expression in work. The craft tradition of printers, in contrast, does produce such expectations and aspirations, which means that technological change in the printing industry will have different consequences from change in the textile industry. For anyone interested in structural change leading to reduction of alienation this kind of analysis is extremely useful.

But the approach has some limitations. Blauner himself notes that there are three other "modes of industrial powerlessness" besides lack of control over the immediate work situation. There is the separation from the means of production and its products, "inability to influence general managerial policies," and "lack of control over the conditions of employment." These modes are ignored in Blauner's definition of alienation on the grounds that the only salient interest of man-

ual workers is control over the immediate work situation. Although there is little information concerning workers' feelings about these broader areas of control, Blauner is undoubtedly right in suggesting that workers do not have any "conscious desires" for control over policy, etc. If so, a great deal of alienation exists that studies like this one simply take for granted. To say that workers in an automated factory are less alienated than assembly-line workers can be misleading if taken at face value. Such conclusions ignore the considerable alienation which takes place *before* the worker even enters the factory.

Some violence has been done here to the very concept of alienation. In *Alienation and Freedom*, Blauner comes dangerously close to equating alienation with "job satisfaction." To the degree that he relies on such an assumption, his book partakes of the very alienation it seeks to diminish.

MURRAY HAUSKNECHT

From the Depths of Our Century

THE HOLOCAUST KINGDOM, by Alexander Donat. Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965. \$5.95.

It is unlikely that any reader of Mr. Donat's book will be able to put it down without having been deeply moved. No matter how familiar one might be with the horrors of Nazism, this straightforward account of the sufferings of one family is bound to arouse a variety of emotional reactions: outrage, pity, disgust, bewilder-

ment. Precisely because it is for the most part a highly personal memoir, the book makes an impact that no scholarly study could match. For men are much more capable of responding to the agonies of individuals than to those of the multitude, which in their very enormity seem beyond comprehension.

Turning only occasionally to history or polemics, Mr. Donat concentrates on relating his own experiences. He describes his family's existence in the Warsaw ghetto, the frightful deprivations, the Nazi cruelties, the fears and the despair. Although it is clear that he rejects Hannah Arendt's thesis about the meaning and significance of Jewish "collaboration" with the Nazis, he makes no attempt to deny that many Jews did indeed do the bidding of their persecutors. He discusses the organization of the ghetto, the ruses that were necessary for survival, the deportations to the gas chambers and the uprising in April, 1943, which ended in the destruction of the ghetto. Shortly before, the Donats had managed to smuggle their five-year-old son out of the ghetto and had billeted him with a gentile family. Miraculously, they survived the uprising, though for the next two years they were separated, each forced to live—if the word may be used in this context—in a series of concentration camps.

Apart from reminding us once again of the ghastliness of the Nazi terror, Donat's memoir is important because it contains valuable material concerning three aspects of the situation that have often been forgotten in recent controversies. The first is that the Nazi persecution of Warsaw Jewry was a *gradual* process, moving from severe, though "bearable," policies to the final program of liquidation. When the ghetto was first established no Jew, nor anyone else, imagined that the fate of his community would be total annihilation. Resistance to the Nazis therefore seemed a futile gesture. The very few who did resist were shot. To be sure, life in the ghetto became progressively harder, but, as Donat puts

it, the Jews had fallen "victim to our faith in mankind, our belief that humanity had set limits to the degradation and persecution of one's fellow man. This mentality underlay the behavior of the Jewish leadership at the very beginning of the Resettlement [transport to the gas chambers], when the overwhelming majority voted against armed resistance."

There were, of course, other reasons for the failure of the Jews to resist before April, 1943, such as the early disappearance of many of the ablest and most militant leaders, the misgovernment of the *Judenrat*, the lack of a military tradition, the difficulty in obtaining arms, the hopelessness of a military conflict against the armed might of the Nazis. But the single most important fact seems to have been an inability to believe that the Nazis had really decided on the ultimate crime. As long as the ghetto existed—and the Nazis made every effort to give the impression that it would continue indefinitely,—there was hope that a substantial remnant would survive the war. The Donats' own will to survive is striking testimony to the strength of this faith.

The second point—not unrelated to the first—that emerges from Mr. Donat's memoir is the degree to which Nazi terror ultimately demoralized and dehumanized its victims. He relates many incidents of brutality by Jewish officials against fellow Jews in the camps, of Jewish policemen rounding up friends and close relatives for the gas chambers in order to fulfill their quotas, of fathers stealing their sick sons' food, of Jewish officials meekly and obediently carrying out Nazi orders. It would be a mistake, how-

ever, to assume that this sort of behavior was simply a consequence of a desperate desire to remain alive, though undoubtedly this was a crucial factor. As the following incident suggests, perhaps equally important was that in the atmosphere of bestiality many men lost all sense of proportion, all sense of reality as they had normally conceived it: One day a Jewish concentration camp inmate lost his shoes in the mud and asked his SS superior what to do. The SS man told him: "Go hang yourself!" The Jew thereupon "took off his belt and obediently hanged himself." This psychic transformation of the inmates, often involving the adoption of the attitudes of their persecutors, was in some ways the most tragic and gruesome consequence of the Nazi terror.

The third general impression derived from the book, like the first two, is not new but often overlooked: the utter fanaticism with which the Nazis pursued their aim of liquidating the

Jews. Even towards the end of the war, when any rational person must have realized that all was lost, the Nazis still were concerned to eliminate as many Jews as possible, and took every precaution to move Jews out of areas about to be occupied by Allied troops even though the German Army desperately needed all means of transportation. It is unlikely that fanatics of this kind would have been deterred from their destructive course had the Jews shown signs of resistance a year or two before the Warsaw ghetto uprising. General Stroop's artillery, used so devastatingly against the ghetto in April, 1943, could easily have been turned against it two years earlier.

There are infelicities in Donat's book, most notably in the next to last chapter in which his son's experiences are related, but these are minor. The over-all impact is shattering. It is a book that should be read by all who are troubled by man's capacity for inhumanity. ABRAHAM ASCHER

The Question Is Not Answered

WHO SPEAKS FOR THE NEGRO?, by Robert Penn Warren. New York: Random House, 1965. xi, 454 pp. \$5.95.

Robert Penn Warren, ex-Southerner, novelist, literary critic, and one-time apologist for segregation writes here about the civil rights movement. Such a combination of author and subject should, one imagines, produce a perceptive and exciting volume. But it doesn't.

One's reaction to this book will depend upon how much one knows about the subject. For readers of the *Saturday Evening Post*, *Time*, even the *New Yorker*, it will make fascinating reading—reading apparently jammed with insights and trenchant analysis. But for knowledgeable readers it will

seem a poorly organized, impressionist rehash of what we already know. I found it boring.

Verisimilitude is sought through lengthy descriptions of physiognomy that reveal, in the outcome, extraordinarily little about the persons involved, and by writing that consists chiefly of long excerpts from taped interviews. "Depth" is obtained, generalizations suggested, by asking different respondents the same set of questions, and by a pseudo-"stream-of-consciousness" technique in which Warren constantly interrupts his accounts of interviews to say that while a particular person was talking to him it reminded him of what another respondent had said. The result is repetitive and distracting.

The book makes clear that no one person or organization can speak for all the Negroes but that underneath the variety of viewpoints there is a unity of goals. Neither these facts nor the particulars of the wide range of views among civil rights leaders, will be news to readers of *DISSENT*, though they may be to the businessmen and politicians who are bewildered and dismayed by their discovery that neither the Urban League nor the NAACP can speak for all Negroes in their communities.

Not only is there nothing new in this book, but what is said is not especially profound; and it is not always even correct. One can overlook such errors as the remark that Du Bois died in Nigeria, but one cannot overlook the superficial coupling of him with emigrationists like Garvey. One can overlook the fact that Aaron Henry is listed in the index as "Reverend," but in a book that aims to give incisive character analysis it is harder to over-

look the author having missed the extraordinary phenomenon of the Clarksdale, Miss., pharmacist living relaxed in the midst of constant threats to his life and property. Of course this sort of superficiality is to be expected, given Warren's limited knowledge of the movement and his journalistic approach (which is not to say that there aren't a handful of reporters who every month give more perceptive analyses of the civil rights movement than Warren has done anywhere in this book). What people told him for the tape recorder was, as Warren himself notes, not necessarily their real thinking, but what they wanted the public to hear. In at least two cases the respondents clearly succeeded in deceiving Warren as to what they really believed. In other cases Warren's questions succeeded only in eliciting the most obvious ideas. For example, the probing quality of Bayard Rustin's mind is altogether missing from Warren's account.

Who Speaks for the Negro? is the title Warren gives his book. But in spite of the massive quotations from numerous interviews, one receives the impression that the whole business is really a platform from which Warren himself can speak. In the final chapter, instead of pulling together and analyzing his data, the author attempts to interpret the civil rights movement to whites, and to advise them as to how they should regard it. Warren's views—especially on the question of the white man's guilt—are of interest in themselves, bearing as Warren does the burden of his own past defense of segregation. But Warren's personal opinions do not help answer the question posed by the title of his book.

The trouble I suppose, is that Warren is simply not addressing himself to people knowledgeable about civil rights. Yet even for them there are a few passages of high value—the illuminating interview with Ralph Ellison; the forthright remarks of Kenneth Clark (though some of the best ones are from the manuscript of Clark's *Dark Ghetto*); and especially the gem of an interview with which the book opens. Because Rev. Joe Carter of West Feliciana Parish, Louisiana, lacked the sophistication of the more experienced

leaders, Warren obtained from him a genuine account of what it was like to attempt to register in the rural counties of the Deep South.

The real significance of this book, lies not in its analysis of Negro thinking and leadership but as a reflection of the advance that Warren and other sensitive men of southern background have made in liberating themselves from what C. Vann Woodward has called "The Burden of Southern History."

AUGUST MEIER

Overorganized and Overroutinized

PEOPLE OR PERSONNEL: DECENTRALIZING AND THE MIXED SYSTEM, by Paul Goodman. New York: Random House, 1965. 247 pp. \$4.95.

IN A FEW HANDS: MONOPOLY IN AMERICA, by Estes Kefauver (with assistance of Irene Till). New York: Pantheon, 1965. 239 pp. \$4.95.

American liberalism has traditionally been of three kinds: reforming and thus oriented toward government; muckraking, with or without some specific political orientation; and anti-governmental pastoral utopian. The last two, which at times have had an affinity for each other, are always considered by those who write our "official" histories to be hopelessly unstylish and obviously inferior to their more solidly respectable relative. For those who need the evidence, two recent books by Estes Kefauver (published posthumously) and Paul Goodman

demonstrate how questionable is this official version.

Kefauver's *In a Few Hands*, prepared from the voluminous records of his Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee hearings, is along with Robert Engler's *The Politics of Oil* the best example of muckraking in recent times. Most of his targets are by now well-known examples of oligopoly and monopoly in industry. Documented here for popular consumption are the familiar cases of administered prices and deliberate scarcity in the steel industry; of the exorbitant profits

reaped by drug manufacturers who use patent rights and price-maintenance techniques against the public interest; of the immense economic waste (nearly \$5 billion annually) incurred by yearly changeover in the auto industry; and of the social dislocation brought about by absentee-controlled corporation dominance in small towns.

Kefauver exposes fallacies and fantasies in the American system of "free" enterprise. With regard to the drug industry he points out the irrelevance of ordinary measures of competition, in that the true buyer of the commodity—the doctor—does not have to pay for it; and as to the necessity for patents, he observes that in Germany and Switzerland, historically the leaders in drug research, product patents on drugs have never been permitted, and that in any event research costs are a very small item in the industry's price structure. He points also to the conclusive evidence which shows that auto style changing is not dictated by consumers but thrust upon them; and he puts indelibly on the public record Roger Blough's interesting notion that a competitive price is one which is the same as a competitors' prices. In sum, his topic is the social and economic costs of concentration in American industry, and the usually fraudulent defenses offered in favor of those who generate the costs.

Concentration is also Paul Goodman's topic in his *People and Personnel*, but in a different way—and the difference is instructive about styles of political criticism. Where Kefauver is, like a traditional muckraker, concerned with the costs of concentration, Goodman, like a traditional utopian,

is concerned with the costs of concentration as a general *method for organizing social life*.

Ultimately Goodman's concern is more useful. One always has trouble trying to explain that a local government or private bureaucracy may be just as offensive in its impersonality as "The Government in Washington." I think one would also have had trouble explaining this to Kefauver, but not to Goodman, who has his finger closer to the real pulse of society. The enemy he sees is unnecessary routinization and over-organization in any setting, be it that of the federal government, corporations, mass communications, large universities and small colleges, the New York City Board of Education, the organization of scientific research, or the Broadway theatre. And he has a genius for discovering functional equivalents of top-heavy organizations in smaller-scale groups that are doing the same kind of work, no less effectively, with less fiscal waste and throttling of innovation, and without contemptuously treating individuals as interchangeable units. To the Organization Liberal who insists that the Peace Corps has to be run on bureaucratic lines, Goodman politely replies that the American Friends Service Committee does the same things at *one-fourth* the cost.

Though often exaggerated and sometimes absurd, Goodman's ideas are hardly ever irrelevant; and surprisingly often the alternative mode of performance he points to—decentralized TV, or public education—seems absolutely easy to put into practice . . . if only . . .

It is the "if only" that is crucial, of course, both for Goodman and Kefauver. The liberal muckraker and the

quasi-syndicalist utopian reject Government as the major agency of social reform (though both appreciate some of its uses, and Kefauver is proud of his Drug Control Bill). What they offer instead is in each case problematical.

Kefauver has been criticized by New Deal liberals and socialists as naive in his fondness for smallness and free competition. At first glance one cannot help but feel critical, but if one reads him more carefully his point becomes clear: "... a government pledged to free-competitive enterprise, harbors within itself a great variety of structures and programs which grant immunities or extend disproportionate privileges to special classes or groups. . . . The roster . . . is long (of) . . . protective tariffs . . . import quotas and export subsidies . . . a patent system originated in the eighteenth century . . . marketing controls and powers exercised by (numerous government agencies) in their respective fields of technology . . . bureaucratic control over the awarding of many and massive government contracts;" and, as Fritz Machlup adds, "'corporation laws, franchises and licensing laws . . . (and) tax law'" conduce to the same end.

In short, concentration is not a natural growth but has been fostered by government itself. This argument is certainly a sophisticated one, much more so than Kefauver's critics have allowed. Yet in the end it is unsatisfactory. While explaining much about monopoly, it explains little about the genesis of *oligopoly* and less about its future prospects (for which prohibitive costs of entry in many fields will be the dominant fact). For as Goodman recognizes and Kefauver seems not to,

while people are never interchangeable some goods are, or at least it is sensible to treat them as though they are. And in such cases centralization is easily explicable and may even be desirable. Not only are economies of scale in production occasionally real, but economies of scale in control, and thus in the placing of responsibility, are often essential.

And yet . . . if Kefauver could have rephrased his argument by adding some realistic sociology, he could still have made a forceful point. For what he could have said—what Goodman would surely say—is that in a society dominated by corporations and large interest groups, and in which individuals and functional groups are most often powerless, New Dealism is prone merely to make the same old patterns of undemocratic social control more "rational" and efficient. Regulation and control may be fine ideas in theory, but in practice they usually add up to hidden subsidy and devolution of public roles to private persons; when Daniel Bell and Talcott Parsons criticized Mills by saying that we have a Welfare State, not a Power Elite, he could have replied correctly that they were talking about the same thing he was, only sugar-coated.

The fundamental point is made by Goodman, when he emphasizes, as have others before him, the sense of individual powerlessness that has come to characterize American society. (Whether the "people" *ever* had power is another question, which could be discussed along with his quaint notions of the medieval University). The only way to make any kind of control democratic, whether its locus be in the central government or the local school

board, is to recreate in individuals the Aristotelian capacity for self-government. Community action, neighborhood organization, civil disobedience—the development of new modes of organizational activity rather than of new loci of industrial production—are thus the key to unlock democracy's barred doors.

And thus we return, at last, to our original "if only..." Utopia is still, sadly, utopian. True, the new context which Goodman predicts will be brought about by massive automation may change that—though certainly not without an end to the cold war and a solution to the population problem. The flowering of the individual and the community may replace the maintenance of "civilization" as the most approved social end. But so far, Civilization has proven remarkably resistant to Eros.

Of course Goodman, unlike traditional pastoral liberals, is a revolutionary. But at the present moment I can see only one feasible approach to a revolution against the over-routinized division of labor in politics and culture: the pressuring into collapse of almost all our existing forms of social and political legitimization. But that prospect is not very attractive, for who would pick up the pieces? Until we can find some room for optimism on that score, we cannot climb out of the over-organized rut we are in. Still we learn more from those who, like Ke-fauver and Goodman, keep reminding

us of the costs of our present way of doing things, than we do from those who think that if we can only invent a few more government agencies everything will be wonderful.

PHILIP GREEN

In Honor of Two Friends

DISSENT Magazine has lost two friends. On June 20th, Carola Epstein-Weingarten died, and the organizations to which she had given her life gave her a moving send-off in the Community Church in New York. She had come from Germany via Paris and Morocco, as a refugee from Hitler. She had done some work for the International Labor Organization, notably for its Committee on Forced Labor, and was a secretary of the League for Mutual Aid. But she was best known to the many whose causes she tirelessly took up and to those with whom she worked together in defense of others. From 1948 to 1963 she was administrative secretary of the Workers Defense League, and she will be remembered in the labor movement of the three countries where she had fulfilled her rich 60 years.

Carl Heidenreich, likewise a refugee from Germany, struggled in a New York slum as a painter without recognition for many years. Ironically, it was only in the end, when the deadly disease already had taken hold of him, that he found fame and honor in his old country. Two retrospectives in Frankfurt were a spectacular success, and the Whitney Museum also acquired one of his later works. The obituaries on both continents, though full of praise, left out a small item: Carl Heidenreich, a quiet man who had no enemies, was a veteran of the Spanish civil war, where he served with the POUM column, and a graduate of the Stalinist prison.

LETTERS

"New Styles"

EDITOR:

Irving Howe's "New Styles in 'Leftism'" [DISSENT, Summer 1965] calls for critical comment. For two decades this sort of defensive anti-communism has undermined the American left, which should not be encumbered by such comparative side-issues. Now, bypassed by new radicals who understandably want none of this merchandise, Mr. Howe dons the proprietary mantle of statesman of the left, to warn against seduction by the far left. "Thereby they would cut off the resurgent American radicalism from what it is, or should be..." (p. 316). Rather ironic, is this not? Does Mr. Howe believe that his group has had anything to do with the fact that radicalism is resurgent?

The attack of this article reminds me of the campaign waged by the right-wing against "Keynesian" economics—diffuse, uncoordinated, embellished by every diverse scrap that can be unearthed. The key to this, I think, is Mr. Howe's apparent incapacity for understanding the trend and impact of events any larger in dimension than the national boundaries of the USA. Characteristically, the over-arching questions of our century to which a wide variety of American radicals now address themselves—revolution, nationalism, the decline of colonialism (*not* the "decline of the west"), the clamor for above-subsistence economic progress—are treated here only so far as they can be fitted into the equation of political shiftings internal to the US. (Those "generational clashes recurrent in our society," and so forth.) If this is to be the point of departure for rebuilding the left, that left will remain condemned to formulating policy within the limits of American standards of judgment. It is at least questionable to many radicals how relevant those standards now are.

The dilemma is that much of the democratic left has been unable to admit that its own fate is bound up with the role of the US "in the world arena." Its beliefs have comprised three general streams.

(1) The hope that basic domestic reform will ultimately have to bring about change in foreign policy. (2) The idea that US foreign policy since FDR has been fundamentally sound in assumption and sincere in aim. (3) The fear that anything less than a full-throated anti-communist foreign policy stance would play into the hands of McCarthyism. Of course these three streams are not fully compatible (nos. 1 and 2 in particular clash), but within some or all three can usually be found the position of Mr. Howe. Yet only (1) has any real merit, and even that one is subject to doubt. Can we afford to wait for structural reform (a dubious prospect at best) to work its change on US foreign policy before the Pentagon and our "liberal" leaders make a nuclear shambles of our planet? I am afraid that the "far left" understands this better than Mr. Howe, even though its blanket salvos against "US imperialism" may often surpass the limits of logic and fact.

It seems that once he gets around to it, Mr. Howe views US foreign policy as more or less viable, but, for some unexplained reason, directed by otherwise sensible men who frequently happen to stray into error. Michael Walzer's comment (DISSENT, Spring 1965) on Howe's thoughts on Viet Nam nail down this point with a precision needing no elaboration: "perhaps it is time we granted the intelligence of the men in Washington and began to argue about their purposes." Another example of the Howe approach is displayed in DISSENT (Summer 1965, p. 363) by Jean Bloch-Michel. M. Bloch-Michel castigates the communists for opposing Gaston Defferre "who believes in NATO." What if one agrees with Mr. Walzer, and with the communists in the above case? Is he dogmatic, conspiratorially-minded, or in "open or covert support of communist powers"? Or does one have the valid right to believe that a pathological and war-oriented foreign policy is the major problem with which the American left must deal?

RICHARD B. DU BOFF

IRVING HOWE *replies*:

Well, yes, I think "my" group has had something to do with whatever resurgence

there is of radicalism. I think Bayard Rustin has something to do with the Negro movement, Michael Harrington with the anti-poverty issue, Norman Thomas with the peace struggle, and even, I might add, *DISSENT* itself with the struggle for democratic radicalism in an intellectual community which over the past decade had all but given up the posture of social criticism.

Mr. Du Boff does not like "defensive anti-communism." Very well. But he does not have the candor, or clarity, to tell us whether he prefers *another* or non-"defensive" kind of anti-communism, or perhaps indifference to communism, or support of it. Many points of view are arguable, but in the present world to say that the question of communism or opposition to it is a "relative side-issue" seems to me so unrealistic, so downright silly that I cannot help thinking that Mr. Du Boff is really being disingenuous.

Talking About the Left

Editors:

Much of the recent discussion about the New Left has been unclear as to why a particular group should be considered on the left and precisely in terms of what it may be said that one group is to the left of another. Does the fact that a group or movement is dissenting from mainstream American politics qualify it for inclusion on the left? By this criterion Young Americans for Freedom and the John Birch Society might be put on the left. Or should integrationist groups which do not advocate a particular social-political philosophy be put on the left? A closely related problem is to determine in terms of what one group or movement is said to be to the left of another. Why, for example, should the Communist party be put to the left of socialists and Stalinists to the left of the Communist party, as is done in *Newsweek*, May 24, 1965? Or what does a phrase like "far left" mean, as it is used, for example, in the following statement by Irving Howe in the Summer *DISSENT*? "On the far left remain a scatter of groups still convinced that Marxism-Leninism, in one or another version, is 'correct.'"

As regards the first question—what groups should be included on the left?—I would make a rather old-hat formulation by way of an answer. I assume that an essential qualification for inclusion on the left would be the rejection of capitalism—or, at the very least, its significant reformation—and the vision of classless society that would follow the abolition or reformation of capitalism. Concerning the second question—in terms of what is it accurate to say that one group is to the left of another?—I would suggest the scrapping altogether of the left-right spectrum and an attempt rather to distinguish three broad traditions on the left—the totalitarian left, the democratic left, and the libertarian left. Very briefly, the totalitarian left would include the Communist party and its various offshoots (the Progressive Labor party, the Socialist Workers party, and so on); the democratic left would include, primarily, democratic socialists; and the libertarian left would include anarchists (who disavow not only capitalism but the state as well) and syndicalists. . .

JAMES MISSEY

Malcolm X

Editors:

Irving Howe seeks, in the Summer 1965 *DISSENT*, to add to the legend of Malcolm X as "cop-out," which was fabricated (by Bayard Rustin, among others) because Malcolm was advocating and searching for methods not acceptable to the leaders of the traditional civil rights organizations. Howe says that he heard Malcolm declare at a meeting (Militant Labor Forum, January 7, 1965) "that he would go, not unarmed, to Mississippi, if the Negroes there would ask him to come: a condition that could only leave him safely North, since the last thing the Negroes of Mississippi needed or wanted was Malcolm's military aid."

It so happens that the meeting Howe attended was recorded on tape. I have listened to the entire tape, including the lengthy question-and-answer period, and can state flatly that Malcolm made no such statement. The closest he came to anything like it was the remark, in his talk, "if we . . . go to Mississippi, or any

place else, to help our people get registered to vote, we intend to go prepared" (to resist violence). Nothing about "if" invited. Then, in the question period, he said, "I'm going down to Mississippi myself, I've been invited to go on down there, and Alabama and some of those other places, and you know—I just don't see nonviolence." Again, no "if" invited.

Four weeks later, early in February, Malcolm did go to Alabama. He spoke at a rally in Tuskegee, and then at another in Selma, where Rev. King was then in jail. He was also scheduled to speak at a Freedom Democratic Party rally in Jackson, Mississippi, on the weekend in February when he was assassinated.

Maybe self-defense of the type Malcolm advocated was the last thing Southern Negroes "needed or wanted," but the *Herald Tribune* report of Malcolm's speech in Selma said it "clearly disturbed the people running the registration drive. . . . The young people cheered (Malcolm) repeatedly, and for hours afterward other speakers tried to simmer off the steam that Malcolm had generated." And the spread of the Deacons for Defense and Justice into Mississippi indicates that Howe is not speaking for all Mississippi Negroes.

Also available is a tape recording of the full meeting during the Christmas holidays when Malcolm spoke to a delegation of young people from McComb, Miss., which was discussed by Jeremy Lerner in the Spring 1965 *DISSENT*. Having listened to this tape too, I find Lerner's report of the meeting marred by a number of distortions.

Malcolm did NOT say that members of his group were being trained and organized to retaliate against racist violence "if we go into Mississippi . . . if you ask us to come . . ." Instead, after explaining the need for self-defense against racist violence, he said, "And if you don't have enough of them down there to do it, we'll come down there and help you do it." And later, "If you don't feel you're qualified to do it, we have some brothers who will slip in, as I said earlier, and help train you and show you how to equip yourself and let you know how to

deal with the man who deals with you."

Lerner says that Malcolm informed the youth "with special awe" that "Zanzibar has a *real* strong man," and that much of what Malcolm offered was contained in his "incantation" of the phrase "a *real* strong man." But Malcolm did not incant any such phrase; in fact, he never used it once, in any way, throughout the talk and discussion period. Either Lerner invented this or it is an example of the power of prejudice to make one hear what one would like to hear.

It is important for Malcolm's ideas and tendency to be debated, and it is to be expected that Howe, Lerner, Rustin and his other political opponents will attack him. Is it asking too much for care to be exercised with facts and quotations?

GEORGE BREITMAN

JEREMY LARNER *replies*:

At his meeting with the kids from McComb, Malcolm X offered no specific political program for the civil rights movement in Mississippi. He hinted that he did have a program, but that to announce it publicly would be to reveal plans to "the enemy." His offer to send "brothers" to the South seemed highly conditional on Southern support which he did not expect to be immediately forthcoming. I am absolutely certain that Malcolm did describe Babu of Zanzibar as "a *real* strong man." Perhaps the tape recorder was off at that moment. At any rate, this reporter was present on at least one other occasion when Malcolm expressed his admiration for Nkrumah, Nasser, and Babu in pretty much the same terms.

IRVING HOWE *replies*:

Knowing Mr. Breitman to be an honest man and not having had the opportunity to listen to the tape of Malcolm's speech, I am prepared to accept his correction. Does it make any difference?

Very well: Malcolm preached contempt for the Negro movement's nonviolence regardless of whether he was invited to Mississippi or not. But even as he charged up his listeners with talk about violence, he had no programmatic content, good or bad, to offer them. To describe his

politics as cop-out is not to reflect on his personal courage but to note that his "militant" verbiage led to nothing—at the very moment that the Negro people, under the banner of nonviolence, were conducting mass struggles of unprecedented strength and magnificence. Nor will it do to invoke the Deacons. For that group, whatever judgment one may make of its methods, is involved with, part of the Civil Rights Movement; it works together with CORE; it does not, as Malcolm did, talk violence and practice abstentionism. As for Trotskyists like Mr. Breitman who have seized upon Malcolm as the authentic "revolutionary" Negro leader, this is an instance of ideological desperation (the search for a substitute proletariat) pushed to absurdity.

On LeRoi Jones

Editors:

Before LeRoi Jones was ever branded a "pop-art guerrilla warrior" shooting off his mouth in "orgies of verbal violence" (Irving Howe, *DISSENT*, Summer '65) or denounced as a careerist and faker (Stanley Kauffmann, *DISSENT*, Spring '65); before George Dennison had accused him of "demagogy" (*Commentary*, February, '65) and even before Robert Brustein had called Jones's *The Slave* and *The Toilet* "two karate blows" "inspired primarily by race hatred" (*New Republic*, January 23, '65)—much before all of this vituperation smashed down upon him, the worst enemy of LeRoi Jones, the serious poet and playwright, was LeRoi Jones, the prophet of worldwide Watts.

But in their praiseworthy eagerness to promote racial brotherhood, the critics have mistakenly attributed aesthetic significance to Jones's politics of beat *négritude*. Hence they politicized his dramaturgy, falling into huge and hopeless irrelevance in the process. Approached in their own terms, I believe, his plays admit of no such interpretation. What they do reveal, when placed alongside his remarks, is either a man torn in two, or a man who wears a mask. Once again, art and life have refused to contaminate each other.

Perhaps the career of Walker Vessels

(protagonist and synonym of *The Slave*) best exhibits Jones's own temptation and realized danger. A former poet who enslaves himself as leader of the revolutionary "Negro liberation movement," Walker Vessels is defeated and—since the play is circular—reemerges in the Prologue as "an old field slave" regretting that we "stone possible lovers with heavy words we think are ideas..." Earlier he has conceded: "...I have killed for all times any creative impulse I will ever have by the depravity of my murderous philosophies." And that these philosophies are, in fact, repeatedly and cogently refuted in the play itself ought to be too obvious to deserve mention, were it not for the critics, who, like Dennison, perversely mishear the overriding *metaphor* of racial warfare as an invitation to chaos. "Demagogy" means, in this context, taking the excited reaction of the audience for the textually defined intent of the author...

Albee's *The Zoo Story* appears to be the model for Jones's *Dutchman*. But in saying this, I of course in no way wish to deprecate the latter's achievement. For an American Negro like Clay, to break through noncommunicative apartheid, to expose his full *négritude*, involves a fatal risk. It involves "losing his cool." ("In a world that is basically irrational, the most legitimate relationship to it is nonparticipation"—Jones, *Blues People*.) Adroitly, Jones works out the fatality. Lula, Clay's subway murderess, is no insane whore, and least of all a White Devil; rather she is a White Negro (*pace* Mailer) who harasses Clay to "break out" ("...You're just a dirty white man") and then discovers from Clay's outburst that his necessary restraint makes her "liberation" puny; and, more seriously, she discovers that her knowledge of the Negro was merely pseudo-knowledge. Clay tells her: "You don't know anything except what's there for you to see. . . . And I sit here, in this buttoned-up suit, to keep myself from cutting all your throats." Lula finally kills to protect her ignorance. The American Negro, almost like his South African counterpart, must stay "buttoned-up"—or kill—or die.

In *The Toilet*, an exciting fragment, rather than a well-made play, a white adolescent homosexual is severely beaten in a high school latrine; he is ultimately comforted by his would-be black lover. Justifiable obscenity and violence do occur, but no scatology, in what I think is Jones's racial *purgatorio*; Aristotelian catharsis in the john. (Cf. His soon to be published novel: *The System of Dante's Hell* (Grove).) Pity and fear are both present but the episode tends toward *con-media*, after the purgation of racial aggression in a theater of ritualized defecation.

The critics have not understood that the political Jones has little or nothing to do with his literary alter-ego. By trying to mix theater and advocacy, the critics have succeeded only in causing confusion.

MARVIN GARY DICKSON

Editors:

Stanley Kauffman, in his putdown of Le Roi Jones, comes off the picket line of reviewing hundreds of bad Hollywood films in recent years; thus he treats Jones like a bad Hollywood movie—complains about the script, doesn't like the melodramatics, finds the score too high-pitched and frenetic; and so he's caught in the game of tilting at facades, because he cannot see substance. (Isn't that the usual way with Kauffman and others, in the Hollywood reviewing dodge?) The ofay part is that Kauffman looks good *in print*, when in fact he hasn't even begun to see his subject.

SIDNEY BERNARD

Facing Jail

Editors:

The three students who were indicted at Indiana University in May, 1963, for their ideas and activities as socialists on the campus, are still facing from one to three years in prison for their political ideas. These three young men were officers of the campus-recognized chapter of the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA), and the prosecutor has stated publicly that his prosecution, under the Indiana Anti-Communist Act, is an attempt to remove the YSA from the campus.

Reversing an earlier decision by a

Bloomington, Indiana judge, the Indiana Supreme Court, in a 3-1 decision early this year, declared the law under which the students are indicted to be constitutional. The defendants are appealing this decision through the federal courts.

The issues raised by the Indiana Supreme Court decision make this one of the most important civil liberties cases. Academic freedom and freedom of speech and assembly on the campus have been challenged. The use of state sedition laws to prosecute individuals for their political opinions has been sanctioned.

Your help is needed to fight this encroachment on civil liberties. Send a contribution to: Committee to Aid the Bloomington Students, Box 213, Cooper Station, New York, New York 10003.

JOYCE DEGROOT

Berkeley Appeal

Editors:

The Berkeley defendants are in serious trouble. The judge, in his attempt to demoralize us and to dissuade us from appealing his decision, has set our bail at \$440,000. In order to appeal, ten per cent of this amount must be raised to cover the bondsman's non-refundable premium. Some students are already in jail, and if we cannot raise at least the \$44,000, then most of the remaining 750 defendants will have to go to jail until the money can be raised. In addition, since we anticipate that the appeal might fail, we are faced with the problem of raising an additional \$200,000 for our fines.

The press, which aided our movement so strongly by bringing our cause before the entire nation has lost interest in our case. Without this publicity, we have been unable to make an effective appeal for funds.

Perhaps the most serious consequence of this isolation is that it threatens our solidarity. We went into Sproul Hall as a group. We are now being differentiated on the basis of our ability to pay. The admission price to Sproul Hall was not money but conscience, and we must not allow those who cannot pay to be jailed for their commitment.

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IRVING HOWE

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